Mental imagery/memory/mind versus eyes/brain/body within the “epistemologically different worlds” (EDWs) perspective

(September 7^th, 2024)

In this short paper, I will furnish more details about the “mental imagery”/memory/mind-EW in correspondence to the eyes/brain/body (the macro-EW) and “light” (the field-EW and the corresponding micro-EW) within the EDWs perspective.

From my EDWs perspective, the mind is an EW while the brain/body is an entity within the macro-EW. One EW is not for any EDW. Mental imagery is when a person recall from memory a “green car”, for instance. What is the format of such mental representations? As I have written in my previous works, I indicated that any mental representation is the mind/self/life, an immaterial EW. The brain/body is a material entity within the macro-EW. In order a person to see a green car in motion (or in rest), it is necessary the presence of light. Within my perspective, we know that light (wave or particles) does not exist for the car; the waves (the field-EW) interact with the electromagnetic waves which correspond to the macro-car (the macro-EW), the photons (the micro-EW) interact with the microparticles which correspond to the car. Because of the light, indirectly, the human being perceives the green car. The green color does not exist, the car has no colors; the green color is not in the brain, it is not given by the neuronal and chemical reactions within the brain. The green color is in the mind. Light interacts neither with the eyes, nor with the brain. There is no light inside the brain. Therefore, there is no mental imagery in the brain! There are certain neuronal and chemical reactions in the brain, but there are no mental representations in the brain. Any mental representation (mental imagery, propositional representations, etc.) are the mind. It does not mean there is light in the mind since the mind is immaterial entity, there is no light there. Then who a person can perceive a green car? In a garage, for instance, without light at all, that person could not see the green car. In her mental perception, there is only “dark” perception, i.e., the person can see nothing. Then, it what sense the light is necessary for visual mental representations? From my EDWs perspective, the necessity of light for perceiving the green car is indirectly since light exists neither for the eyes, nor for the mind. It mean, light (both waves and photons, i.e., two EDWs) are indirectly necessary for human being to perceive that green car.

The perceptual representation of that green car is the mind, an immaterial EW. It means that perceptual mental representation is something immaterial. The same statement is true for any mental imagery. When a human being recall a green car, that mental representation is an immaterial representation. Because in my memory there is no “light”, it means the mental imagery of that green car is not a visual representation.[1] Then what kind of mental representation is a mental imagery. Since the memory has to be involved in recalling any mental imagery, for instance, that green car, when we talk about a mental imagery in fact we refer to the entire mind/self/life. However, the mind is immaterial, therefore any mental imagery has to be also immaterial but without the corresponding features (no light, no colors, no extensions) of any visual perceptual representations. Any visual perceptual representation is immaterial but there are certain correspondences with ED entities, processes which belong to certain EDWs. Again, a visual perceptual representation of a green car is immaterial but it involves indirectly, through correspondences, light, extensions, etc. The green color is the mind but without the corresponding light and macro-extensions of that car, there would be no visual perceptual image/representation of that green car. When we recall this visual perceptual representation from memory (mental imagery), there is no color and representation of extension since there is no corresponding light. Any mental imagery is the self but it is not neither an image (perceptual, imagery, etc.), nor propositional. Any mental imagery corresponds to certain parts (not all) of the brain that are involved in the corresponding visual perceptual representation. Moreover, the eyes are not involved in any mental imagery. Many human beings have the illusion of a visual perceptual representation in recalling a green car, but from my viewpoint, there is no visual perceptual representation (since there is no corresponding light, extension, etc.). Any mental imagery is not an “image” since any mental image is a visual perceptual representation which involves the corresponding eyes, brain, body, light, extensions, etc. When you recall a green car, that mental imagery has no colors and extensions (dimensions): you do not “see” green color (as you perceive, indirectly through correspondence, a real car on the street), you do not “see” the dimensions of that car. You recall a green car and someone asks you “how big is that car”, your answer would be: “I have not thought about this”.

I strongly emphasize here that, in reality, you have the illusion of having an image of a green car in your memory because of the habituation of the visual perceiving (green or red) cars! Because of such habituation, the mind has the illusion of a visual mental representation when it recalls an “image” of a green car. That imagery representation is neither an image (there is no light!), nor a proposition (certain concepts/worlds involved); it is just the self without any correspondences to the macro-EW, the micro-EW or the field-EW. Such correspondences are involved only in a visual perceptual representation. So, any imagery representation is  not only part of your memory, the entire memory is involved and also your “entire” immaterial self is involved something without any correspondences.

I ask the reader to close her eyes/ears. What is your visual and auditory perception in that moment[2]? Nothing, everything is totally dark (no “light”, i.e., no macro-objects made visible, indirectly, by light), there is no sound. You have the “internal” feeling of self (supposing you do not have any “external” feeling given by the tactile sense). It is quite impossible to suspend all the senses, but we can image such state: it is the mind-EW. When you recall the “image” of a green car, that the mental imagery is immaterial and it is “part” of the mind-EW. However, because the mind is an immaterial EW, there are no parts-whole relationship (see my previous works), so it is better to say: any mental imagery is the mind/self-EW. The mental imagery of a green car is the mind-EW, it is the entire implicit knowledge and the explicit (the expression of “green car”) knowledge. The implicit knowledge is the mind-EW/self exactly because, being immaterial, the mind has no parts. Anyway, the explicit knowledge is part of the implicit knowledge which it is the mind/self. However, the self/mind/life is not the implicit knowledge; on the contrary, the implicit knowledge is the mind/self who has the “personal identity” during its entire life but it is meaningless to talk about personal identity referring to the implicit knowledge which it has been changing the entire life of each person. (see my previous works)

Conclusion: When you recall an “image of a green car”, there is neither an image, nor a particular propositional content; in reality, within the EDWs perspective, that mental “imagery representation” of a “green car” is the immaterial self/mind-EW. The mind-EW corresponds to:

– the macro-EW

– the micro-EW

– the field-EW.

In this sense, entanglement between two particles (for instance) and “consciousness” do not even exist; these processes correspond to the continuity of the electromagnetic field, but these correspondences (any correspondence within the EDWs perspective) do not have any ontological background.

[1] We recall, many researchers in cognitive science and philosophy of mind believed, in the past, that the format of a mental imagery is a visual presentation. There were totally wrong. Neither Fodor was right with his propositional representation for mental imagery.

[2] Together, visual and auditory perceptions involve the binding problem and the crossmodal interactions. About these topics, see my previous works.