Some pseudo-conceptual dichotomies in the history of human thinking

“As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain;
and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality.”
(Einstein)

“Physics is to math what sex is to masturbation.”
(Feynman )[1]

In this work, I will argue that most of dichotomies like being-becoming, sameness-otherness, function-substance, self/mind-world, God-world, nothing-world, mind-world, Theseus’s paradox, innate-acquired knowledge/ideas/concepts, etc., have been the great pseudo-dichotomies and pseudo-problems realized by some human minds within the wrong framework, the “universe”/world or, as I called, the “unicorn world” during the entire history of “human knowledge”.[2] Not even the dichotomy “mind-world” is true since the “world” does not even exist. The mind is an EW and this EW (like any EW or certain ED entities from the micro-EW or the macro-EW, for instance) is “for itself” and “in-itself”, therefore, it is meaningless to consider any relationship between the mind and the world or the “external environment”.[3] More exactly, there is an external environment (the macro-EW) only for the brain/body (a macro-entity within the macro-EW), but the mind does not exist even for the corresponding body. Any EW exists/is in itself and for itself; any EW does not exist/is for any EDW. Showing that all these dichotomies have been just pseudo-notions which have created the greatest debates in the history of human thinking (all particular sciences and philosophy), I indicate that the EDWs perspective is only the correct and the largest framework of thinking in our days (and, probabilistically speaking, for the next 200 years). With my EDWs perspective, I have demolished all the great scientific theories from mainly particular science (physics, cognitive neuroscience, biology) and all the philosophical approaches. During this work, I will investigate these pseudo-dichotomies in relationships with other philosophical or scientific notions/theories under the EDWs perspective.[4] Some of these dichotomies will be investigated in relationship to Friedman’s two articles (2009 and 2012), i.e., the relationships between mathematics, physical theories and the “truth”. So, in this work, I will investigate certain well-known distinctions (God-world, nothing-world, mind-world, online-offline, whole-parts, a priori-a posteriori) related to other topics/concepts/theories/approaches from philosophy (of science) and physics. We will see in this work that many concepts and ideas are strong related just because these notions/ideas have been constructed within the same wrong paradigm of thinking. I will try to illustrate unseen connections between apparently unrelated concepts, ideas, scientific theories, and philosophical approaches. Working within the same wrong framework, the “universe”/“world”, inevitable all the great philosophers and the scientists have been realized very similar mistakes.

God-world
Religion has always been the main tool for manipulating limited people and even quite smart people who have been afraid by the death. Together with army, police and mainly SS (recall the “medieval Inquisition” or Ceausescu’ security or KGB or CIA), the priests have always been a very important tool for “governments/Parliaments” (even during Ceausescu’s most dictatorial system in Europe) to manipulated the masses (in general, quite limited people). However, God was introduced in many of the most important philosophical approaches in the history of philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Newton, Leibniz, and many others. In the 19th century, God died.[5] In my previous works, I have proved, for the first time in the history of human thinking, “God could not even exist” (see my article free at my webpage). Therefore, all types of religions/churches have been created for manipulating the masses in all the countries on this Earth since the beginning of any religion. Since Ancient period until last century, “mathematics” has been related to religion for many great thinkers (Plato, Newton, etc.). In the 20th century, the scientists gave up to “God” in their works, but the “role of God” had been replaced by “mathematics”. (see below) Not surprisingly, the superstring theory has replaced God in physics (!); in this way, certain mathematical statements had become mythical statements in last century until I discovered (2002) the beings of the EDWs.

Nothing-world
In the 20th century, no scientist could insert God in his scientific theory, no philosopher could insert God in his philosophical approach. After God was killed by Newton (who unified those two “worlds”, the “celestial world” of God and the “world on Earth”, the common world for humans/bastards), Nietzsche just shouted (he did not “killed” God): “God is dead, we have killed him.”[6] In sciences (mainly in physics regarding the “origin of Universe”), “God” (being killed by Newton’s laws) has been replaced by “nothing”. However, Newton believed in God (related to his “absolute space” and “absolute time”[7]). After the appearance of Newton’s laws (the “gravitational force” being unexplained by his theory), mainly since the 19th century, God has been replaced with “nothing” at least in physics until these days. To the question: “From where everything did appear?” the answer has been: “Everything appears from nothing”. This has been the classical answer given by the majority of contemporary physicists. However, this statement is the most ontological contradictory one in relationship to Parmenides’ ontological principle: “Nothing can appear from nothing”. From my viewpoint, Parmenides was perfectly right, his principle has always been very correct statement. If everything has appeared from nothing, there would be a very strong ontological contradiction since “nothing” has no ontology, “everything” has certain ED ontologies. Regarding the origin of “our universe”, there have been three alternatives: God, infinite, nothing. Since God died and infinite (in space and time) could not even exist (see Aristotle), “nothing” has remained the only solution for this problem. However, the framework of thinking for the majority of physicists during the last 100 years have contradicted this principle: “Before the existence of the Universe (one or more, i.e., “multiverse”), it was inevitable nothing”. In our days, a scientist could not insert God into his equation; otherwise, his colleagues would send him to church.

With my EDWs perspective, I have solved the dichotomy “nothing-world” through my EDWs perspective in my works 2008, 2016, and mainly 2023. The EW0 has always been the hypernothing, i.e., this EW has no ontology, but a hyperontology, the “ontology of nothing” which corresponds to the ED ontologies. The essential point is that, together, these ED ontologies represent “nothing”. That is, from the viewpoint of nothing (no ontology), these EDWs do not even exist. Therefore, for nothing, “nothing has appeared”! There have been many EDWs (EW1a-n) which have appeared only in certain correspondences (no ontology) to the EW0 (nothing). These EW1a-n appeared not from “nothing” (we have to preserve the above Parmenides’ principle); each of these EDWs appeared in itself and for itself and it does not exist for the EW0 or for any EDW. In this way, I have eliminated that strong ontological contradiction according to which “everything has appeared from nothing”. So my alternative is not against Parmenides’ principle since I have introduced the correspondences (no ontology) between the EW0 and the EW1a-n. (for more details, see my previous works) In the next part of this work, let me investigate those pseudo-notions mentioned above.

Mind-world
This work refers mainly to this dichotomy. The self-world dichotomy has been one of the most important distinction in the history of philosophy. This relationship had been important for Plato and Aristotle, for the rationalists (Descartes and Leibniz) and the empiricists (Locke and Hume). However, Kant’s transcendental philosophy goes beyond the rationalism-empiricism debate (this is the main reason Kant has been one of the most important philosophers in history). For his transcendental philosophy, Kant needs to introduce “thing-in-itself”. He replaced the “world” with the “thing-in-itself”, but the noumena-phenomena distinction is related to Plato’s distinction between the “Ideas” (real entities) and the objects (appearances). Aristotle rejects this “theological” distinction (a real great problem unsolved by Plato, anyway!), i.e., he rejects the Ideas and the “participations” of objects/appearances to the Ideas. Under the same umbrella of thinking, Descartes (rationalist) had another great problem: the “interaction” between two ontological different substances, the immaterial mind and the material brain/body placed in material world (the external world). He could not solve this problem. Another problem for Descartes was the “I”/self: “I think, therefore I exists.” But he did not define precisely the “I”/self. He indicates some of the self’s properties (thinking, having perceptual images) but the problem was that the “I” needed to be related to the mind (immaterial) and the body (material). For Descartes, the self/I “has” a mind and a body; the self is not only the mind, the self needs to include the body, otherwise, there would not be the self, but mostly the human mind. Descartes did not solve the interaction between two ontological different substances, the mind and the body, therefore, he could not furnished a correct definition for the self. I have solved this problem indicating that the mind and the body are not “ontological different substances” but are related to the EDWs (in my approach, the distinction between the immaterial and material substances is meaningless, not because these substances do not exist; these substances really exist, but there are ED substances, i.e., one does not exist for the other. Moreover, for me, the self is the mind, life is the mind. Otherwise, if mind is somehow different than life, there would be another great pseudo-problem: the pseudo-relationship relationship mind-life or mind-organism.

Trying to be somewhere beyond the rationalism-empiricism debates, Kant needs to introduce the “thing-in-itself”. He explains only the “functions” of human mind, i.e., how a human being constructs an images/scenes of an external world. Newton did not have a definition for “gravity”, and Hume introduced his skepticism regarding causality. Being awaked from the a “dogmatic sleep” by Hume, Kant wanted to furnish a new ontology for Newton’s theory of physics (which refers to the external world). In fact, Kant’s transcendental idealism moves our “image of the external world” inside the human mind, but it preserves the “external world” as “thing-in-itself”. Not accidentally, few decades after Kant, Berkeley (priest-philosopher) introduced his “absolute idealism” in the philosophical market. The philosophers can ask how a real priest had been able to preserve his name in the history of philosophy. From my viewpoint, Berkeley’s movement is amazing: in order to avoid the ontological dichotomy referring “subject-world” or “immaterial-material” or “spirit-external world”, he eliminates “world” or “material world” and identifies the immaterial mind/self with God. In this way, Berkeley reaches the “absolute idealism”. In fact, we have here another essential philosophical distinction between the material/physical substance and the immaterial substance which involves the difference between the brain/body and the mind/spirit. In the history of philosophy, when philosophers have investigated mind-brain distinction, they could not have avoided the material-immaterial duality/dichotomy. Only in the second half of 20th century (except Searle’s approach, i.e., the material/physical mind is produced by the material/physical brain), the philosophers had rejected this distinction by accepting the identity theory (the mind is the brain or the mind is the body and external environment for the dynamical system approach). In this way, since 1956 (Place and few years later, Smart), the mind had been eliminated from the mind-body/brain equation (until I have published my article at Synthese in 2005). So, in the second part of the 20th century until 2005, everything had been material/physical for all philosophers, cognitive scientists, and physicists.[8]

In physics, also everything has always been material matter (including the super-string theory). The material substance has always been placed within a “space” or “spacetime”, but very few thinkers have questioned the ontology of spacetime even if many of them have accepted the existence of space and time (spacetime). For rejecting the “material space”, Berkeley needed to reject the material substance. However, space had been relativized by Galilei until 2016 when me and my brother published a book in which we indicated, for the first time in the history of ideas, that the “spacetime” could not have any ontology, that is, we indicate that the conditions of the possibility for the existence of space or spacetime are null. Moreover, I indicated that the existence of spacetime would have create great ontological contradictions. Anyway, my idea has been quite different from the idea that “spacetime does not exist”.[9]

In the first article (2009), Friedman illustrates, as usually very amazing, the relationships between Kant, Helmholtz, Poincaré and Einstein (special and general relativities) regarding their a priori knowledge versus the empirical knowledge in their theories.[10] Obviously, the starting point for principles of a priori knowledge is, for Friedman, Kant’s transcendentalism: “sensibility” with pure intuitions (“Transcendental Aesthetic”) which presupposes the Euclidian space (Euclidian geometry) and “understanding” which includes categories (“Transcendental Analytic”) necessary for Newton’s laws of motions. According to Friedman, these laws of motion are necessary condition (a priori) for the essential force of gravity. I recall that Newton did not furnish a definition for the “gravitational force”. Therefore, Kant wants to give a definition for the “world” as being the phenomenal world (his transcendental idealism) versus the thing-in-itself. In this sense, both the pure intuitions and the pure understanding represent the “transcendental apperception”. The problem for Kant is that these essential notions from his transcendental idealism are just ‘functional” notions without any ontological substrate. More exactly, Kant did not even try to solve the mind-brain/body problem. His “Critique of Pure Reason” is just a “functional analysis” of the pure reason, not of the mind. Kant’s transcendentalism is somehow “absolute”, i.e., these pure intuitions and pure understanding are necessary for the entire human knowledge (not only for the Euclidian geometry and Newton’s physics). Essentially, for Kant, every perceptual image (visual or, more generally, perceptual mental representation) involves his pure intuitions and pure understanding (i.e., the transcendental apperception). Again, even within his transcendental idealism, Kant deals with the empirical intuitions which are based on the pure intuitions. If the pure spatial intuition involves the Euclidean space, then the empirical intuitions are represented by the human mind and these representations involves the spatial form of the Euclidean space. For the human visual perceptions, the pure intuition of space furnishes the Euclidean spatial form for our empirical perceptions. For Kant, the external world has not the Euclidean space since outside is the “thing-in-itself” and we do not have access to this thing-in-itself. I repeat, Kant brought the “external world” inside of the human mind: the “external world” is created by our mind inside the mind. For instance, we can think that a car moves on a street; we can believe the car moves in the Euclidean space. For Kant this “space” is an “internal image of an Euclidean distance” in which the car runs. So, this internal image follows the Euclidean geometry. The pure intuition of space has the pure form of the Euclidean space therefore, any empirical intuition (inside the mind) which presupposes the interaction between the brain/mind[11] and thing-in-itself has an Euclidean space. However, what does the pure intuition of space means? It has no ontology since it cannot even exist as “pure”; I recall, Kant deals with the pure reason from a functionalist view, he has nothing to do with the great ontological problem, the mind-body problem. Then what would it be an empirical intuition? Any perceptual “scene” (the car running on a street) involves this pure intuition of space which has the form of Euclidean space. How do we know? The Euclidean geometry was the only known geometry during Kant’s life. Therefore, the “Euclidean space” needed to be inserted somewhere. Kant inserted this “form” within the “pure reason” as being the “pure intuition of space”. The question which immediately appears is where is it placed a perceptual scene (the car running on the street) which involves an Euclidean space? In the mind. It means, for Kant, that any perceptual scene involves an Euclidean space. From my viewpoint, this would be a wrong statement since spacetime cannot even exist. Is a photo printed on a piece of paper an image having two spatial dimension within an Euclidean space? Not at all: the photo does not really exist, there are some “extended” points of ink/toner on that piece of paper (also an “extended” object, not a “plate” (2D) Euclidean “sheet of paper”). During more than two millenniums, the human beings have had the illusion of the existence of space and time (spacetime).

Let me suppose that the car (moving on that street) “has” the green color. Then, this perceptual scene implies an Euclidean space and a green color. According to Kant, the green of that car does not exist for that car, the car itself does not exist since there is only a thing-in-itself and any human being has no access to the “external world”/thing-in-itself. The green color of that car, the “image/scene” of that car moving on that street, the “Euclidean space”, all these elements are in the mind. Where is the mind? Kant has no idea since his transcendental idealism is a functional view and he avoids the mind-brain problem. Before Kant, there was the great dispute between the rationalists and the empiricists. The rationalists (Descartes and Leibniz, for instance) were dualists, but even the empiricist Locke did not officially rejected the dualism, but only the innate ideas (one of the main ideas of the rationalists). I do not care about innate-acquired knowledge (a totally meaningless distinction), I am interested where is placed the perceptual scene (an image-in-motion) of “the green car moving on a gray street”. This “movie” is a perceptual scene for a normal human mind. Then, where is the mind? Kant did not even ask this question. All the philosophers and the scientists of the second half of 20th century until 2005 had accepted the identity theory: the mind is the brain, that is, the mind does not even exist. In the last 70 years, the great majority of scientists and philosophers have accepted the identity theory. Many people had been aware about a great problem: the scene of the green car moving on a gray street is a perceptual scene, therefore, this perceptual scene has to be somewhere. Everybody has been aware that such perceptual scenes could not be in the brain/body since the brain has no green color (for instance). If the mind does not exist, where these scenes had been placed? Nowhere! Such perceptual scenes had been considered as being linguistic notions, pragmatic or useful notions, illusions, etc.

With my discovery of the EDWs, I indicated, long time ago, that the identity theory had been a totally wrong approach. According to the EDWs, the mind is an EW, the brain/body is an entity within the macro-EW. However, the mind corresponds to the brain/body and its external environment/world. Does the space (it does not matter Euclidean or non-Euclidean) exist in the mind? There are certain perceptual visual representations/scenes. Are these static or in motion representations? Wrong distinction. Moreover, there are no 1D or 2D or 3D or 4D visual representations since the spatiotemporal framework could not have any ontological status. (see Vacariu and Vacariu 2016) The mind is an immaterial EW: it really is, but its ontology is not something physically (like brain/body), that is the mind has no “extension” (Descartes) (anyway, space anyway does not even exist), while the brain/body has “extension”. Extension does not mean the brain is placed within a spacetime framework since spacetime could not even exist. Also, the “green car” and the street have extensions: it means that the car and the street are physical entities/processes/ensembles which have “extensions”. Such extensions do not involves “space” anymore; the “extended car” (any material object is an “extended object”) moves on that “extended street”; the car (in the macro-EW) runs no that street but it moves in “nothing” (no ontology) (not in space/spacetime since space/spacetime could not even exist) which corresponds to an electromagnetic field from the field-EW (for instance). A perceptual movie/scene is part of the mind/self: in one perceptual scene, a human being perceives a green car moving on a street. What is the status of this perceptual movie inside the mind? First of all, the mind has no extension (“space” or “spacetime” does not exist, anyway). However, the brain/body has an extension (I recall, the 3D spatial framework and one temporal dimension do not even exist) and the mind (no extension) corresponds to a brain/body placed within an environment. Because of the correspondence between something having an extension (brain/body) and something immaterial (the mind), it is possible, a perceptual movie to exists as part of the mind, an immaterial EW. This perceptual scene/movie does not have any illusory spatial-temporal framework, i.e., it does not have any extension. This perceptual movie is something immaterial (part of the immaterial mind): it has no extension (not even that “illusory space/spacetime”[12]). In our visual perception, there is an image of a “green car” moving on that “gray street”. It is a perceptual scene/movie as part (not even an illusory spatial-temporal framework) of one human mind. That perceptual scene is something immaterial (“a movie in colors”) which corresponds to something material (the brain/body) and having extension (illusory “space”/spacetime, without ontology) and physical processes (illusory “time”), but not something having colors. The colors (the second-order property, according to Locke) are “attributes” of certain perceptual visual images/scenes (part of the mind). Because of its correspondence to the brain, any perceptual image/scene corresponds to the entire brain/body placed in an environment (in an extended physical scene). This perceptual scene seems to have also an extension; exactly as green color is a “second-order” property of the mind, this extension is a “first-order” property of the perceptual scene (part of the mind). The external objects (objects in the macro-EW, or the microparticles in the micro-EW, for instance) have no colors. Nevertheless, any external entity has extension (always that illusory spatial 3 D). The electromagnetic waves/field or the amalgam of microparticles/photons cannot be “seen” by the human eyes (the macro-entities in the macro-EW), that is, the eyes do not interact with the electromagnetic waves/field (the field-EW) or the microparticles/photons (the macro-EW). Since one EW does not even exist for any EDW, then, the photons (the micro-EW) or the electromagnetic wave (the field-E) of a light does not exist for our eyes/brain/body (a macro-entity in the macro-EW). In this context, I introduce here a new and very important principle of my EDWs perspective:

The multiple and simultaneous correspondences
Any EW simultaneously corresponds to the many EDWs. For instance, all three set of ED entities, the electromagnetic (waves/the field-EW), the photons (the micro-EW), and the body (brain, eyes, the car, the street, etc., the macro-EW) simultaneously correspond to the mind-EW.

Essentially, we can explain certain real phenomena (belonging to the EDWs) only using the correspondences between the ED entities which belong to the EDWs. For instance, “gravity” is the “relationship” (no ontology) between the Sun and the Earth or between a (red) apple and (green) grasp. These entities (like the Sun, the Earth and the apple) are certain physical macro-entities which exist without any human observer, without any language (“words, words, words”). Nevertheless, “gravity” has no ontology (“gravitational force: does not exist, “spacetime” could not have any ontology –see our works 2016, “gravitons” do not exist). The real macro-phenomena of that apple falling on a soil/grasp/Earth (within the macro-EW) can be explained only using the correspondences between these macro-entities with the curved electromagnetic field (the field-EW). (see below)

Regarding our perceptual states, the eyes do not “see” light, a mental perception for an “external” scene (the car moving on that street) does not include light as a perceived entity since the eyes do not interact with the light (light being either certain electromagnetic waves or a corresponding huge amalgam of photons). Because of the principle of multiple and simultaneous correspondences, the mind corresponds to certain electromagnetic waves (field-EW) and some microparticles (the micro-EW) and the body (brain, eyes, retina, etc., the macro-EW). Due to the evolution of species, and following the biologist Lorentz (see my work 2007 or 2008 or 2015), the mind has evolved in the multiple and simultaneously correspondences with these three set of ED entities/processes belonging to the EDWs. Moreover, the brain/body have evolved in interactions with the entities from the macro-EW. The consequence is the immaterial mind-EW which has those immaterial perceptual images-in-motion due to the multiple and simultaneously correspondences: the mind corresponds to the body (a macro-entity from the macro-EW), but it also corresponds to an electromagnetic field/waves (the field-EW) and an amalgam of microparticles (the micro-EW).Therefore, we have to reject Locke’s primary (mass, extension) and secondary properties (colors, smell, etc.). There are immaterial properties of the mind given by the multiple and simultaneously correspondences to the ED entities. There are these multiple and simultaneously correspondences between the mind/self and:

  • the brain/body and the macro-entities (the macro-EW) (so, the perceptual scenes of the mind have extensions, static and in motion of objects);
  • the electromagnetic waves (different wavelengths, frequency, intensity) (the field-EW) (so, the mind has “colors”);
  • the microparticles (the micro-EW) (so, the mind has perceptual scenes and any perceptual scene has parts in it, i.e., the self/mind can make the distinction, inside the same perceptual scene) between the moving green car and the street. So, colors do belong neither to the macro-objects, nor to the microparticles (electrons and photons have no colors); light is white color, but we cannot even see “white color” since we cannot see light at all. However, the mind has an image-in-motion of a green car in an environment full of extensions (always macro) and various colors because the mind corresponds to the above three sets of ED entities. The mind has the image of
  • the car-in-motion because this image corresponds to the macro-object, the car in motion
  • the green car is in-motion in a virtual 3D scene because the mind corresponds to the brain/body (which has extension, and because of this extension, it is possible for the mind to have virtual 3 D spatial scenes)
  • the green color because that image corresponds to a light having certain wavelength and frequency
  • the car-in-motion in a static environment (the street, houses near the street) because light is not only a continuous process (waves/field) but also microparticles.

It has to be very clear: the mind has a perceptual image-in-motion of the green car (this scene being part of the mind because any mind is an EW but also an entity having an unity and identity) because of these multiple and simultaneously correspondences between the mind-EW and the ED entities (EDWs). In order to get certain explanations of some ED phenomena, the same principle of multiple and simultaneously correspondences has to be applied to many ED phenomena which belong to all the EDWs which we know until now. Obviously, certain new EDWs will be discovered in the future (I have no idea which new EDWs will be discovered and when; this is a job for scientists…) In the following paragraphs, I will examine certain particular cases/examples.

I start with one particular important case: a human person is a room without windows; the bulb from that room is turn on, the light appear in the room. The human being perceive a green cup of coffee on a white table. If the bulb is turn off, the light disappear from that room, the person will perceive just “dark”; the person would not see the green cup and the white table. Does it mean light has a major role in our human perception? It has a “major” role, but in indirect role, given by the correspondences between the mind (an EW), the macro-entities (cup, table, bulb, walls of that room), light (the field-EW) and photons (the micro-EW). If the light is turn off, it does not mean the cup and the table are not there. However, light (either waves or microparticles) does not exist even for the brain/body (a macro-entity in the macro-EW). Because of the common correspondences, the mind (an EW) has the image-in-motion (an immaterial part of the mind-EW) of that “green” (field-EW) car (macro-EW) in-motion. The mind has the image of a “green color” because of the correspondence between the mind and the field-EW (certain wavelengths/frequency of light). We can find here something from the Kantian view: the external world (more exactly, the perceptual/visual images-in-motion of the external world) are brought inside the mind; however, contrary to Kant, the car (not the thing-in-itself) is still outside, the light (both waves and photons) are still outside; there are no waves or photons inside the brain, so we cannot claim there has to be some electromagnetic waves inside the mind. Following the species evolution, the human beings have some perceptual visual representations which correspond to certain macro-entities which really exist outside the body; these macro-entities have certain real primary-order properties. The brain corresponds to certain electromagnetic waves/field; the brain/body in continuously interactions with the macro-entities belonging to the external environment (the macro-EW) correspond to the mind-EW. A person cannot “see” the “green color”, for instance, not only because its brain does not interact with proper electromagnetic waves (certain wavelengths/frequency), but because certain macro-biological elements from his organism do not react, through correspondences, to some electromagnetic waves (having particular wavelengths/frequency). (These biological macro-entities correspond to certain electromagnetic waves and amalgams of microparticles.)

The specialists claim that that there are some visual electromagnetic waves and other non-visual/perceptual waves.[13] In reality, we do not perceive any light (any electromagnetic waves or photons); we perceive, indirectly, only the macro-entities just because the bulb and the eyes/brain/body are all the macro-entities from the same macro-EW. It means these entities interact, but in the case the bulb is “turn on”, the eyes does not interact with the light (the electromagnetic waves and their corresponding microparticles/photons) but only with those macro-entities (like the bulb). However, the eyes, the table, and the cup correspond to certain amalgams of microparticles (which interact with the photons) and certain electromagnetic waves which interact with the electromagnetic waves of that light – all these electromagnetic waves being parts of the same electromagnetic field, the field-EW). Obviously, that bulb can physical interact with one eye/body, but in this case, there would be another kind of interaction, a direct interaction between the bulb and the eyes/body (direct means both entities belong to the same EW). In this case, both the interaction and the entities (the bulb and the eyes/body) are in the same macro-EW. The eyes and the car can interact (in an accident car), but the eyes do not perceive the (green) car. The perceptual image of that green car is a visual perception as part of the mind, an immaterial EW. The image of light also does not appear in the mind-EW; in this visual perception (part of the mind-EW) are visualized only the macro-entities like car and street just because corresponding parts of the body (the eyes/brain, etc.), the car and the street are all certain macro-entities belonging to the same EW and these macro-entities (macro-EW) correspond to the light (field-EW and micro-EW) and both the macro-entities (indirect observable) and the light (either electromagnetic field or amalgam of photons) not possible to be observable) correspond to the visual perceptual movie (the mind-EW).

I recall, the mind is an immaterial entity/EW, it does not have extension (“illusory space” or “illusory spacetime”), but the colors (the green color of the perceptual image of that car) are attributes of the mind. There are colors neither in the brain, nor being attributes of the macro-objects which belong to the external environment (the macro-EW). Light is white, it is a “combination of colors”, but we cannot see even the “white light”. Following Newton and using a pyramidal crystal, we can perceive indirectly some different “colors of light”. In that moment, we do not see different wavelengths of light, we perceive, indirectly, certain “colored” molecules of air. However, the “images of colors” are only perceptual representations in our immaterial mind. Immaterial means not physical substance; immaterial has an immaterial ontology, a non-physical ontology, but an immaterial entity (the mind/life) has to correspond, with necessity, to a material entity (the brain/body placed within an extended environment). The external objects (like that car) have extensions (a kind of first-order property but it is not an object in space since space could not even exist), but not colors. The light is, in general, not “white light” (we do not see white color everywhere even if light is everywhere in this “Cosmos”). We do not see any light because it is not a macroscopic entity/process which interacts with the eyes/brain/body but the corresponding electromagnetic wave and the corresponding amalgam of microparticles.

Do we have a perceptual image of that green car in motion? The most radical reductionists in physics have claimed that “everything” which exists is the electromagnetic field. Therefore, our body/brain is a concentration of electromagnetic field. Then, what is the image-in-motion of that “green car running on the street” within this electromagnetic field? Is it certain electromagnetic waves with different wavelengths and frequency? It means, my body does not exist, my mind does not exist; then is my pain just a “manifestation” of this electromagnetic field? Impossible, even absurd, since any pain does not really exist in an electromagnetic field (even if we can presuppose “colors” are just different wavelengths/frequency of light). My feeling that “I am the same self in each day since I have been born” (which corresponds to a macro-body from the macro-EW) cannot be reduced to a concentration of the electromagnetic field. This concentration is part of the entire electromagnetic field which covers the entire “universe”; then, if we would accept the radical reductionism from physics (everything is the electromagnetic field), then there would be no real distinction between my mind/body (the person who had written these words in the past) and your mind/body (the reader who have read these statements in these moments). There would be no distinction between “myself” and “yourself”. Within the EDWs perspective, any reductionism approach (strong or weak, etc., see my previous works) is totally meaningless. So, we cannot claim such feelings (the feeling of the self, felling a pain or perceiving a green color) are just manifestations of the electromagnetic field. If we accept the absolute reductionism, it would mean that the self/mind does not really exist, the Earth and the Sun do not really exist, nothing really exists except this electromagnetic field. It would mean, these sentences are written by a certain concentration of the electromagnetic field.[14] Anyway the EDWs perspective rejects any kind of reductionism. The reductionists have believed that they could have explained almost the majority of the real phenomena (essential topics of different particular sciences and philosophy). However, we cannot claim that the EDWs are just “pragmatic” notions or “linguistic” concepts/words. Again, we cannot claim a concentration of an electromagnetic field (which covers the entire Cosmos 380.000 years after the Big Bangs) have been writing these sentences using another concentration (the laptop) of the same field for another concentration of the same electromagnetic field, the reader.

The electromagnetic waves (with certain wavelength and frequency) representing the “green color” are not reflected by the electromagnetic waves which correspond to the car (a macro-entity). In fact, the photons which correspond to those different electromagnetic waves interact and some of them are reflected in different directions. These electromagnetic waves correspond to certain photons (the micro-EW) and to the retina/eyes/body (the macro-EW). Without the existence of photons, we would also not be able to explain the photoelectric effect. Therefore, the photons (as microparticles) really exist; we cannot reduce the photons/microparticles to the electromagnetic waves (see my book 2023 “Quantum mechanics versus the EDWs perspective”), but also we cannot reduce the brain/body to an amalgam of microparticles. So, it would be quite impossible to reduce all the ED entities/processes/phenomena to the electromagnetic field. The green color from a visual perception scene (image-in-motion) (which is the mind-EW) corresponds to a wave with a particular wavelength/frequency light (the field-EW); also the gray color of the street corresponds to another wavelength/frequency of light. Any visual perceptual scene corresponds to an amalgam of waves with certain wavelengths/frequency; we perceive the green color of that car because the eyes/brain interact only with the macro-objects (the macro-EW). The green color of the car is given by the corresponding electromagnetic waves (having certain wavelengths/frequency). It has been believed that the light, in general, is “transparent” (not “white light”) and this being the reason we cannot see light in the “empty space”. From my viewpoint, we do not see the “green light” (an electromagnetic wave with certain wavelength and frequency) reflected by the car because the human eye cannot interact with the light (waves or photons) and, moreover, the “light” does not exist for the mind. Between the car and your eyes there is light but it is an invisible light; all the electromagnetic waves are invisible for the human eyes. We do not see the electromagnetic waves corresponding to the green color. We have a perceptual image-in-motion of the green car just because these particular waves (for the “green color”) are reflected by a concentration of an electromagnetic field (corresponding to the car) and these particular waves (for the “green color”) interact with the waves corresponding to the eyes/brain/body. The interactions of these waves correspond to the perceptual images-in-motion (which are the mind-EW). Within a partially Kantian view, the external electromagnetic waves are “brought” inside the mind, that is, we do not see these electromagnetic waves at all, but through the principle of multiple and simultaneously correspondences, the mind-EW has the “image-in-motion of a green car”.

In analogy with colors, the “extensions” of the macro-and the micro-entities are certain ontological properties since the car and the street (the macro-entities) really interact and, as we already know, these interactions furnish the ontological status for the car and the street (the ED interactions, i.e., the micro-interactions, furnish the ontological status for the microparticles which correspond to the car and the street). The external space does not have any ontology either. The car is not within a space with a certain ontological status and a particular geometry. Space (spacetime) could not have any ontological status. How, then a human subject does perceive an external car running on the street in front of his eyes? Nobody in the history of human thinking has introduced an alternative similar to my EDWs. The mental images (parts of the mind) have no “spacetime” since spacetime could not have any ontology. (see Vacariu and Vacariu 2016) However, an entire mental image (parts of the immaterial mind) is composed of parts: for instance, in our perceptual image of the car running on the street in front of us, any human mind makes the distinction between that car and its environment but both the car and its environment are parts of the same visual perceptual scene (part of the mind-EW). How is this possible? Such processes are possible because of the correspondences between

  • the mental images (the mind-EW) and the eyes and the neuronal pattern (the macro-EW) and
  • the correspondence to the field-EW.

However, neither the mental images, nor the external scenes have any “spatial features”, since space(time) could not even exist. In this context, what does it mean a picture? Space could not have any ontology and the “nothing” between that car and some trees has no ontology. Nevertheless, that nothing is not something having “virtual 3-dimensions” since physical 1D and 2D does not even exist. In reality, the distinction between 1D, 2D and 3D is totally false distinction: we can talk about the concept of 3D (referring to a “virtual space” with no ontology, that is, between the car and the trees there is a “extended nothing” including certain macro-processes (equivalent to the “time-dimension”/no ontology) which corresponds the electromagnetic field/the field-EW), but we cannot even talk about 1D or 2D, not even virtually. Only within the pure mathematics we can talk about 1D or 2D or even 3D or 4D since spacetime could not have any ontology.

What does really exist if spacetime does not exist? What is in our external environment? Where does the green car move on that street if not in spacetime? Excepting the air, the microparticles and the electromagnetic field (the last two belong to the EDWs), the car runs in “nothing” (no ontology) which corresponds to the field-EW (field-EW) presents everywhere. Does this electromagnetic field have a 3D or 4D? Meaningless question since 1D and 2D do not even exist. The car is not an object running in 4D since there is no object or entity having 1D or 2 D. All the EDWs entities have a “virtual 4D”, but “4D” is a pseudo-notion since any spacetime (1D, 2D, 3D, 4D, 10D, 11D, 26 D, etc.) could not even exist. However, this “empty spatial 3D” corresponds to the electromagnetic field. A physical entity can exist only having Cartesian extension, but not being in a 3D or 4D spacetime framework. Except the mind-EW, all the ED entities have such “extensions” (but not 3 or 4 spatial-temporal dimensions). The mind is an immaterial EW and all the perceptual scenes/images are the mind; more exactly, being immaterial, we cannot make a “quantitative” distinction between the mind and “its” mental states. All the mental states are the mind, but “all” is not a quantitative quality/modality.

Descartes mentions two essential properties: “extension” (for the material things) and “thinking” (for the mind, an immaterial thing). I can perceive the extension of the brain; without this extension, the brain would not even exist (from what we know today, any physical entity has this extension). We can suppose, on a Kantian line, any extension is just a phenomenal property inside of our mind; however, without the extension of the brain/body and the extension of the Earth, the “I” would not be. “I think, therefore, I exist” is perfect available statement, even if Descartes did not know exactly what “thinking” is and what the “I” is. I have delineated here the meanings of these two notions. Maybe I have not grasped the “truth”, but I can talk about particular truths (for instance, “the mind corresponds to the brain/body within an environment”), otherwise, nobody would pronounce something. Nevertheless, “something pronounces a statement”, therefore, this something has somehow to exits/be. According to the EDWs perspective, the self/mind/life really is an EW. This is a truth, not the “great truth”/“whole truth”, but a “truth”. The mind perceives the green car. Somebody could claim the green color is given by the light (electromagnetic waves and/photons). However, the self cannot perceive electromagnetic waves or photons. Obviously, we perceive macro-objects due to light, but the eyes do interact neither with electromagnetic waves, nor with photon but only with macro-objects. Moreover, the perceptual scene of a green car running on a gray static street is a “movie” as part of your mind/self, but this part and the mind is an immaterial EW, so, there is no virtual/illusory spatial-temporal framework. Maybe somebody can claim the colors inside the mind are given by light. But light has extension, while mind has no extension, i.e., the mind has no this “illusory/virtual 4D spatial-temporal framework” (i.e., an extension!). This illusory spatiotemporal framework correspond to the electromagnetic field, but this field has the speed c, so, this field has not even an “illusory time” (according to the special relativity, “time” does not exist for the electromagnetic waves). Any perceptual color (part of the immaterial self/mind) is not given (produced) by light because light does not exist for the mind. Similarly, the self/mind can “have”, for instance, a pain. Any pain (as a mental state that is the mind-EW) exists neither for light, nor for the brain since the pain exists as being the mind, exactly as a perceptual color scene (a “green” car-in-motion) is the immaterial mind. If color were directly related to the electromagnetic field, my mind would cover the entire “universe” since this field has been spread in the entire “universe” 380,000 years after the Big Bangs.

It is meaningless to believe that Descartes’ “extension” has “3D spatial extension”. Descartes (firstly a mathematician, secondary, a philosopher) avoids to introduce the very dubious notion of “space” (even if he introduces the “Cartesian coordinates”, just as a mathematical notion). He uses “extension” exactly to avoid the notion of “space”: a human being can perceive the extension of a table, but nobody perceives “space”. Moreover, any human normal mind surely has the property of thinking (we consider, for instance, that any mathematical calculation, like 7=5=12, involves thinking).  These two properties, “extension” and “thinking”, are strongly related to those two ontological different substances, material and immaterial substances.  However, we know that the great problem for Descartes was the “interaction” between two ontological different substances, the mind (immaterial) and the brain/body (material). I have solved this problem indicating that the mind is an EW, the body is an entity within the macro-EW and one EW does not exist for any EDW. Anyway, space does not even exist, therefore, it would be totally wrong to believe in such statements like this one: “the car exists in a 3D or 4D spatiotemporal framework”. Where do you see the 3D space, for instance? What is the ontology of space? What would be the ontology of time? What is the ontology of spacetime (a more dubious notion than “space” and “time”)? Meaningless question, this is the reason nobody has furnished an acceptable (until now, nobody believes in the “right answer” for the ontology of spacetime) answer for this question.

The problem regarding the ontology of space has increased since Einstein, with his special relativity, related space with time. What would be the ontology of “spacetime”? We have no idea about the ontology of space, but since 1905, we are force to think about the “spacetime” even if nobody could understand exactly what does it mean to “add” the temporal dimension to those 3D “spatial” dimensions. (I do not talk about mathematics here… ask Minkowski, not me) When he was quite old, even Einstein had real doubts about the existence of time (1D), but he did not question the ontology of space. Why “time” has only 1D? Does somebody see/perceive “time”? Who can furnish any clear argument for supporting that “time” is one dimension of 4D “spacetime”? Nobody can perceive even space. Is any mental visual perception a “picture” or a “movie”? Is it like a “cinema screen” or a real reality having 3D spatial dimensions or even 4D spatiotemporal framework? Are these 3D in the brain? No, since the brain has no green color. If the brain has no green color, then the brain is not in “space”. Moreover, it means that the “any visual perception” (colors, (parts of) images in motion, etc.[15]) is not in the brain, i.e., the mind cannot be in the brain. Therefore, we cannot relate the “movie” of our perceptual “green car” moving on that “gray” street to the brain, i.e., as being a “perceptual movie” in our brain.[16]

As every material entity, the brain has extension (“3D” extension), but extension does not involve, automatically, space. On the contrary, “space” does not even exist. The car is not running in a “spacetime” framework since spacetime could not even exist. The car is moving in “nothing” which corresponds to the electromagnetic field (the field-EW). This “nothing” has no ontology, but the electromagnetic field really exists not in 3D or 4D; it exists but all the ED material entities have this “illusory 4D” (illusory spatial 3D and illusory temporal 1D), i.e., all the physical entities have extensions. The mental, perceptual movie of a “green car moving on a gray street” has no “dimensions” since “dimensions” does not even exist for the car, the street, the brain, the mind. Then what kind of mental movie is this one within the mind? The mind is immaterial entity and EW, then this/any mental perceptual movie is also immaterial event just because it is the mind.[17]

Online-offline
The online-offline distinction refers usually to “online-offline cognition”. (see Markman and Dietrich’s article 2000 and my comments in my previous works) This distinction involves some pseudo-distinctions from the philosophy of mind/cognitive science like “consciousness-unconscious” distinction. What does it mean, for the philosophers and the scientists (working within the unicorn world paradigm of thinking until 2005) the “offline-online cognition” distinction? The “online cognition” presupposes certain sensorial-motor mechanics interacting with the external environment, i.e., being “active” and somehow related to our “cognition”. The “offline cognition” means certain mental states without being, somehow, in contact to these sensorial-motor mechanics. For instance, when I think to certain abstract words (something about “freedom” in the world or some “differential equations” from mathematics), there are no sensorial-motor “mechanisms” “directly” involved in their relationship to the brain.[18] “Directly” means that I do not need “information” (pseudo-notion) furnished by these sensorial-motor mechanisms (parts of the body always strongly related to the brain). When I think to “7+5=12”, I do not need any information furnished by the body (sensorial-motor mechanics and the rest of the body). This thought would be an “offline cognition” within the unicorn world. When I visually perceive one (not two) green car, I have an “online cognition”.

From my EDWs perspective, the online-offline cognition is quite a pseudo-distinction since the mind-EW does not exist for the brain/body always placed in a macro-environment (body and external environment representing the macro-EW). There are those five sensorial-perceptual mechanics (seeing, auditory, tactile, smelling and gustative ones) and these mechanisms of the body are strongly related to the brain.[19] As we see below, in the same cases, we can make the distinction between the eyes and the ears, but in other cases, the body is a whole entity (not composed by parts). There is online change of “information” (“online information”) between the body/brain and the external environment; at the same time, there is some change of “internal information” within the mind-EW and this internal knowledge corresponds to this online knowledge. So, online-cognition and offline-cognition (knowledge belonging to the mind) are all parts of the mind-EW which correspond with two types of information within the brain/body. However, the distinction between these two types of information in the brain is a pseudo-distinction (mostly a pragmatically distinction, no more). I can really “hear” a thought in my mind (“7+5=12”) without the need of the corresponding knowledge furnished by the body/sensorial-motor mechanisms (my mouth or ears) in its interactions to the external environment. I can listen a “melody in my mind” without the need of the auditory mechanism (ears, etc.). These mental states are the mind and the beings of these mental states represent strong arguments for the being of the mind as an immaterial EW (having a “personal identity”) which corresponds to the same brain/body, the same entity even if it is in continuously interactions with the objects from the external environment (the macro-EW).

The eliminative materialists
Churchlands and other eliminative materialists (and other philosophers and scientists) claim that we have to eliminate the mind, the mental states, the self from our scientific and philosophical discussions. Let me suppose, we cannot accept the mind as an immaterial entity. Then, we have to accept everything is material. The problem is why the eliminative materialists do not reject the existence of the brain/neurons, i.e., the existences of the macro-entities? It seems that they did not care about the great disputes within the domain of quantum mechanics, they did not know something about the great dispute between Einstein and those from quantum mechanics. From an epistemological viewpoint (or even within a “linguistic framework”) they try to preserve the macro-entities. They have no answer to the relationship between the macro- and the micro-entities, much less regarding the quantum relationship between the waves and the microparticles. They want, however, to eliminate the mind and the mental states.

With my new principle, the “principle of multiple and simultaneously correspondences”, we have to accept that that each self/mind really is an entity and an EW and there are multiple and simultaneously correspondences between the mind and some ED material entities/EDWs. Some eliminative materialists claimed that the self/mind does not even exist. So, following the eliminative materialists had have eliminated any “ontology” of the self/mind. From their viewpoint, we have to accept the existences only of the “material things”.[20] It would be something without any ontology, just some correspondences (no ontology) and nothing else. From a modest reductionist, an “individual walking on a street” is just the correspondences between a concentration of electromagnetic field, an amalgam of microparticles and a brain/body, nothing else. Again, these correspondences do not have any ontology, therefore, the mind/self would not even exist (isn’t). There are many problems with these correspondences and the elimination of the immaterial mind/self. The eliminative materialists have rejected the “personal identity”: it is meaningless to talk about “I am the same person today as I was yesterday.” From my EDWs perspective, each person (each mind) has the same “personal identity” during her entire life. Moreover, the mind/life corresponds to the same body during the entire life (even if a body loses a “part” of it, for instance, a leg – see below). Like the eliminative materialists, we can assume (wrong assumption from my EDWs perspective) that the “personal identity” is a meaningless notion. I want to mention only two great problems if we eliminate the “immaterial ontology”, i.e., if we eliminate the being of the mind/self (the immaterial ontology):

  • The pain: the electromagnetic field, a huge amalgam of microparticles or the brain/body do not have any pain. The “pain” does not exist for any of these material ED entities. The pain does not exist within the brain/body. Where is the pain? The pain is a property of the mind (more exactly, the pain is the mind, an immaterial entity). We cannot localize pain in one or more material entities because the pain does not exist in any ED material/physical entities.
  • The music: a person listens classical music, for instance. Does the musical sounds really exist? We know, a human person can listen the music of an orchestra playing a classical music just because the sounds create air waves. But the movements of the air are not music! These movements interact with the timpani of our ears which moves with certain frequencies; these timpani send signals to other parts of our organism and to the brain. However, within the brain, the music does not exist. We know, within the brain, the colors do not exist. An eliminativist could claim, because of principles of multiple and simultaneously correspondences, we do not need colors in the brain since the brain corresponds to certain electromagnetic waves/field (“which are the colors”). So, the interactions (wrong notion) between the brain/microparticles and the electromagnetic field would be the colors for a human person (which does not have any ontology since there are only correspondences between certain material things). Even if we can explain (partially or even wrongly) the color for a human person through the correspondences of these material things, we cannot explain music. Within the brain, there is no music! The motions of timpani and the rest of other elements of our organism are not music; the activations of large parts of the brain (more exactly, from my perspective, the activation of the entire brain – see my previous works) are not music. If the “colors” correspond to certain electromagnetic waves (or to certain wavelengths/frequencies of an electromagnetic field), the music correspond to nothing in the brain since there are no physical elements (from any material EW) which we can identify it with “music”.

Having these two problems (and many other problems), we have to accept that the self/mind really is and its ontology is an immaterial one; it is an immaterial EW, while the body is an entity (which corresponds to an amalgam of macro-sub-entities/the organs of the body which exist one for the other, not for the body as a whole) within the macro-EW. Otherwise, we would not be able to explain certain mental state through reducing these mental states to the material states (belonging to an EW). We cannot reduce all the ED physical entities/processes to the electromagnetic field since the photoelectric effect (and many others physical phenomena) could not be explained only through the electromagnetic field. For instance, since the electromagnetic field has no mass, we cannot talk about the masses of certain physical entities (the macro or the micro-entities) without accepting the existences of the micro-entities (the micro-EW) and the macro-entities (the macro-EW). In the same way, we have to accept the mind/self is an immaterial EW. There are many mental phenomena (like having a pain, listening music, mental perceptions, personal identity) which cannot be explained through some material entities/processes belonging to the brain/body. Even the identity of a particular mental perceptual scene would be impossible to be explained using the correspondences between the ED entities belonging to only the material EDWs. The immaterial ontology has to be even if it is quite impossible for us to perceive it. During my works, I have furnished many arguments for accepting the mind as being an immaterial EW; it would be quite absurd to believe someone can prove the being of the mind/self (an immaterial EW) through some empirical (material) elements (belonging to those three material/physical EDWs which we know they exist, the field-EW, the micro-EW and the macro-EW; we can add here and the fourth EW, the mega-EW even if, according to my previous works, mainly my Hypermetaphysics from 2023, we know there have to be many EDWs, not only three or four material EDWs…) Moreover, it would be quite absurd to believe something exists only if somebody observe or visually perceived that entity (see some interpretations in quantum mechanics). God-humans distinction, self-world distinction, the “rationalism-empiricism” debate, the innate-acquired dispute, the “static-in motion” dispute and many other distinctions/debates/disputes/problems have been all “great” pseudo-distinctions/debates/disputes/problems within a wrong framework of thinking (the unicorn world) during more than two millennium.[21]

Whole-parts (a particular case: “Theseus’ ship”, a philosophical “paradox”)
The whole-parts distinction (example, the “Theseus’ ship”) is a famous one in philosophy. Let me investigate it from my EDWs perspective. A car (the whole) and its wheels, doors, etc. (macro-parts) are entities from the same EW, the macro-EW. Then what is the relationship between the whole and its parts? From an ontological viewpoint, it is the identity, but it depends from which point we want to give the answer. There is an organizational thresholds (see my previous works): the car and its macro-components are from the same macro-EW. If a car hits my body on the street, it is the entire car in motion which is an entity in its interaction with my body. It is not the hood of that car which hits/interacts with my body; it is the whole car (its entire mass) in motion. Being in motion, we need to introduce the engine and the wheels as “parts of the car”. The hood does not move itself, therefore, the interaction is between the car (a macro-entity with its identity) and my body (another macro-entity with its identity). Each of these macro-entities corresponds to an amalgam of macro-parts (for the car, the hood, engine, doors, wheels, etc.) from the same macro-EW. From another “viewpoint” (within an EDW), the car corresponds to an amalgam of microparticles. The microparticles corresponding to the car are changing continuously (indirect radiation, “heat”, interaction with photons, etc.) but these changes do not pass an organizational threshold for that amalgam of microparticles. Therefore, even if there are not exactly (100%) the same microparticles, the corresponding car (an entity with its identity within the macro-EW) remains the same during years.

We know from Einstein, we need particles for explaining the photoelectric effect of light. We need the macro-entities for explaining the macro-phenomena which cannot be explain through the microparticles or the electromagnetic waves/field. It is not about “words, words, words” (language) or the human observer (Spinoza, Kant, Bohr, etc.) but about certain ED entities which really exist without the human observer. The body really exists as an entity in its interaction with the car; the body corresponds to certain electromagnetic waves (see my principle the multiple and simultaneous correspondences) for explaining the corresponding mind-EW. This statement is true for any “person” perceiving a green car: there is online information, i.e., the information changed between the brain/body and the external macro-environment and the corresponding changed within the mind-EW. The mind and the body preserve their identities even if there is some changes within these entities (their masses, speed, etc.). If these changes do not pass an organizational threshold or epistemological-ontological threshold, the entities remain the same. At the same time, there are some exchange of “information” between

  • certain amalgams of microparticles which correspond to the body/brain and the green car and the mind-EW
  • certain electromagnetic waves/field which correspond to the body/brain and the green car and the mind-EW.

The dichotomy “function-substance” (see below) is represented by the (un)famous “Theseus’ ship”: it is about the self-identity of an object/entity and the “personal identity” of a human person. From my viewpoint, the “personal identity” is the mind/self/life (always the same); in other words, your self is the same as yesterday, even if you have acquired more “knowledge” (i.e., something has changed within yourself but as an immaterial entity, the self/life has remained the same). Since the mind-EW is an immaterial entity, there could be some changes without its identity to be lost or dramatically changed. (see organizational and epistemological-ontological thresholds) So, there are different “things”: the personal identity and the identity of a material object; the personal identity of a person is the self/mind/life which is always the same exactly because the self/mind is an immaterial entity/EW and it has no parts. The classical distinction parts-whole cannot be applied to the self/mind since the self is immaterial.

Let me investigate the identity of a material thing under Theseus’ ship thought experiment. Let me suppose the ship (a macro-object) has ten macro-components. We admit the identity theory: the ship is these ten macro-components. Is the “ship” just a notion, a slogan for the combination of those ten macro-components? The question would be: for whom the ship = 10 components? For a human being who works on philosophy of language? We have to introduce more elements to talk about the car. Each component of that car exists at least in relationship to the other components of the car. If we replace one component, can we talk about the same entity, the ship? From the viewpoint of each macro-component (among those ten components), the ship (as an entity having identity) does not even exist[22]: for each macro-component, there are nine other macro-components. However, the ship as an entity (having an identity/unity) is the same entity in its interaction with the river/water. From the “viewpoint of the ship as a whole”, it is the same entity which interacts with the entire water of that river. (see below)

If we would be adepts of the identity theory, the “green car” moving on the street is not an individual entity, but an amalgam of those macro-components, an amalgam of macro-objects. I recall: the identity of one physical entity is given by its (possible) interactions with other entities which belong to the same EW. Between the car and its macro-components, there is an organizational threshold. However, there is an epistemological-ontological threshold[23] between the car (or one of its macro-component) and the corresponding amalgam of microparticles, for instance. From a functionalist’s viewpoint, the car has the same “identity”, but it is a functional identity[24]; from an ontological viewpoint, the car (or Watt’s governor) does not really exist, it is an ensemble of macro-components/objects exactly as it is Watt’s governor. However, its macro-component has an ontology within the macro-EW. Each macro-component (the macro-EW) corresponds to the ED entities which belong to the EDWs, for instance to the microparticles (the micro-EW) or to an amalgam of electromagnetic waves (the field-EW).[25]

The “personal identity” for any human being is the mind (an entity and an EW) which corresponds to the brain/body (and its interactions with the environment). It reflects the dispute between computationalism and the dynamical system approach, for instance. However, Fodor (computationalist) is a functionalist (he accepts the identity theory, even if he declares he accepts only the “token identity”), while van Gelder’s example with Watt’s governor is under the dynamical system approach and rejects the existence of the self and mental representations. The problem is that, for rejecting the computationalism, van Gelder furnishes a wrong analogy: Watt’s governor is a macro-mechanism realized by various macro-components, while the mind is an immaterial entity and each component of the mind (any perceptual image) is the mind (not part of the mind since “part-whole” distinction is available only for some of the material things). Your body is the same as yesterday (even if the corresponding amalgam of microparticles is not exactly the same; the majority of the microparticles are the same in both days). However, if we compare your body from today and your body from your age 3 years, can we say, there are different bodies? Of course, we cannot identify the body of a person of being 3-yers old with the body of the same person being 30 years old. Nevertheless, the mind-self/life has always been the same in correspondence to the same body which has changed a lot (regarding its mass, for instance). From the viewpoint of the mind, the body has been the same from the beginning till the end.

In Theseus’ ship, there are organizational and epistemological-ontological thresholds, but also the above distinction between “function” and “substance” (see below Friedman’s article 2012). “Function” sends to certain mathematical functions (long time ago, “mathematics” was identified with God) and to the mathematical laws of physical phenomena. “Substance” sends to the individuality of the physical and/or non-physical entities. Can we talk about the identity of a physical law during a period of time? Until I have discovered the EDWs, it has been known that there are four forces for the material things: the gravitational force, the electromagnetic force, the strong force and the weak force. The last three forces presupposes the exchange of bosons. The identity of a force is given by the interactions among certain microparticles. The elementary particles are bosons (force carriers or the mass) or fermions (leptons and quarks which represents the matter).[26] Does a quark really exist? Yes, of course: it exists because of its interactions with other microparticles. Does a macroparticle (a planet) really exist? Yes, of course: it exists as a discrete entity (having a discrete extension) because of its interactions with other discrete entities/planets in the macro-EW. Does an electromagnetic field really exist? Yes, of course, it exists as continuous (continuous extension) physical entity in the field-EW (which covers the entire “cosmos”). Does the gravitational force really exist? No, it does not exist, Newton was totally wrong. Then is, according to the general theory of relativity, “gravity” given by the curved spacetime? Spacetime could not have any ontology (see my previous works); therefore, gravity is not curved spacetime, so Einstein was wrong. Does the gravity exist? If not, why than the apple falls down on Earth? Why the Earth moves around the Sun? The apple, the Earth and the Sun really exist as certain macro-entities (within the macro-EW0). Then what is the “gravity” if the microparticle “graviton” does not exist and if “spacetime” could not have any ontology? From my viewpoint, the “gravity” between the Earth and the Sun (the macro-EW) is “nothing” (no ontology) which corresponds to the curved electromagnetic field (the field-EW). It means, gravity does not even exist, gravity is “nothing” which corresponds to something belonging to an EDW than the macro-EW. However, gravity (nothing) involves the relationship (“nothing” with no ontology) between two macro-entities which really exist in the macro-EW: the planets. So, in order to explain the motion of the Earth around the Sun (two entities having real ontology), we need to use, in our explanation, an empty notion, “gravity” without having any ontology. It is a new linguistic framework or a new pragmatism? Neither: it is a new framework of thinking which involves certain ED entities which really exist without any human observer or any language. From my viewpoint, the “interactions” is somehow equivalence to the “human perceptions/observations”. Obviously, for our communication, we need to use language, but not all the objects/entities/forces are just “empty linguistic concepts” (like “gravity”). The mind really is as an immaterial EW; the brain/body really is a macro-entity just because without this macro-entity, the mind would not exist. However, the mind is not for the brain/body, so we need not to check for an ontological relationship between the mind and the brain/body. The same argument is available for explaining “gravity” (no ontology) between two macro-planets (both exist in the macro-EW). The explanations involves a language, but it does not mean I reduce “ontology” to language/categories (like Kant, Wittgenstein, Carnap) or mathematics/logic/categories (Plato, Kant, Carnap, logical empiricists, etc.[27]) So, the gravity between two planets (physical entities having individual identities in the macro-EW) is “nothing” which corresponds to a curved electromagnetic field (the field-EW).

Let me solve, with my EDWs perspective, the paradox of “Theseus’ ship”. There is a boat (small ship) on the river Danube. It has ten wooden macro-parts. We change one wooden part. Is it the same entity? From an organizational viewpoint, it is not the same entity; from an epistemological-ontological viewpoint, it is the same entity. In its interaction with the water of that river, the boat is a macro-entity (having its identity) which corresponds to an amalgam of microparticles. Some of these microparticles has changed continuously. Is the same boat? From an organizational viewpoint (the viewpoint of microparticles), it is not the same entity, from an epistemological-ontological viewpoint (the viewpoint of water of that river), it is the same entity. This boat interacts with the river Danube. Does the river Danube exist or is it just a word/notion? You, the reader, can be drown in this river so, the water of that river is not just a “word”. Is the river an entity? But the river is water and water is not the same from one day to another (Heraclitus). So, from Heraclitus’ viewpoint, the river does not exist. I mention the river and the water would be two macro-entities and if both exist and there would be an organizational threshold. But does the water of that river really exist? Yes, it exist: the river is the entire water since the river has appeared in that area; the river is not only the water that we can see today. Does the water from yesterday not exist for the water from today? If the answer to this question is yes, then where is the line between the “water of today” and the “water of yesterday”? Where is the “water of 10 minutes ago” and the “water of now”? There is no difference between these two states of “water”; it is the same water just because it is an entity having its identity given by the whole water. The river interacts with the boat. Both these macro-entities exist in the macro-EW. All the “parts” of the water of Danube are physically so “strong related”, we cannot identity one part from the other part of that water in any moment. More exactly, the water of Danube is the same. Therefore, “the parts of water of Danube” is just an abstract notion. The river exists as a physical entity which interacts with the soil/land. Is it the same land? From the river’s viewpoint, it is the same land since the river interacts not only with some stones and some parts of soil/land but with the entire land. However, the water from Danube flows into the Black See, but the sea is related to other sea which is related to an ocean related to other oceans. In a way, the water of all oceans is the same water. Then, indeed, the Pacific-ocean and the Atlantic-ocean are just “words, words, words”.

Does the river Danube exist for the Sun? No, it does not exist. For the Sun (as a macro-planet), it exists only the Earth as a planet. The Sun-planet interacts with the Earth-planet and the river (the mass of the river) is included in the mass of the Earth-planet since gravity requires the “pseudo-interactions” between masses. Both the river and the soil are macro-planets, but we are interesting in the interaction between the Sun and the Earth. In this interaction, the river (its mass) does not exist. It exists only the mass of the Earth and the mass of the Sun, i.e., these macro-planets exist as certain macro-entities. So, there is an “organizational threshold” for defining certain physical macro-entities (i.e., these entities belong to the same macro-EW) or for defining certain ED entities which belong to the EDWs. The Sun corresponds to a huge amalgam of microparticles (the micro-E) and a huge amalgam of electromagnetic field (the field-EW). However, the river does not exist either for the planet Sun, neither for the microparticles or for the electromagnetic field. The “river” exists for that boat, for instance.

Let me introduce another example with “water”: on my table, there is a cup with water. According to my EDWs, the cup and the table are two physical distinct entities within the macro-EW. Is the water from the cup an entity? Yes, it is because its “parts” do not even exist.[28] That water (a real macro-entity) interacts with (the interior of) that cup (a real macro-entity). If that water interacts with the cup, it means that water has an ontology, it really exists; all the “parts” of that water being physically united, it means that the water from the cup is a single physical entity with no parts. For the amount of water from that cup, the distinction parts-whole is meaningless.

We spread the water from that cup on the floor. That water has become small separated “puddles of water” on the floor. Each puddle of water interacts particularly (without being in contact to the other puddles of water) with the floor. Then, each puddle of water is an entity which interacts with the floor (the same entity for all the puddles of water). Each puddle of water corresponds to an amalgam of microparticles (the micro-EW) and to the same electromagnetic field (the field-EW). So, with my EDWs perspective, we have solved completely the famous paradox, the “Theseus’ ship”. Not using “words, words, words”, but talking about the ensembles of entities from the same EW and the ED physical entities which really exist without any the presence of human observer. The Earth and the Sun has existed before the apparition of species of the animals (the humans included) and the plants. The existences of these planets have been the necessary condition for the appearances of certain macro-bodies (the body/brain included) on Earth (a macro-entity in its interaction with the Sun and other planets from our Solar system and other macro-entities). However, any macro-body from the Earth does not exist for the Sun; any macro-body exists for other macro-entities from its external environment and all these macro-objects corresponds to the Earth (for the Sun). Each macro-object is the Earth in relationship to the Sun; each macro-object (“from the Earth”) exists in relationship to other macro-objects (“from the Earth”).[29] Each human macro-body has corresponded with a particular mind/life-EW. How then can I explain the gravity if neither Newton’s gravitational force exists, nor the curved spacetime exists (Einstein furnished an alternative for gravity, the curved spacetime)? Again, gravity is “nothing” (no ontology) within the macro-EW which corresponds to a curved electromagnetic field (the field-EW) which really exists. This is the “gravity” (no ontology in the macro-EW) between the macro-entities.

Without the existences of the macro-entities (the macro-EW), and being an absolute reductionist (i.e., reducing everything to the electromagnetic field), you would not been unable to explain the masses of the macro-planets (the Earth, the Sun, the car) since the electromagnetic field has no mass. Essentially, without “masses”, we could not talk about “gravity”. Both the micro-entities and the macro-entities have masses. But there is no quantum gravity (no “graviton”). In the field-EW, the planets do not exist; there are certain very large concentrations of electromagnetic field. This field has no mass, therefore, we cannot explain gravity in the field-EW: there is no gravity between two electromagnetic fields/waves because these physical entities do not have masses. “Gravity” has no ontology, of course, but the apple falls down on Earth even if there is no human person who observes this real macro-phenomena. Why then that apple (any apple) falls down on Earth? Because of the “interactions” between the mass of the apple and the mass of the Earth. Nobody cannot deny the Earth or that car has a mass. Gravity has no ontology, it does not exist. However, the apple (having mass) falls down on Earth (having a much greater mass than the apple). Between these two masses, there is nothing (no ontology) which corresponds to the curved electromagnetic field (the field-EW). Only in this way, we can explain many real macro-physical processes which involves certain macro-entities: the falling down of an apple on the Earth, the rotation of the Earth around the Sun, etc. In consequence, we need the EDWs perspective to explain many real entities and proceeses from the same EW or the correspondences of the ED entities and their ED interactions. I recall: some EDWs are just labels/names since only the ED set of entities really exist like the micro-entities and respectively the macro-entities and their corresponding interactions. (Recall my above principle!)

I recall here a very important notion from my previous works: the “interval of similarity”. The ellipse of the trajectory of the Earth around the Sun is not exactly the same in year: there is a very small difference between the two trajectories in two years. Does it mean, there is no law for these trajectories or the law is changing? As I wrote above, the Sun and the Earth are two macro-entities which really exist even if their masses have been changing in each second. There is an “interval of similarity” for the Earth as being the same entity (during billions of years) in relationship to the Sun. The same is available for those two trajectories of the Earth in two years: it is the same “law” (explained through correspondence, i.e., no ontology!) during billions of years.

Another example: I have a stone in my hand. I make this statement: “If the physical conditions do not change dramatically or if the physical conditions are preserved within an ‘interval of similarity’ and I let the stone to fall down toward the pavement/Earth, the stone will fall down toward the pavement.” Is this statement a truth one or is it just a “linguistic game”? All the philosophers of the last century had believed this statement was a linguistic or pragmatic statement. Also, many physicists had believed this statement as being a linguistic and/or a pragmatic/useful statement (see, for instance, Peebles 2022). Some people had believed it was a “statement” which refers to a real “physical phenomena”, but they were unable to explain why “the stone falls down on Earth” since they had been working within the unicorn world. The physicists either had believed in curved spacetime or they had checked for “graviton”. From my viewpoint, the statement about that stone is a “truth statement”[30]: it describes (using our language) a real phenomenon which involves certain real physical entities (more exactly, this phenoeman involves the ED entities like the stone and the Earth or different amalgams of microparticles from the EDWs). If a new macro-planet or a “black hole” does not suddenly appear close enough to the Earth in the next ten seconds, the stone will fall down on the pavement. Inevitable, without any exception! It means that the process of that stone falling down is a real physical process; it is not necessary a human observer to observe/perceive this process which it is a physical real process involving certain macro-entities like the stone and the Earth. As we have seen above, the trajectory of the Earth around the Sun is not the same in each year, it is not the same from one moment to the other. However, the “gravity” is the “almost the same” (there is an “interval of similarity” for “gravity” in this case (and many other cases) in the last four billions years or so, for instance). That is, the stone will inevitable fall on the pavement if the general physical conditions do not pass an epistemological-ontological threshold in changing. (see my previous works about the “epistemological-ontological threshold” and the “organizational threshold”) The gravity is neither a “physical force” (Newton), nor the “curved spacetime” (Einstein) (both expressions are empty concepts), but it is “nothing” (between the stone and the Earth, the real macro-entities within the macro-EW) which corresponds to the curved electromagnetic field between two concentrations of the same electromagnetic field (one concentration corresponds to the stone, the other concentration to the Earth). These two concentrations and the electromagnetic field between them are all parts of the same electromagnetic field, a continuous entity which has been spreading in the “entire cosmos” since 380,000 years after the Big Bangs until now. Gravity is not a physical process/force/curved spacetime; the stone and the Earth really exist and “between them” there is not “gravity”, not curved spacetime, but “nothing” (no ontological status) which corresponds to the curved electromagnetic field. So, we need to use my EDWs for explaining certain real physical events/processes.

I add other examples. The air around the Earth. Does this air exist? Obviously it exist since without this air, the humans would not survive on this Earth. Is the air a physical entity or many physical entity? In both cases, it is quite impossible to identity the entity/entities. But the air really exist as a physical “entity”/entities/processes. The water from the rivers/oceans and the air around the Earth are certain material entities which really exist. In this context, the question is the following: “Can we establish the boundaries for such physical entities/processes?” My answer is: no, we cannot establish the boundaries for many physical entities/processes. So, there are certain ED entities/processes for which we cannot establish their boundaries.

A car hits my body (both the car and the body are macro-entities). Does that car really exists or is an amalgam of macro-pieces (engine, doors, etc.)? In the interaction between that car and my body, the car and the driver are a single entity because the entire mass of the car (which includes the mass of the human driver) interacts with the mass of my body. So, regarding this interaction, the entire car as a whole is an entity in that interaction. If somebody dissembles the car in its components macro-parts, the car would not exist. It is not here a “functional” role of that car in hitting/interacting with my body. It is a physical interaction between that car (including the mass of the driver) and my body (the mass of my body); it is a physical interaction with includes those two physical entities: the car (including the mass of the driver) and my body. Nothing else.

Let me suppose the same car is on the top of a hill without the driver. Because of the valley of the hill, the car has started to move toward the basement of that hill. At one moment, because I have been checking my Facebook page on my phone, the car hits/interacts with my body. The mass of the car interacts with the mass of my body. Is the same car? Yes, it is the same car, but it is not the same “entity” because the driver is not in the car, therefore, the mass of the car is not the same as the mass of the car and the mass of the driver. Can we consider the mass of the car is the sum of the masses of all macro-parts? It depends on the context: a car interacts, through its wheels, with the street. Can we consider only the wheels interact with that street? No, we cannot: it is the mass of the car which interacts with that street (because of the “gravity”). A car moves on a street. Are only the wheels which interact with the street? Without the engine, the car would not moves on that street. The linguistics, functionalists or pragmatists would claim it is about certain “words, words, words”; others would claim there are certain “functional/useful” tools/information in certain conditions. From my viewpoint, it is the car (as an entity having a mass) which interacts with the street; it is not a sum of the masses of the “components” of that car. If the car moves with certain speed, because of that speed, the mass of the car increases (Einstein’s special relativity). Therefore, we cannot consider the mass of that car as being the sum of the masses of all its “components”. (The car and its macro-components are entities in the same EW, the macro-EW!) Let suppose the car (with a human driver inside the car) hits my body on the street. Who did interacted with my body? The mass of the car and the mass of the driver. I can say my body interacted with an ensemble of certain macro-entities representing the sum of the masses of each macro-entity. There is a problem: during each second, some oil from that car is used, so the masses of the oil decreases in relationship to its speed. So, the mass of the car (including the mass of the driver) is in a continuously change. However, the entity (represented by the car and the driver in relationship to the street) is the same even if a property of that entity (its mass) is continuously in change. In that moment, the oil from the reservoir and the reservoir (and other macro-parts of the car) exist only one for the other but not for the street. During the same time (the car and the driver moves on that street), the car and the driver are two entities which exist one for the other but only the entity as a whole (the car and the driver) exists for the street. Again, according to the special relativity, in motion, the mass of the car increases extremely little, but a large amount of oil is consumed. It is not the fact that the “energy is equal to the mass”; “equal” is totally wrong here. As I wrote in my previous works, it would be about the “correspondence” between the energy and the mass, i.e., about the correspondence between certain ED entities belonging to the EDWs.[31] The “car in motion” has other mass than that “car in rest”, but the car is the same entity (in rest or in motion). In another case, for instance, the car has no oil in the reservoir. The driver is behind the car and pushes it and moves the car. The driver’s energy (the kinetic energy) is transferred to the car in motion. The mass of that car increases in those moments in which it moves.

An watermill: there is the building (mill, an ensemble of macro-entities) and the river/water. Does that water exist? Yes, it exist: it interacts with the mill. Does the river exist? It exists the water. If later, the river interacts with another river and another river and finally that water enters in one ocean, we cannot delineate the water of those rivers from the water of the oceans. The water of that river has no “clear” boundaries conditions even if it interacts with the mill. (The water and the mill correspond to (a) two huge amalgams of microparticles, the micro-EW, and (b) two concentrations of the continuous electromagnetic field, the field-EW…) The water from Danube and seas and oceans really exist, but this water has no boundaries: there are “amounts of water”. Some physical entities have physical boundaries (a car, the amount of water in that glass, the glass), some amounts of water do not have boundaries (the water of that river, the water of any ocean). The water from that glass has certain boundaries given by the interaction between that “amount of water” and the interior of that glass (the glass, an entity with clear boundaries). The electromagnetic field has no boundaries, it is a continuous entity (as any “field”), but it really exists in the field-EW. In the summer, certain amount of water of the river Danube evaporates in each moment. Is it the same amount of water? No, it is not. Is it the same river? If the river is the same amount of water, it is not the same river. But, the river is not exactly the same amount of water; this amount can be in changed quite strongly. Therefore, the river is the same during the summer. It is the same river in the winter, even if some parts of that amount of water become pieces of ices.

A human body is very small at birth, but much bigger at age 30. During the 7-8 years, except the neurons, all the cells of the body have somehow changed. Is the same body during these 30 years? For the mind of that person, it is the same body. My body interacts, in one day, with a chair (few hours). Is the same body during that interaction? Yes, it is. Is the same chair? Yes, it is. During 30 and 40 years, the body of that person interacts with the body of his wife. Is the same body? Is the body, according to our definition the sum of all macro-cells? Then during that period, it is not the same body since many macro-cells have replaced by new cells produced by the organism. From my viewpoint, the body of a person is the same body during his entire life, even if the mass of any human body dramatically changes in this period. For the mind of each person, it is the same body. It the body an entity? It can be considered an ensemble of macro-entities like parts of body, blood, and many other macro-elements. However, in correspondence to the mind, the body has always been the same entity. Those from the dynamical system approach would claim the body is in continuous interactions with the external environment and we cannot consider the body as a particular entity. Then, any proponent of the dynamical system approach (classically, “a human person with a human body”) does not exist; therefore “his” opinion does not matter at all. From my viewpoint, the body is an entity with a particular identity: some properties are in always in change, for instance, the air/oxygen absorbed by the lungs/body in each moment: are the air part of the body? Without the air, the body would not survive. Then we have to include the air in the identity of the body? Not necessary: there are some properties of the body that are continuously in change, but it does not mean that the body has no identity. My body interacts with the chair I sit on at this moment and I have constantly been breathing air. Is it the same body? My mind corresponds to the same body since I have been born until I would dye. The temperature of my body has been continuously changing. Does it mean it is not the same body? My body is the same body as yesterday and as ten years ago because of its correspondence to the mind. From another viewpoint, the blood (“inside” my body, but from my viewpoint, the blood is the body in relationship to the chair) interacts with other parts of the body. Is the blood a kind of entity (like a river) different from the vein and lungs? Yes, it is since the blood interacts with different organs (parts of my body, including the blood). However, my entire body interacts with the chair, so the body exists as an entity given also by this interaction. It is not only my “back” which interacts with the chair, it is my entire body which interacts with the entire chair (not only with its surface).

I walk on a street. Does my body exist in these moments or is it just an ensemble of macro-entities being in continuous contact with the environment? As I indicated above, it is my body as an individual entity even if some of its properties have changed during this period of time. The Sun and the Earth are the same macro-planets; their identities is given by their interaction (“gravity” which it is “nothing” but it corresponds to the curved electromagnetic field from the field-EW). For the Sun, the river Danube does not exist; for the Sun (a macro-planet), the Earth exists as a macro-entity, the planet Earth. For the Sun, the Earth is not an ensemble of macro-entities (or the corresponding micro-entities, or electromagnetic field). These macro-entities (rivers, oceans, continents, etc.) which represent this ensemble (composed of these macro-entities) do not exist for the Sun (as a planet).[32] The Earth loses its energy/mass in each moment; is it the same entity during one year, for instance? Yes, it is: as I have claimed above, there are certain properties that can change but the entity remains to be the same entity in relationship to other entities.

As I wrote my works 2007 and 2008 (and later), if an epistemological-threshold is passed, the entity would not be the same. The Sun and the Earth are the same two macro-planets since these macro-entities have appeared. They would be the same entities (the planets) until one or both will disappear even if their masses has been in a continuous change. The same is with the car with consumes the gas continuously: from one viewpoint, the car is the same in its relationship to the gas. We can say that the sum of the mass of that car and the mass of that amount of gas from that moment hits my body at one moment. However, in that interaction, we cannot differentiate between those two masses. In their relationship, there are two different macro-entities: the car and the gas or if we accept the identity theory for that car, from the viewpoint of a macro-object (like another car), the car does not exist, it is just the sum of all its macro-entities like the engine, the doors, reservoir, etc. From my viewpoint, after consuming an amount of gas, we can add more gas in that reservoir, but the car remains the same. Two days later, the car hits me again. It is the same car? Yes, it is. Is the same ensemble (car and gas) which would hit me? No: it is the same car (an ensemble of macro-entities like wheels, doors, etc.) but at least partially other “amount of gas”. The gas from the reservoir exists for the reservoir; the entire car-in-motion (including the gas from the reservoir) exists for that street.

An airplane on Earth: an airplane on an airport interacts with the soil/asphalt/pavement of that airport. The asphalt and the plane are two different macro-entities which interact during a period of time. However, for the Sun, there is no distinction between that airplane and the Earth; there is one entity with one mass (that is, sum of the mass of the Earth including the mass of the airplane and the mass of the pilot). The Sun interacts with this entity, the Earth (which includes the airplane and the pilot). At one moment, the airplane (with the pilot inside) has started to fly. After few seconds, the plane is in the air at 50 meters altitude. The airplane exists as entity for the Earth; it interacts with the Earth because the “gravity” of the Earth acts on the airplane. In the air, the airplane is not part of the Earth because it is not in direct contact with the Earth (as it was on the pavement of the airport). For the Sun, at 50 meters in the air, the airplane is still “part” of the Earth (more exactly, it is the Earth); there is no distinction between these two macro entities for the Sun. There is the airplane and the Earth in their interaction. The airplane flies at higher and higher altitude. At one moment, the gravity of the Earth stops (partially, not completely) to act on the airplane. If the pilot stops the engine of the airplane, the airplane would not fall on Earth, but it would “freely” float. From that moment, the airplane does not exist for the Earth since the “gravity” of the Earth does not act on that airplane. The airplane has become a real physical entity (with its boundaries) for the Sun, the air plane is not part of the Earth anymore since the Sun interacts now (through “gravity”) with the airplane (as a different entity than the Earth).

I introduce the second principle of my EDWs perspective for “the identity of an entity”[33]:

The identity of an entity is given by the interactions with other entities from the same EW or by the correspondence(s) with an entity/entities from an EDW/EDWs.

This principle is not a general one: we have to investigate each particular fact/process/entity/phenomena (physical or mental). The table in front of me (or a small metal ball in a park of the city) is a distinct physical entity having an identity within the macro-EW. The photons the light (emitted by the Sun) hit the table (i.e., more exactly, the amalgam of microparticles which corresponds to that table) and, therefore, some electrons are released from that amalgam of microparticles. Is it the same table? Yes, it is, since the table (a macro-entity) is not the sum of those microparticles, the table just corresponds to that amalgam of microparticles. If that table is split in two totally separated parts, then the table would not exist anymore; there would be two different macro-entities, but not the table. Before splitting the table in two parts, these two parts did not even exist, only the table existed as a macro-entity.

The immaterial ontology: a mental state really is but all the mental thoughts/feelings/states are the mind-EW (an immaterial EW). Any mental state has no material/physical boundaries since the mind-EW is an immaterial EW. So, we have to introduce another principle referring to the “boundaries of any entity which really exist/is”. An apple[34] is “part” of a tree (more exactly the apple is that tree), if the apple is still “growing part” of that tree. In the period, has that apple been a separate entity from the tree? No, it has not been a separate entity, the apple has been part of the tree (more exactly, that apple has been that tree). Later, the apple falls from the tree on the Earth. Is the apple a different entity than the tree and the Earth? Yes, it is; on the soil, that apple interacts with the Earth through “gravity”. Is the tree a different entity than the Earth? For the Sun, the tree, the apple and the soil are all the same entity, the Earth, even if there is a lot of changes between the tree, the apple and the soil (the tree would not survive without these changes). Again, for the Sun, the tree does not exist, the tree is the Earth. I introduce here another principle: “the boundaries of the ED entities”:

All the ED entities really exist but we cannot establish the boundaries of all the ED entities. The mental entities have no boundaries at all. Some ED physical entities have boundaries and we can establish them, some ED entities really exist and interact with certain entities from the same EW but it is quite impossible for us to determine these boundaries. It is not about the (ontological and/or epistemological) limits of the human knowledge/being, but about the ontological (physical or mental) conditions of existence for certain ED entities.

Let me introduce a thought experiment (against mainly philosophy of language, pragmatism, etc. – i.e., the entire philosophy and scientific theories of the last 120 years): “Vacariu’s victim of a terrorist attack”. A terrorist shut me with a gun and a bullet enters in my chest. An ambulance takes me to the hospital and some persons from the medical staff have immediately started to make a surgical operation to me. During this operation, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Peirce, James, Dewey, Quine, Rorty, Putnam and many other philosophers and scientists working within the framework given by “philosophy of language”, pragmatism/utilitarianism, neo-pragmatism, analytic pragmatism, etc. (all philosophers and scientists from the 20th century until 2005) have appeared in that room at the hospital and ask the doctor:

“Philosophers”: Doctor, what are you doing now?

Doctor: I am operating this person, I will take out the bullet from his chest.

Philosophers: What is a “bullet”?

Doctor: It is a piece of metal used with a gun. Somebody shut with this bullet in the chest of this person. Look, I have taken out this bullet from his chest.

Philosophers: “Bullet”? It is just a word, mostly a concept. Words, words, words, nothing else…

Doctor: Words? Look here the bullet, I have just extracted it from the body of this patient. From my experience, the victim will survive, but I have to stitch the incision and close the wound of this chest created by the bullet.

Philosophers: Chest? Body? Wound? You, the doctor, are just talking, your mind is full of words, words, words, nothing else.

Doctor: But look, I continue my surgical operation and my patient will survive. If I had not realized this surgical operation, surely he would not be able to survive.

Philosophers: Words, words, words… mostly, certain pragmatic, utilitarian actions, nothing else.

Doctor: But I got out the bullet from his chest, I have operated the victim’s chest/body he will survive. He will not dye, I have saved his life.

Philosophers: Body?  Life? Words, words, words…

Doctor: Look, he is not dead, he will survive because of my surgical operation. I have saved his life.

Philosophers: Life? Where do you see his life?

Doctor: But I have operated his damaged body.

Philosophers: You have no idea about life! Have you seen life in your life? Body? Words, words, words, mostly pragmatic actions, no more.

Doctor: I have saved his life.

Philosophers: Words, words, words…

Doctor (after finishing that surgical operation): With my experience (this surgical operation is among many other surgical operations I have done until now), I have saved another life of another patient.

Philosophers: Words, words, words… mostly, pragmatic actions…

Doctor: I have saved his life, during my career I have saved many lives…

Philosophers: Words, words, WORDS.

(Vacariu’s life has been saved because of this surgical operation.)

[End of my thought experiment here.]

Philosophers: Wait, wait! This was a “thought-experiment”, wasn’t it?

Vacariu: Yes, it is a “thought-experiment”.

Philosophers: Then, there were just “words, words, words”. We are saved! Clearly, it is our victory.

Vacariu: Where do you see these words?

Philosophers: On the screen of our computer using the Internet.

Vacariu: The screen of your laptop, the “laptop” itself is just an “word”, isn’t it? The laptop is a pragmatic tool or a word? Then, can I strike your head with your laptop? Or do you prefer my laptop?

Philosophers: Come on, we can accuse you of “planning a crime” against us. You are a criminal, during your career, you have wanted to demolish all our great philosophical notions, ideas, topics, approaches, our most general framework of thinking, the world, our world. At least, you have to know: the Internet is Wi-Fi and you cannot see it or touch it…

A priori-a posteriori: geometry, physics and the relativized a priori knowledge for Newton, Kant, Helmholtz, Poincaré and Einstein (according to Friedman 2009, 2012 and other authors)
During the 20th century, the philosophers had moved within the “philosophy of language” (or much worst, in “ethics”) or in analyzing, “philosophically” (i.e., “linguistically”), the “structures” of scientific theories in their relationships to the real (physical) phenomena.

In this context, I want to investigate the movement from the rationalism-empiricism distinction (a pseudo-distinction, see above), to the Kantian “a priori-a posteriori” distinction that had appeared in the philosophical analyses of scientific theories. Analyzing the theories from physics, the philosophers had been interested in the priori-a posteriori distinction. However, the a priori-a posteriori distinction had been a “functionalist” distinction since it did not refer to the ontological problems (for instance, the mind-brain/body problem). This distinction has no ontology; in fact, with this distinction, Kant intentionally avoided the mind-brain problem, the distinction between self-world (he brought the “world”, the “representation of the world” inside the self, so he rejected any ontology).[35] From my viewpoint, the rationalism-empiricism distinction is a pseudo-distinction and the a priori-a posteriori distinction is a functionalist one. We can say that the body is innate (but it is in a continuous change; for instance, the mass of a body increases much more 30 years after the day that body has been born). However, the entire knowledge (all the ideas, concepts, etc.) are acquired during each life-time.[36] Probably, the ability for a person to perceive some “colors” and “nuances of colors” is partially an innate “capacity”.[37] But, to perceive a red apple falling on Erath is not “knowledge”, it is an empirical fact. (I avoid to investigate here the pseudo-distinction “innate-acquired”.) For the majority of physicists, it had been necessary, during the last four centuries at least, to explain why the apple falls down toward the soil/Earth. The problem had been that even if the apple falling down toward the soil is an empirical process perceived by a human being, nevertheless, there was the “unobservable causation” of “why the apple falls down on Earth. Newton believed it was the “gravitational force”, while Einstein replaced this force with the “curved spacetime”. As I have indicated in my previous works, neither the “gravitational force”, nor the “spacetime” had been an “observable phenomena”. In fact, as I indicated in my previous works (I developed more ideas in this work), these notions were just “empty notions”. During my career as philosopher (of cognitive science and physics), I have tried to eliminate from the explanations of different “empirical facts” the “unobserved phenomena” introduced/presupposed by the human minds or at least to explain their unobserved status (like the mind-EW). Obviously, it has been quite impossible to reject all these abstract notions. The meaning of any word involves quite a lot of empirical and abstracts words. Any scientific theory involves certain empirical and abstract concepts/ideas/principles since these theories do not only describes empirical facts since any scientific theory tries to explain certain empirical facts/phenomena. All these explanations (all the scientific theories) have always involved certain empirical and abstract concepts, principles, ideas. Beginning with Galilei and mainly Newton, among cetain abstract concepts and ideas there have been included some “mathematical apparatus” (notions, geometries, algebras, calculus, differential equations, ideas, methods, etc.). Therefore, the relationships between the “pure mathematical language” and the “physical languages” have been quite difficult to be separated in the recent scientific theories from physics (for instance). I have not been interested in analyzing the “language of a scientific theory”; I have always been interested in investigating the main concepts/notions/principles of a scientific theory which refer to the “real” entities/processes/laws. For instance, I had inquired about the “real existence” of “spacetime” in Einstein’s relativities (for instance) and the “non-locality” in quantum mechanics. In these theories, these notions/concepts had referred to certain real physical entities/processes/phenomena, so my questions have been not about the “words, words, words” physicists have used to explain certain phenomena, but about the existences of the phenomena described by these concepts. I have always been interested on the ontological status of real (physical) phenomena, objects, processes, forces and not on the linguistic or mathematical tools used by certain great human minds for elaborating their scientific theories or philosophical approaches in explaining these “real phenomena”.

Let me investigate Kant’s a priori-a posteriori distinction from my EDWs perspective. Maybe, this distinction is not a pseudo-distinction, but it does not have any ontological background, therefore, maybe somebody can claim that this distinction is just a pragmatic/linguistic distinction.[38] From my viewpoint, I do not care too much about such “linguistic debates” (see the motto of this work). Due to the knowledge of 19th Century (the non-Euclidian geometries, the polyadic logic and the anti-psychological movement), Kant’s “absolute” apriorism became quite “relative”: a particular scientific theory contains certain a priori elements, but this apriorism does not refer to the human mind, it is relative to a certain “historical context”. In 19th century, the polyadic logic (versus Aristotle’s logic) and the non-Euclidean geometries appeared only as “theoretical knowledge”. So, in 19th century, these non-Euclidean geometries were only some “abstract knowledge” without any empirical application. For Kant, his pure intuition refers to the Euclidean geometry, the only geometry from that period. We have to understand a very important difference referring to the “relativity of a priori elements”: for Kant, the pure intuitions and the pure understanding are those pure elements of human reason; it is not even about the “mind”, but only about the “reason” (no ontology, only a functional analysis – exactly as it is Fodor’s “computationalism”)! Even in Kant’s transcendental idealism, the relativization of a priori elements moved from the “pure elements of reason” to the pure elements of a scientific (physics) theory, Newton’s theory of gravity[39]. At the first view, these a priori elements do not refer to the human mind, therefore, this “relativization” is an abstract notion. Kant refers to the pure intuitions and the categories, i.e., the “transcendental apperception” in explaining the “pure reason”. In his works, Friedman refers to the “relative apriorism” regarding the content of certain empirical theories (Einstein’s relativities, mainly) in physics. For Kant, the a priori elements refers to his pure intuitions and categories, but these notions do not refer to something which really exist in the mind. These notions do not have any ontological status since these notions refer to the “pure reasoning”. Meanwhile, in Friedman’s terms, Einstein’s “apriorism” refers to some elements from his theories of relativity. Nevertheless, Kant’s a priori involves indirectly, more functionally, the human pure reason (the ability of knowledge for a human person), while Einstein’s “a priori elements” refers to a scientific theory from physics.

Following Friedman (and others), I want to investigate the relationship between “space” (already “spacetime” according to Einstein’s special relativity) and “geometry”, from one side, and the “motion of objects” and “physics”, from the other side. So, I have to analyze two pairs of elements: space-motion (of entities) and geometry-physics. Moreover, we have to investigate the most important relationship in philosophy: the “subject-object” dichotomy, i.e., better, the “subject-world” pseudo-dichotomy. The “external world” from this dichotomy requires a certain “space” (related to a kind of geometry) for the external world. With his a priori pure intuitions and categories (representing both the “transcendental apperception”), Kant is beyond the rationalism-empiricism debate (since Ancient Greeks, a long debate in the history of philosophy).[40] Kant avoids the mind-brain problem in relationship with the subject-world dichotomy: even if something exists outside the “human person”, the “external world” is not the “real world”, but it is our “image of the world” which belongs to our reason. To avoid an absolute idealism (see Berkeley few decades later), ontologically, the “real world” is the “thing-in-itself”. Therefore, Friedman’s “relativization” of “a priori elements” does not mean a “relativization” in Kantian terms. In other words, Friedman does not investigate Einstein’s relativity within Kant’s framework of thinking; there are different frameworks of thinking for Kant and Friedman’s investigation of Einstein’s relativity.

With my EDWs perspective, I had realized more than a simple “relativization” of Kant’s intuitions (and categories): space “is relativized” neither by the non-Euclidean geometries (a conceptual mathematical instrument created in the 19th century), nor by Einstein’s general relativity (which necessitated the non-Euclidian geometry): the “real space”/spacetime does not even exist and our mental external images are parts of the mind which is an immaterial substance, therefore, the mind has no “space”/spacetime (not even an “illusory space”). From my viewpoint, “space” is “nothing” (no ontology) and it “corresponds”, for instance, to the electromagnetic field which has its own physical ontology (a continuous entity/process) in the field-EW.

I will continue presenting Friedman’s article from 2009 on “relativized” a priori knowledge for certain scientific theories and another article written also by Friedman in 2012 on “the change of paradigms” in the scientific theories in a particular science, physics.[41] I also add commentaries to and paragraphs from Weinert’s article (2009). I will interpret these works within my EDWs. Friedman have successfully indicated certain a priori elements in these theories. I will introduce a table about all these elements (a priori and empirical knowledge for the authors mentioned in the previous statements) as a summary of Friedman’s chapter and I also inserted some of his ideas.

Authors         A priori/postulates          Geometry                  Kinematics motion entities

Newton                                                   Euclid                            laws of motion + gravity

Kant                  pure intuitions               Euclid                              Newton’s gravitation

  1. (infinitely iterate geometric construction)

Hume                  + perception of spatial objects)

Locke                laws of motion

Helmholtz      space                                Euclid                spatial measurements  → Euclid

free mobility

Poincaré  hierarchy disciplines               Euclid +nonEuclid=conventions

free mobility + iteration                   →                        physical law of relativity

relativity of space

(space: homogenous, isotropic)

Einstein

SR            relativity                               Euclid              dynamic of Minkowski space-time

rectilinear motion                                                 electrodynamics moving objects

inertial trajectories/

laws electromagnetic, c                        →                       new simultaneity

mechanical phenomena

GR       equivalence                non-Euclid (empirical)           free falling trajectories

gravitation=acceleration                                                     in gravitational field

mg=mi
c

The main topic: “relativization of a priori principles” in the human knowledge within the framework given by the eternal “rational-empirical” debate.

  • Newton: Euclid geometry + three laws of motion. It results the “motions of the inertial objects” and later the “gravitational force”/gravity.
  • Kant: pure intuitions (sensibility, Euclidian space) and categories (understanding with Newton’s laws of motions and Aristotle’s logic) are a priori. Such a priori knowledge (given by the pure mathematics and the universal natural sciences) was against Hume’s skepticism and Locke’s empiricism. Kant’s main questions:

“How is pure mathematics possible?” → Because of the pure sensibility (Transcendental Aesthetic-CPR)

“How is pure natural science possible?” → Because of the pure understanding (Transcendental Analytic)

For Kant, geometry (space) and physics (motion) are strong related under his “transcendental apperception”. The main problem for Kant was the “uniqueness” of these pure intuitions (Euclidean space) and categories (motions, etc.). This uniqueness was challenged/rejected by the new

  • non-Euclidean geometries
  • the logical/analytic “truths” (against the Kantian faculty of “pure sensibility”)
  • new subjective cognitive faculties (against the Kantian categories).

Moreover, against Aristotle’s logic, Kant believes that the “pure intellect” cannot represent the “infinite extendibility” and the “divisibility of geometrical space”. (Friedman 2009) In this sense, Kant “integrates” the “external Euclidean space” within the pure intuition of space (and time) inside the “pure reason” (a functional notion). Nevertheless, Kant also deals with the “empirical intuitions” which are parts of the “empirical” reason/intellect/mind. So, in the end, Kant’s transcendental idealism requires some “ontological applications”. In this context, Kant rejects Newton’s “absolute space” and “absolute time”; he also rejects Leibniz’s “relative space” and “relative time”. Trying to be beyond Newton-Leibniz dispute, Kant brings the intuitions of space and time inside the “pure reason”. We have to recall, there are also those empirical intuitions of space and time…

  • Helmholtz: “space” and “free mobility” as a priori, but the “Euclidian geometry” is given by certain “spatial measurements”. Helmholtz’s condition of “free mobility” is a kind of generalization of Kant’s (Euclid) conception of “geometrical construction”. The principle of free mobility indicates a “necessary structure of our form of external intuition”. (Friedman 2009) Poincaré and others mathematician indicated that the principle of free mobility is available also for the non-Euclidian geometry, therefore, this principle could not be an “a priori knowledge” in order to indicate the geometry of the “external space”. With his general relativity, Einstein indicates that the spatial(temporal) framework near the Earth is non-Euclidean (i.e., it is curved by the mass of the Earth). From my viewpoint, the problem is that the “free mobility” of an external macro-object near to the Earth does not follow an “Euclidian space” just because, according to my EDWs perspective, this “empty space” (i.e., “nothing”, no ontology) corresponds to the curved electromagnetic field (the field-EW). If this “empty space” (space or spacetime, in general) cannot have any ontology, then both the Euclidean and the non-Euclidean geometries cannot be applied. Nevertheless, since the corresponding electromagnetic field is curved, then practically, we can consider (an abstract consideration, no more) that the “empty space” (no ontology) near the Earth is “curved” (the non-Euclidean geometry) just because this “empty curvature” (no ontology) corresponds to the real curved electromagnetic field (the field-EW). This electromagnetic field “near” the Earth is curved not by the planet Earth (the planet Earth does not exist in the field-EW), but it is curved by a great concentration of electromagnetic field which corresponds to the planet Earth.
  • Poincaré: The French mathematician recognizes the importance of “free mobility” regarding the motions of physical bodies, but he is aware that this principle cannot indicates if the space is an Euclidean or a non-Euclidean one. (Friedman 2009) Therefore, for Poincaré, the geometry necessary for explaining the “space placed” near the Earth (for instance) is just a “convention”. Poincaré believes that the rigid objects move in a “real space”. He introduces a “hierarchy of domains (arithmetic, analytics, geometry, mechanics/physics) to relate “geometry” to “physics”. However, the “free mobility” and “iteration” are still certain a priori elements, but both the Euclidian and the non-Euclidian geometries (referring to external space available for the free mobility of objects) are just “conventions”. From the “relativity of space” (“homogenous and isotropic”) results the “physical law of relativity”. Essentially, under the modern notion of the “inertial frame of reference”[42], both Helmholtz and Mach believe that geometry (space) is not directly related to physics (motion), i.e., the foundation of geometry and the relativity of motions are independent concepts.[43] (Friedman 2009) Even if Poincaré introduces the “principle of relative motion” (the inertial systems) and the “law of relativity (the non-inertial systems), nevertheless, the second principle does not explain Newton’s “rotating bucket experiment”. (Friedman 2009) This “rotating bucket experiment”, the motions of objects are accelerated, the speed is not uniform and constant. From the EDWs perspective, there are neither the Euclidean space (for the “uniform and constant” motion), nor the non-Euclidean space (for the “non-uniform and non-constant” motion). So, the relation between geometry and physics is not meaningless, but it becomes just a pragmatic/practical relationship. Regarding the “law of relativity”, Poincaré has strong a priori reasons from his “philosophy of geometry” (“relativity and passivity of space”). So, for him, the geometry of “real space” is just a “convention”. Even if we cannot agree if the space is an Euclidean space or an non-Euclidean space, nevertheless, for Poincaré, the “space” really exists. He has no doubts about the existence of space; his conventions refer to the geometry of the external space, not to the existence of external space.
  • Einstein:

Weinert (2009) indicates that a great scientist is also philosopher, that is, for elaborating a new great scientific theory, a great scientist needs to change the “old framework of thinking” (or at least the old sub-paradigm of thinking”) with a new one (this being a job for a philosopher). Weinert mentions Born’s words (1949) referring to the role of experience in changing the old concepts with new concepts. Importantly, Weinert adds that certain concepts are quite “physic-philosophical” notions not directly related to a particular physical theory. (Weinert 2009, p. 2) Einstein believes that the scientific theories are only creations of human minds but for him, a scientific theory is valid only in relationship to the existence of the “external world”. (Weinert 2009, p. 9) Under certain “constraints”, any physical theory has somehow “to fit” with the “external experiences”. (idem, p. 14) From my viewpoint, “to fit” means to explain all the (physical) events/phenomena/entities from a particular scientific domain during a period of time. If there are not all the phenomena/entities explained (if there are some “anomalies” – see Kuhn), it means that something could be wrong (or, at least, “incomplete”) with that theory. Einstein was a realist (the external world really exists), but he believed that, even if the external world is independent of any human observer, all the scientific theories are just inventions of the human minds.[44] Einstein introduces new philosophical concepts as “consequences” of his physical theories. (Weinert, p. 2)[45] However, Weinert try to introduce his personal “relational structural view” (“words, words, words”, from my viewpoint) regarding the “form of physical laws”, but this “form” is strongly related to certain statements from mathematics and therefore, from my viewpoint, “form”/structure is a very abstract notion (a kind of return to Plato’s “Ideas” and Kant’s “pure reason”…). It seems that in his structuralism, Weinert was influenced by Einstein: “The structure of the external world practically determines the form of the theoretical system. [Einstein 1918b; 1933]” (in Weinert, p. 9) As I indicated in the past, the “world”/“Universe” does not even exist, therefore, the “structure of the world” would be a very abstract notion or even wrong concept; anyway, it could not refer to certain real entities/laws  having a real ontology.

From my viewpoint, we cannot make a clear distinction between the philosophical and the scientific concepts and ideas, between the empirical notions and the theoretical notions. We can make an relative distinction (but essential) between a scientific theory (physics) and a philosophical approach mainly if we consider that a theory in physics explains some particular physical phenomena, while a philosophical systematic approach (so rarely in the history of philosophy) pretends to explain the “entire universe” (or at least, “many parts of the world”). I believe this distinction has to indicate the great difference between a scientific theory and a philosophical systematic approach. Any great scientific theory represents a change of a sub-paradigm or even a particular “paradigm of thinking”, i.e., the change of some essential concepts from the previous (sub)paradigm of thinking. However, a great philosophical systematic approach requires, with necessity, the radical changes of the main concepts and ideas of the previous (sub)paradigm of thinking, i.e., the change of the entire paradigm of thinking. Even if it is difficult to delineate a clear line between a great scientific theory and a great philosophical approach, there has to be an important difference: a scientific theory refers to a particular domain of entities, processes, events, phenomena, while a philosophical approach has to explain the “entire world”. For instance, in our days, a theory from physics refers to some particular phenomena/entities/processes of the external world. Essentially, some concepts in any scientific theory in physics cannot be testified but these notions (“subject to interpretations”) are very important in that theory. (Weinert, p. 2) “Although the fundamental notions—energy, event, mass, space, time—are logically speaking free inventions of the human mind, they must strike empirical roots. [Einstein 1920, 141]” (Weinert, p. 4) Einstein’s wonderful statement does not clarify the status of a scientific theory in relation to “the truth”. On the contrary, I could claim that it contains a contradiction: what does it mean “strike empirical roots” since any “empirical root” (related to a “scientific theory”) is a mixture between the “human mind” and the “external experience”? What does it mean, for Einstein, “experience”? From a Kantian viewpoint, all the “experiences” are creations of the human mind, all “the experiences” are just some “phenomenal experiences” within the mind of each human being. Einstein clearly rejects the Kantian view. From my viewpoint, there are certain “experiences” accepted by the great majority of human beings from a society during a period of time. It means that, Kuhn’s historicism, this acceptance is a historical one; it means that a scientific theory is not “the truth” but it has been accepted by “society” during a period of time. Then, can we talk about the “truth” regarding any scientific theory? We will see below my answer to this question; I mention here that I avoid any pragmatism, Kantianism, relativism, nihilism, etc. I am, as Einstein, a “critical realist” (see below).

Special Relativity: the principle of relativity (Galilei) and the constant speed of light c are the “a priori principles” (within the Euclidian geometry). The great difference between Kant and Einstein is not only the “uniqueness” of “space” and “time” for Kant and the “contraction of space and dilation of time” of the objects-in-motion for Einstein. For Kant, the pure intuitions (and the categories) are a priori “pure elements” of pure reason. According to Friedman, in Einstein’s relativity, his postulates (certain empirical facts, for instance the speed of light c) are “a priori” in relationship to other elements of knowledge which refer to certain empirical objects/facts. That is, this apriorism (certain “postulate principles”) is within a physical theory (Einstein’s special relativity). Also, Weinert indicates that Einstein needs to take into account the electro-magnetic events (among these processes, it is the constant speed of light, c, for all the observers) in order to generalize Galilei’s “principle of relativity”.  Therefore, Einstein uses Lorentz’s transformations for the measurements of “spacetime” from one reference frame to another. (Weinert, p. 99) Let me take the example of “time”: “Einstein time is a clock time.” (Weinert, p. 4)[46] From my viewpoint, any clock has no “time”, there are only certain “physical elements in motion”, nothing else. (see Vacariu and Vacariu 2016) Even the “empirical fact” that “the motion of light is the same for all the observers” does not involve “time” (or “spacetime”). On the contrary, as we indicated in our work (2016), the “everywhere presence” of the electromagnetic field (in this “cosmos”, i.e., everywhere in the field-EW)) excludes the “existence of any space” (spacetime). Otherwise, the presence of the electromagnetic field in “space” at the same time would mean a strong ontological contradiction since two entities (“space” and the electromagnetic field) cannot be “placed in the same place, at the same moment”. (place and moment are just pragmatic notions…)

From my viewpoint, what would be the difference between a priori-a posteriori distinction[47] and the rationalism-empiricism distinction[48]? Both distinctions refer to the human knowledge, but the first distinction refers to the “propositions” related to experience, the second distinction refers to the “human knowledge” and the external world. It means, the a priori-a posteriori distinction does not involves, directly, the “human being” (her mind); this distinction would be just a “functional” distinction. (Recall Einstein’s idea that all the scientific theories from physics are creations of certain human minds…) Within Friedman’s framework, Einstein’s “a priori postulates” of both theories of relativity refer to the contents of these theories. Moreover, from a human viewpoint, even the speed of light (c) is an empirical fact, it “is raised” by Einstein at the status of “a priori” in its relationship with other elements of knowledge in both theories, “special relativity” “general relativity”. It means the human subject is not directly involves in this a priori-a posteriori distinction; this distinction refers to the content of those scientific theories, no more. For Kant, this distinction is a “functional” distinction (no ontology), but these pure elements of pure reason are functional/explicative elements in relationship to the human intellect/mind (a real entity) and, in the end, these pure elements are “applied” to the “external thing-in-itself”. More exactly, the “thing-in-itself” (which really exists but we have no idea about it) becomes, because of our applied transcendental apperception, the “phenomena”, i.e., certain mental representations/scene inside of our mind, while outside remains the thing-in-itself.

In this context, I believe we cannot even talk about the “relativization” of Kant “apriorism”. Some people would claim that any scientific theory is represented by certain propositions/statements and any scientific theory does not involve directly the “human mind”. But any proposition/statement, any scientific theory or any philosophical approach is elaborated by a human mind and Kant refers to the “pure reasoning” of the human mind in relationship to the “thing-in-itself”. Exactly because Kant introduces “thing-in-itself” in his equation, probably being aware that the rationalism-empiricism distinction becomes superfluous, it was compulsory for him to use the “priori-a posteriori” distinction (and not the “rationalism-empiricism” distinction).

Einstein’s special relativity refers to the motions of objects in the inertial trajectories/frames (following Minkowski’s kinematics of space, time and motion for the electrodynamics of moving objects): the “electro-magnetic and optical phenomena do not distinguish one inertial frame from another”. (Friedman 2009)[49] Again, according to Friedman, Einstein “elevates” an empirical fact to the status of “a priori postulate”. I believe, Einstein did not care what elements from his theories are a priori and what elements are a posteriori! Nevertheless, for Einstein, his two postulates (the special relativity) are a priori knowledge for describing the “electrodynamics of moving bodies”. Friedman: the same laws of electrodynamics and the optics are valid for all the frames of reference in which “equations of mechanics are valid”; so, Einstein elevates the “principle of relativity” and the “light velocity c (independent of state of motion of emitting body”) to a priori postulates. (Friedman 2009) Indeed, if Kant does not refer to the “external experience”/“thing-in-itself” at all, then the rational-empiricism distinction becomes superfluous and only “a priori-a posteriori” distinction becomes useful, pragmatic distinction (no ontology). Einstein refers to the external/empirical phenomena (the motions of certain external bodies) not to certain mental phenomena (like Kant). With his special relativity (space contracts and time dilates in relationship to the speed of objects), based on his two principles, Einstein furnishes a new interpretation of “simultaneity”: a “radical revision of classical kinematics of space, time, and motion”. (Friedman 2009) There are the classical mechanics with its “kinematical structure of inertial frame of reference on Newton laws of motion” and Einstein’s two postulates which involves the changes of “spacetime frameworks” in relationships to the motions of objects. Light moves with the constant speed c for all the inertial frames. The motion of any observer/physical entity involves the contraction of space and dilation of time (within a unified 4-D spacetime framework). I have been surprised by the fact that, even if Einstein “relativized” the “spacetime framework”, he did not think to reject completely the ontology of space and time (or spacetime)…[50]

Friedman insists in informing us about Einstein’s “elevation”: for the special relativity, there are two a priori principles (the principle of relativity and the speed of light c), for the general relativity are also two a priori principles (the principle of equivalence and c). In both cases, there is a “new inertial-kinematical structure for space, time, motion”. (Friedman 2009) In the case of the general relativity, the “principle of equivalence” is also an empirical fact elevated to the a priori status. Friedman mentions “Einstein’s delicate dance” between Helmholtz and Poincaré. Earlier, Einstein follows

  • Poincaré “conventionalist” status in “elevating” the principle of relativity and the light principle to “postulates”
  • Helmholtz “empiricism” in rejecting Poincaré’s “specific philosophy of geometry in favor of practically rigid bodies”. (Friedman 2009)

So, Einstein introduces a new radical view about “geometry” (space or, more exactly, spacetime) and “physics” (motions of practically rigid bodies in “spacetime”). In the general relativity, the geometry of space is a non-Euclidian one, so this space (spacetime) is not just a “convention” (Poincaré) but it is a real fact, i.e., this “geometry has physical content” (Friedman). In the case of general relativity, an empirical fact (inertial mass = gravitational mass) is transformed in an “a priori principle”, the “principle of equivalence” (acceleration = gravity). Nevertheless, in this case, the “space” is neither a pure a priori intuition (Kant), nor an Euclidean space/spacetime (spacetime with the special relativity) but an empirical fact, a real “non-Euclidean space/spacetime” (with a real ontology). So, Friedman emphasizes that the geometry “in a general relativistic spacetime” is “empirically determined by the distribution of mass and energy in accordance with Einstein’s field equation”, while the principle of equivalence is a kind of “transcendentally constitutive condition” for this “geometrical description of space–time” in acquiring a “genuine empirical” meaning. (Friedman) Friedman’s conclusion is that if Kant strongly relates geometry (space) and physics (motions of phenomenal bodies) within his “transcendental method”, “there is a new conception of relativized a priori first instantiated” in Einstein’s general relativity which furnishes a “radically new reconfiguration of connection geometry-physics in general relativity”. (Friedman) Regarding the geometry-physics relationship, there is the Euclidean geometry and the Newtonian physics followed by “successive reconceptualizations of this relationship (discoveries in the pure mathematics and the empirical basis of mathematical physics”) and, in the end, Einstein’s general relativity. From my viewpoint, even if we can talk (practically, about the inertial frames of references), nevertheless, there is no space (Euclidean) for the inertial motions. Moreover, we cannot believe that, due to motion, the “spacetime framework” changes “its parameters” (i.e., space contracts and time dilates relative to motion) since we cannot draw a line between the “spacetime” of somebody in a train-in-motion and the “spacetime” of somebody resting-on-the pavement. (see Vacariu and Vacariu 2014 or 2016) Since “spacetime” could not even exist, certain physical processes-in-motion become longer-in-happening: if the motion of a physical system increases, the physical processes of that system become longer, therefore, it is not the “dilation of time”. I repeat, in the past (see our work 2014, 2016), I was very surprised that, unifying “space” (3D) with “time” (1D) and relativizing the “spacetime” (4D) with the special relativity, Einstein did not think even to reject the existence of this already “relativized spacetime”. I believe that even such “relativization” involves a direct “rejection”. More amazing, very few people had enquired about the ontology of such “relativized spacetime”. Again, even the unification of “space” with “time” could rise some important questions about the ontology of these “unified” four-dimensions (three spatial “dimensions”, one temporal “dimension”).

Discovering the existence of the EDWs (in the same place”, at the same “period”), I inquired the ontology of spacetime: there was the same “spacetime” for the micro-entities (the micro-EW) and the macro-entities (the macro-EW)? Moreover, the continuous electromagnetic field which “covers the entire cosmos” (the field-EW) could not be “inserted within a space”. This field is not “in space”, otherwise there would be an ontological contradiction (see above or my previous works). This continuous electromagnetic field corresponds to the micro-entities and the macro-objects and their motions. If we agree with the special relativity, the motions of these ED entities would be in different “spacetime frameworks”. How can we delineate the many spacetime frameworks of the microparticles in motion or in rest from the many spacetime frameworks of macro-objects in motion or in rest? I repeat, for me, there was an ontological contradiction between the existence of the “spacetime” among the micro-entities and the macro-entities and the corresponding electromagnetic field. Having in my mind all these ideas (and the mind-body problem), I concluded that “spacetime” could not even exist.

General Relativity: The principle of equivalence (mg = mi or gravitation = acceleration) is an a priori principle; also, the speed of light is an a priori principle. This theory refers to the non-Euclidian geometry (the non-Euclidean space being “empirically” established), the gravitational force does not exist, it is just the “curved spacetime”[51]. The result of this “curved spacetime” near the Earth is that those “free falling trajectories in a gravitational field”. Einstein rejects

– “Helmholtz’s empiricism” because of relativity of motion of objects in different relative spatiotemporal frameworks

– “Poincaré’s conventionalism” because of the non-Euclidean geometry of “spacetime” (determined empirically) from the general relativity.

However, like Kant, Einstein strongly relates geometry (space/sensibility) and physics (understanding). In fact, in his entire article, Friedman indicates the relationship between geometry (space) and physics (kinematics, space-time-motion) for Newton-Kant, Helmholtz, Poincaré and Einstein. For Einstein, Kant’s a priori “absolute principles” (“sensibility” and “understanding”) became “relative” a priori principles in different scientific theories/knowledge.

  • Reichenbach (1920): after Einstein’s creations of both the special and the general theories of relativity, Reichenbach relativizes Kantian constitutively a priori principles of geometry and mechanics.

The EDWs perspective: I discovered the existence of EDWs working on the mind-brain problem (somehow, an “empirical” problem). I have always been working on various “entities” and their processes/relationships, but I totally avoided working on the problem of “spacetime” in the first years of my career. However, as I have indicated above, few years later, I asked myself if it was the same “space” in some EDWs or each EW had its “own space”? The only answer was that the “spacetime” could not even exist. Even at the beginning, I realized that the mind had no “space”; later I understood that the space (spacetime) itself could not have any ontological status (again, its existence being in contradiction to the existence of the electromagnetic field in the field-EW). So, in our books 2014 and 2016, we indicated that “spacetime” could not have any ontological status. In our book 2016, we re-wrote both Einstein special relativity and general relativity without “spacetime” (using only the “motions of entities”). Therefore, our “paradigm of thinking” was not to relate “geometry” to “physics”, but to exclude completely “geometry” (space or spacetime) from discussions referring  to physics (the motions of objects/entities). We believed that space and time (or spacetime, as you wish) were just certain concepts created by the human minds.[52] With my EDWs perspective, I rejected any kind of “reductionism” but I also rejected the existence of any kind of spacetime. With the help of the EDWs perspective, the macro-entities acquired a clear ontological status (in their relationships to the microparticles and the electromagnetic waves from quantum mechanics) without the need of any “spacetime frameworks”.[53] All the macro-entities (the macro-EW) and the micro-entities (the micro-EW) are placed in “nothing” (no ontology) which corresponds to the electromagnetic field (the field-EW) which “covers the entire “cosmos”. Following Friedman (2009), I could sustain that my empirical discovery of the EDWs has become an a priori (relative) principle regarding many problems (for instance, the “ontology of spacetime”): the existence of EDWs rejected the existence of space(time).

Helmholtz and Poincaré separated the Kantian relationship between “space”/geometry and “motion”/physics. I recall, with his transcendental idealism, Kant explains the phenomena (in our mind); the external objects do not exist, there is just an unknown forever “thing-in-itself”. Again, with my EDWs, I completely rejected the existence/ontology of “spacetime”, so geometry is not a “science” but a discipline and the “objects of studying” of this discipline do not refer to certain “real entities” but to some abstract notions (like the “Euclidean space” or the “non-Euclidean space”), just “inventions” of the human minds. Among the macroentities (the macro-EW) and the microentities (the micro-EW), there would be “nothing” which has no ontological status, but in these two cases, the “nothing” corresponds to the electromagnetic field (the field-EW). Therefore, a planet does not curve “space”/spacetime but “nothing” (no ontology) in the macro-EW which corresponds to the electromagnetic field (the field-EW). (See Vacariu and Vacariu 2016) Therefore, “spacetime” could not have any ontological status. Again, between two planets (the Sun and the Earth, for instance) there is “nothing” (no ontological status) which corresponds to the electromagnetic field. This electromagnetic field “between two planets” is curved not by the planets (the planets do not exist in the field-EW) but by those two concentrations of the electromagnetic fields (“parts” of the entire field-EW) which correspond to those two planets (the macro-EW). It has been supposed that the “infinitesimal space” is “straight” (not curved); an apple falls on Earth following the “shortest distance” which is “straight” in an infinitesimal distance but curved in the field-EW. I can raise my hand if I want, so my hand do not follow the “law of gravitation”: can I touch my nose with my hand following a “straight line”? In the field-EW, this line is curved. On short distances, we have the illusion that a “short distance” (a short space/spacetime) is “straight”; in reality, any “distance” is curved because it corresponds to the curved electromagnetic field (which covers the entire “cosmos”). Anyway, “distance” refers to “nothing” (no ontology) since “space/spacetime” could not have any ontological status.

Eddington’s experiment confirmed Einstein’s theory of general relativity, even if the photons (“light”) do not have masses just because “light” follows the “shortest distance” which is, in the field-EW, the corresponding curved electromagnetic field. Why an apple falls down on Earth? Because the apple and the Earth (the macro-EW) have their “masses” which correspond to those two concentrations of the electromagnetic field (the field-EW). It is not these concentrations which attract each other (since the electromagnetic field does not have any mass), but there are those two planets (the macro-EW) which “attract each other” just because of their masses and the corresponding concentration of the electromagnetic field and the curved electromagnetic field between these two concentrations of the same electromagnetic field.

Working on the mind-brain problem, I have always dealt only with “substances” (I have never dealt with “function” or “mathematics”[54]). In this way, I discovered the existences of certain ED entities (“substance”) which belong to the EDWs. But even when I was working on the EDWs (others than the mind-EW), I indicated these EDWs involve certain ED entities. Later, I applied the EDWs perspective to the ED entities and their ED interactions. I applied my EDWs perspective to quantum mechanics and I indicated that the electromagnetic waves (the field-EW) and the microparticles (the micro-EW) belonged to the EDWs. Then, I applied the EDWs perspective to both Einstein’s special and general relativity without “spacetime”: for me, there were only the macro-entities (the planets, for instance) and their motions without any “spacetime”, and these macro-entities belong to the macro-EW[55].

Let me investigate, in few words, the (super)string theory and my EDWs (for details, see my work 2010):
Authors
String theory
(Veneziano, Schwartz, Susskind, Green, Witten, etc.)

Philosophical position                      
function/formalism (absolute)
Mathematics = Physics

Revolution/change in science
mathematics = reality
abstract math equations = reality
(super)strings 10-11-26 dimensions

For the (super)string theory, each particle is a “vibration of a string” in 5/10/11/26 dimensions; the mass of a particle is determined by the energy of a string vibration. (Greene 1999) Different types of vibrations determine the particles having different masses. The researchers of the superstring theory believe that they (Schwarz and Sherck) can explain not only the strong forces but also the gravitation/“graviton” (as I indicated in my previous works, graviton could not even exist!). Based on the “uncertainty principle” (for me, an epistemological principle not an ontological one – as many physicists had believed until I discovered the EDWs and published my article in 2002/2005), every string is in a continuous “vibration” in 10/11/26 dimensions. Thus, the “reality” is “geometrized/mathematized”, more exactly, the “reality” is given by some mathematical abstract formulas in a multidimensional spacetime of 10/11/26 dimensions. In the (super)string theory, “everything” is given by the “abstract mathematics”, but these physicists believe spacetime is so small that it would be impossible for us to measure it in our days just because of the limits of our tools of measurement. As we indicated in 2010, the (super)string theory has been the worst “mathematization of physics” (the “reality”/“universe” explained only by certain abstract mathematical formula/notions/concepts) in the history of human thinking. In our chapter (2010), we indicated that (super)string theory was totally wrong since its mathematics had nothing to do with “reality”, i.e., with the EDWs. The (super)string theory is the worst SF story in the history of physics, nothing else. Later, in our book 2016, we indicated that the space (spacetime) could not have any ontological status, therefore, the string theory is just a SF creation for many “SF imaginative” minds; during many decades, many physicists had been totally conquered by the totally “abstract mathematics”. Also, the researchers have invented certain mathematical formulas in their goal to relate quantum mechanics to the general relativity. As I indicated in my works, quantum mechanics refers to at least two EDWs (the particle-EW and the field-EW[56]), while the general relativity refers to the macro-EW and, since one EW does not exist for any EDW, it is meaningless to relate these two theories. So, the entire (super)string theory has been the worst SF and wrong story in the 20th century.

Clearly, the EDWs perspective has been a sudden/“incommensurable” revolution in the development of human thinking (not only for particular sciences like cognitive (neuro)science or physics but also for philosophers and other scientists!).[57] With the EDWs perspective, I have introduced a totally new “paradigm of thinking” against the oldest paradigm of thinking, the “universe/world”. This change has been a “radical/incommensurable change” in the framework of human thinking since it presupposed not a development/improvement of a previous scientific theory or philosophical approach but a radical rejection of the oldest and largest paradigm of thinking of human thinking (not only for scientists/philosophers), the “unicorn world” and the rejection of all the scientific theories and the philosophical approaches. This wrong framework of thinking, the unicorn world, has been replaced by a totally new one, the EDWs perspective. Without any doubt, my discovery of the EDWs and the applications of my approach for many topics of the main particular sciences (CNS, physics, biology) and philosophy has been the “greatest revolution” in the entire history of human thinking.

Before investigating in more details Friedman’s second article, “Kuhn and philosophy” (2012) and Weinert’s article (2009) within the EDWs perspective, firstly I try to indicate the “general umbrella” under which these authors have written their articles. These philosophers analyses certain notions, principles, ideas from Einstein’s theories of relativity. They try to grasp either the a priori-a posteriori distinction or the changes of some essential concepts and principles of these theories in explaining some empirical/physical phenomena. Friedman analyses two conceptual frameworks: “development-by-accumulation” (“early logical positivism”) versus Kuhn’s “conceptual discontinuity” or “incommensurability”. This dichotomy mirrors a very general dispute/dichotomy in the history of philosophy and physics: rationalism/idealism (Pythagoras, Plato, Kant, early logical positivism (Carnap), i.e., mathematics as the basement of describing the external reality) versus empiricism/historicism (Aristotle, Hume, Koyrè, Kuhn). My EDWs is beyond the empiricism-rationalism/mathematics dispute. In fact, Plato’s “Ideas” are based on a religious umbrella: I believe for Plato, the existences of Ideas were very similar to the existences of Greek “Gods”. In this context, he believes that all the “phenomena” are just “appearances/illusions” which, however, “participate” to the real “Ideas”. This “participations”, a very problematic notion, was totally rejected by Aristotle. Nevertheless, Aristotle uses “logic” and the problematic “form”-“matter” distinction and many other problematic concepts in his Metaphysics. Nevertheless, he rejected the existences of “Ideas”. It has been a great dispute between statements from “mathematics” (absolute truths)/generality/types/FUNCTION and statements from physics (normal truths)/individuality/tokens/SUBSTANCE during the history of human thinking of the last 2,500 years. “Function” has been strong related to mathematics, “substance” has been related to the “external existences”, the “individual objects”. Not surprisingly, at the entrance of Plato’s school was written: “Nobody can enter in this school without knowing geometry”. In that time, “geometry” was mathematics/science. Plato was very influenced by the “Pythagoras’ school of mathematics” (full of “mysticism”): Plato’s “Ideas” were strong related to the mathematical numbers/functions and “rationality”. On the contrary, Aristotle rejected the existence of Ideas/types and preserves only the existences of objects/individuality/tokens. His perspective was somehow related to the empiricism but his approach was not a total empiricism since he considered “logic” as having a major role in human thinking and used the problematic notion of “essence” referring to each individual object/entity. We can think that Aristotle’s “essence” of individual things (two chairs are chairs because their essence is the form of a chair) is just a “linguistic notion”, nothing else: those two chairs really exist as macro-entities (the macro-EW), but these entities do not have any “essence”. We see here the strong role of concepts and ideas from mathematics (and logic – see logical empiricism) in explaining the “reality”. This relationship (in which “mathematics” had have a very important role in explaining the reality) has been preserved in the next two millennium until 2005.

Very problematic Plato’s notion of “participation” of “phenomena”/apparent objects to “Ideas” is strong related to Descartes’ very problematic notion of “interaction” between two different ontological substances, the immaterial/mind and the material/brain-body. In order to avoid the problematic notion of “interaction” between the mind and the body (two different substances), Spinoza realizes a movement from “ontology” (the real existences of the mind and the brain/body) to “epistemology”: the mind and the body are just “epistemological attributes” of the “thing-in-itself”. The “I” “perceives” the mind and the body, but these “perceptions” are just “attributes” (epistemology) created by our mind in relationship to the thing-in-itself (ontology). Moreover, Spinoza adopts a pantheistic view. Leibniz introduces his “pre-established harmony” between the mind and the body, this harmony being “pre-arranged by God”. We recall, before Leibniz, Descartes introduced “God” for “solving” the interactions between those two different ontological substances. On the contrary, Kant explains the “pure reason” which cannot have any ontology. He does not explain directly the “functions of the mind” just because he has no alternative to the Cartesian mind-body dualism. Kant’s “transcendental idealism” (which indicates “ontology” only for the “thing-in-itself”) deals with certain “functions” of “pure reason”. Therefore, Kant is a functionalist (no ontology) (exactly as Fodor is with his computationalism, see below). In an absolute banal and old “movement”, in order to avoid this very problematic “interaction” between two different ontological substances, Berkeley (the priest) rejects the “material substance” (matter) and preserves only the immaterial substance, the mind. Moreover, he identify each mind (immaterial substance) with “God” (also an immaterial substance). Fodor deals with the “functions of the mind”; if somebody asks Fodor what it would be his answer to the mind-brain problem, he would reply: “the token identity theory”, i.e., each mental state is a neuronal state. So, Fodor accepts the same movement realized by Berkeley, but in the opposite direction: the “identity theory” (the mind is the brain, therefore, only the brain/body really exists in “nature”) which has dominated the second part of 20th century until my article 2005. Fodor explains the functions of “mind”, but the “mind” is the “brain”, therefore, the mind does not even exist, only the brain has an ontology (the materialistic ontology). We recall, Fodor was Chomsky’s student. Chomsky, a linguist, proclaims the existence of the “innate universal grammar” and a “general vocabulary”.[58] Fodor moves from the “linguistic language” to the “language of thought” (philosophy of mind); he explains the functions of the mind from a functionalistic perspective since he accepted the identity theory (the mind is the brain, that is, the mind does not even exist, only the brain, a material entity, really exists).

I return to investigate the scientific theories and philosophical approaches. In this sense, I follow Kuhn’s “historical view” (inspired by Koyrè, Meyerson, etc.): two scientific theories cannot be compared. We cannot claim, as the logical positivism, that there is a “progress in science” (physics) in which the scientific theories of physics come “closer and closer to truth”. Obviously, Einstein’s general relativity makes better predictions regarding certain physical phenomena, but “better predictions” does not mean “closer to truth”! Based on mathematics, from Plato to the logical empiricism (Whitehead and Russell’s work, Principia Mathematics and Carnap’s Aufbau included), the “rationalists” could pretend that the scientific theories have moved “closer and closer to truth”. However, can we speak about “truth” only within a mathematical framework? No, of course (see Einstein’s words in the first motto of this work). However, recall Descartes’ slogan: “I think, therefore, I exist.” This is a banal truth without involving any mathematics. Mathematics sends to “functions” (“Platonic ideas”, Kant’s transcendental idealism, Berkeley’s absolute idealism, Fodor’s functionalism/computationalism), while physics (without too much mathematics) sends to “substances” and individual objects/things (Aristotle, Locke, Hume, connectionism). Friedman’s view is a kind of neo-Kantian approach (preserving the “a priori structure” – of what?) and accept Kuhn’s incommensurability (Kuhn, Structure). This incommensurability was against the logical positivism/empiricism (based on logic and mathematics “truths”). It seems that Carnap et. company (the Vienna Circle, etc.) did not know about Gödel’s “incompleteness theory” which had demolished the idea that all the “arithmetical/mathematical/logical statements” can be “proved as being truths”. However, the “truth premises” introduced by a logician or mathematician in creating a particular logical or mathematical “system” has to take into account the EDWs perspective, even if any logical or pure mathematical system is an amalgam of “analytic propositions”, nothing else.

In what sense can we speak about the relativization of Kantian a priori pure intuitions of space and time and categories? Kant deal with the “pure reason” (not with the human mind), therefore, I repeat, Kant is a functionalist (the “pure reason” has no ontology!), but not dealing with ontology like Descartes (who believes in the existence of mind/immaterial and brain/material) or Berkeley (who believes only mind = God really exists). Again, Fodor is also functionalist. The “connectionism” is a kind of “ontological approach” since these “neural networks” refer to the structure of brain (which really exists as part of the physical body). Friedman’s relativization moves from Kant’s a priori structure of “pure reason” (functional pure intuitions and categories which refer to the “pure reason”) to the a priori structures of a scientific theory (physics). From my viewpoint, it is wrong to consider this movement as being a “relativization” of Kant’s a priori “structure”: the movement from the pure reason to a scientific theory is not a “linear movement” since these two notions refer to totally two different areas of knowledge. The pure reason is a functional explanation of the human mind, while the scientific theories from physics have tried to explain the external, empirical facts (for instance, the motions of external, material objects). Moreover, for Kant, the pure intuitions of space and time are a priori (before any experience, but are not “innate” elements of the mind!). Fodor accepts the “innate elements” (the “language of mind” having certain innate laws and innate vocabulary) of the mind. Again, even if Fodor is “functionalist”, he accepts the identity theory (mind = brain, i.e., mind has no ontology). Kant is also “functionalist” but he did not even try to furnish an answer to the mind-brain problem. Because Newton could not explain “gravitational force”, Kant is forced to create/invent his “transcendental idealism”: the external space does not exist (since outside is just the “thing-in-itself”); the “Euclidean space” is given by our “pure intuition of space”, it is inside of “human reason”, so the “Euclidean space” is just a “functional representation”, no more. For Kant, our perceptual mental images/scenes (parts of the human mind) are the results of the interactions between our pure intuitions of space and time and intellectual categories.

For Friedman, this “a priori structure” moves from Kant’s “pure reason” (functionalism) to the particular scientific theories of physics which explain, for instance, the motions of certain external objects. Are these external objects certain real entities? For Einstein, the planets really exist as the macro-entities; for the physicists working on quantum mechanics, the “planets” do not really exist, only the micro-entities and the electromagnetic waves/fields really exist. In the past, the proponents of quantum mechanics (the majority of physicists until my article 2005), Einstein’s considered that the general relativity had been just an “approximation of reality” which involved certain “fictional entities” like the planets, no more. In this context, I repeat, the “relativization” of Kant’s “a priori structure” is quite a wrong notion. I do not refer here to Aristotle’s “logic” or to Kant’s “categories” (even more “empty notions”). I refer to “space” and “time”, for instance, in the Kant’s transcendental idealism: “space” is the form of pure intuition of space (related to the pure reason) and it is, inevitable, related to the empirical intuitions (“phenomena” of the mind, not “objects” of the external world, since this external world is the unknown “thing-in-itself”). For Kant, the Euclidean geometry refers to the mental phenomena (pure and empirical intuitions) not to the “unknown external world” (“thing-in-itself”). Kant needs his “transcendental idealism” in order to avoid Hume’s skepticism exactly because Newton did not furnish any definition for the “gravitational force”, even if he elaborated his “mathematical formula” for this “force” and its applications had been working very well in that period (in the next century). This was another very important step toward the “mathematical physics” in which mathematics had become much more important than the empirical, external content/objects. As I wrote above, the absolute movement toward the complete “mathematization” of a scientific theory in physics was the (super)string theory (against this theory, see Vacariu and Vacariu 2010).

Weinert writes that, under the classical view of “causality” (Newton included!), Einstein indicated that quantum mechanics is an “incomplete theory” since it includes only certain “statistical statements” about the “ensembles of microparticles” and Heisenberg’s “principle of uncertainty” does not describe certain “deterministic spatio-temporal determinations of atomic trajectories” required by the “differential equations”. So, the differential equations involves a “classical causality” and “deterministic predictions”. (Weinert, p. 7) Einstein was a proponent of the classical (even Newtonian) “strict determinism”. Obviously, this idea had been quite against the entanglement/non-locality from quantum mechanics.[59] Weinert writes about the famous distinction between “locality” and “separability” related to “causality”.

Einstein actually maintains that a renunciation of the principle of locality would render empirically testable laws impossible. And locality is expressed in differential equations in real space-time. [Einstein 1927, 261] Since the discovery of Bell’s inequalities in the 1960s much effort has gone into distinguishing various senses of ‘locality.’ If we speak, with Einstein, of the ‘mutually independent existence of spatially distant things’, we formulate a principle of spatial separability. (See [Einstein 1948] transl. in [Howard 1993, 238]) In view of the results of quantum mechanics, we must distinguish this principle of separability from the principle of locality. This principle has been formulated in a number of ways. Einstein locality means that no ‘faster-than-light-signals’ should be permitted to propagate between spatially separated quantum systems. But locality can also mean that a spin measurement performed on one system, which is spatially separated from another system in the sense of satisfying Einstein locality, cannot influence the spin state of the other system. This type of locality Einstein calls the ‘principle of local action’. (Weinert, p. 8)

Then, Weinert mentions Bell’s inequality and recent researches on “quantum entanglement” which have empirically confirmed the “quantum non-locality”. (p. 9)[60] As I indicated in my previous works, it is about the “correspondence” (no ontology) between two microparticle (for instance) and an electromagnetic wave: the microparticles and the electromagnetic wave belong to the EDWs.

I will also investigate Einstein’s essential distinction between the “constructive theories” and the “principles theories”. (Einstein 1919; Miller, 1998, 125 in Weinert, p. 9) The “constructive theories” refers to certain “models” of “unobserved reality” (for instance, the Ptolemaic model versus the Copernican model), while the “principles theories” introduces new theoretical principles like “the laws of thermodynamics, the principles of relativity, of covariance and invariance, and the constancy of light” which represent certain “constraints” on models and theories. (Weinert, p. 9) In order to avoid the “underdetermination” of the scientific theories (avoiding holism, conventionalism and other approaches/directions), Einstein strongly supports the “empirical constraints”, even if he considers any scientific theory as being a human mind invention.[61] Any theory is a combination between certain theoretical and empirical data and, I believe, it is quite difficult to determine which concepts/principles are theoretical notions/principles and which are empirical. However, all human normal beings can observe the same empirical events. There is no problem in “describing” certain empirical facts. However, there is a problem in trying to explain why those empirical “facts/processes/events” take place just because such explanations would involve certain physical laws and, usually, any law has to be explained by a “scientific theory” which involves certain theoretical constructions (not only those “empirical evidences”). According to Einstein, all the physical theories are just constructions of human minds[62] and the final verdict for these hypothetical constructions is given by the empirical evidences.

Minkowski’s four-dimensional interpretation of space-time provided Einstein with a new criterion for the physically real. Physics, he says, deals with ‘events’ in space and time. [Einstein 1949c] Temporal and spatial measurements varied from reference frame to reference frame. They could not be physically real. But the space-time interval, ds, remained invariant for every observer. It was therefore to be regarded as real. [Einstein 1920 App. II, 1922a, 23– 31; 1936, 34-41] [Scheibe 1981] In general, what a scientific theory tells us to regard as ‘real’ is what remains invariant in transitions between different reference frames. These transitions are governed by transformation groups. (Weinert, p. 16)

From my viewpoint, any “spacetime” could not have any ontology. (see our work 2016) Therefore, we cannot consider the “space-time interval, ds”, as being “real”.[63] The “space” (spacetime) is neither the Euclidean space nor the non-Euclidean “space” since “space” (spacetime) could not have any ontology. Nevertheless, Weinert does not reject the existence of “spacetime” (even if he mentions certain thinkers who tried to reject it), but he is correct claiming that any scientist needs to become a philosopher if the scientist wants to explain certain essential “anomalies” unexplained by the theories from his/her period of working.

As Einstein realized, when the foundations of science become problematic, the man of science becomes a philosopher. [Einstein 1936, § 1]… As Einstein realized himself, science makes philosophical presuppositions. The scientist needs philosophical ideas, simply because amongst the experimental and mathematical tools in the toolbox of the scientist there are conceptual tools, like the fundamental notions. (Weinert, p. 17)[64]

Following Einstein, I believe any explanation of certain factual events needs some theoretical and empirical concepts/ideas. Again, I believe it is quite difficult to mention which concepts/ideas are “a priori” and which are “a posteriori” (even more difficult it is to identify which elements are “innate” and which are acquired…). Friedman, Weinert and other thinkers have tried to identify the concepts/principles that are a priori in their relationships to other concepts/ideas from the same theory. Maybe these explanations are quite interesting for some philosophers (“philosophy of science), but the scientists have not cared too much about these distinctions in elaborating their scientific theories in the last two centuries. Again, the speed of light c (an empirical phenomena) was “postulated as principle” by Einstein in relationship to other statements from his both theories of relativity. (see Friedman, for instance) It means that all other statements from his theories cannot contradict this postulate. Also, even all the known empirical/physical phenomena could not contradict this postulate. Nevertheless, the “non-locality” in quantum mechanics has contradicted this postulate! It means something was wrong either with this postulate (Einstein’s relativities) or with quantum mechanics or with both approaches. As we have seen above (and my previous works), it was the framework of thinking, the unicorn world, which had been wrong for all the physicists (Einstein and all from quantum mechanics included) until I discovered the EDWs. The explanations of many “factual events” could be given by a scientific theory (or by a philosophical approach, very rarely in our days). There are some notions and/or statements/ideas which refer to certain real entities/processes/events. Therefore, some statements/concepts from a scientific theory or philosophical approach could remain “true”, while other statements could become false. Even an entire scientific theory (all its statements) could be prove as being “false”. Nevertheless, I believe some statements from my EDWs will remain “forever true statements” which refer to certain real physical and mental phenomena which belong to the EDWs.

Friedman mentions certain aspects of Carnap’s “logical structure” in describing the “world”: in agreement with Kuhn’s approach, Carnap introduces different “formal language” or “linguistic frameworks”, non-intertranslatable (related directly to Kuhn’s “incommensurability”). His “internal question” (certain “logical rules”) can be applied only to the statements from a particular “linguistic framework”, while his “external questions” refers to a “conventional/pragmatic choice” (Poincaré), i.e., the adoption of a particular “linguistic framework”. In this sense, the “scientific revolution” involves the change from a particular “linguistic framework” to a different one. However, as Friedman emphasizes, Carnap did not pay attention to any “scientific revolution”: the “special sciences” are related to different linguistic frameworks and “philosophical problems are purely formal and belong to application of logic to language of special sciences”.[65] Carnap rejects the “fixed synthetic a priori status of specifically Euclidean geometry”. (Friedman) The problem was that, because of Einstein’s special and mainly general relativity theory, the Euclidean geometry was rejected in explaining the motions of the external objects close to the Earth. Einstein did not even try to explain if our “perceptual scenes” include the Euclidean space or the non-Euclidean space. I do not insist in investigating Carnap’s view, I mention only that he insists on “logical structure of the world”, but from my viewpoint, both these notions (“logic” and “world”) are quite “empty concepts”. Therefore, Carnap’s approach was a failure (recognized even by him 20 years later…).

I want to insist, however, that such “mathematics-logic structure of the world” has been a very old and very disastrous umbrella of the human thinking during the last 2,500 years. This idea has been originated in the paradigms of thinking given by all the religion doctrines. No philosopher or scientist from the Ancient period until 19th century could avoided the “existence of God. Many great (and many “little”) thinkers had introduced “God” in trying to solve these problems. (again, see Feynman’s idea about the invention of “God” for unsolved or pseudo-problems in the motto of this work…) This tendency sends back to Pythagoras’s “mathematics” constructed under the umbrella of strong “religious myths” which, in fact, represented a kind of “idealization of nature/world” and of “human beings”. In this context we can inquire, why the most important Plato’s dialogue is named “Parmenides”? During his life, the great philosopher Parmenides had been in a great dispute with another great philosopher, Heraclitus. Parmenides was promoting the “One, static, unchangeable”, Heraclitus was fighting for “motion, changeable, diversity, non-identity” (“a river has never been the same”). Parmenides-Heraclitus dichotomy mirrors the greatest disputes in philosophy and science until our days: the dispute between “being” and “becoming”:

  • “Being” involves the ontology of the same entity during a period of time (i.e., the identity of material objects), the same entity for “God” (available in religion since any “God” is the same, eternal, never in-change) and the Platonic Ideas/mathematics (always the “same”), while the “appearances” do not even exist. The mathematical numbers and the mathematical equations, for instance, have been considered as always being the “same”: “number 2” is the “same number” now and few minutes ago; it is not “another number” even if the “self” had been in two different mental states. “1 + 1 = 2” because “1” and “2” are always the “same numbers”;
  • “Becoming” involves the ontology of processes, changes, non-identity: “a river has never been the same”.

From my viewpoint, however, the Moon is a macro-entity “in motion” but it is the “same planet” in its interactions with the planet Earth. Why “the same”? Because of its interaction with the Earth has been “the same” yesterday and today.[66] A cup of coffee is on a table. There is an interactions between the cup and the table now. It is the same interaction for the next minute, hours, days, months… This interaction furnishes, “ontologically”, the “existences” of the cup and that table. These two macro-entities really exist, exactly as the Earth and the Moon really exist today as yesterday and, very probable, for tomorrow. Always, there have been some changes in any physical phenomena/entity, but if these changes take place into an “interval of similarity”, a scientific theory or a philosophical statement can predict the future of that physical phenomena/entity. The existences of the physical laws, the physical entities and the self/mind are not pragmatic statements, conventions or linguistic ideas/notions/concepts.[67] If somebody believes there are only “words, words, words”, that person (like Wittgenstein, Carnap, the Vienna circle, and almost all the philosophers of the last century working on philosophy of language, philosophy of science, etc.) has to go to toilet. (see Feynman’s idea – the motto of this work  – regarding the relationship between physics and mathematics…[68])

I return to the main dichotomy, “substance versus function” or, following the “course of history”, “function versus substance”. Historically, since the beginning, the human beings have always been manipulated by certain “groups of interests” which have belonged either to one or another church/religion but these groups have always been under the control of the political leaders/groups. For any priest, “God” is “eternal, unmovable, unchanged, the same identity”, etc. Mathematics deals with numbers, functions, etc., and these numbers and functions have been the same in any mathematical calculus realized by a human being: “7+5=12” has always been considered as a true statement[69]. This is the reasons, mathematics (the identity of numbers, functions) has always been related to

  • God[70] (since 19th century, but also in our days for some professors and the masses)
  • “Ideas” (Plato, these ideas having their own ontology, an ontology similar to those of Gods)
  • logic (Aristotle)
  • “pure reason” (no ontology, Kant)
  • “logic” and, more generally, “language” (Wittgenstein[71], Carnap, the Vienna circle)

The main attacks on mathematics were realized by Aristotle (but he strongly used “logic” in his approach) and Gödel (his theory of incompleteness[72]). I add here even Descartes with his “extension” (that is, he wanted to avoid to use “space” in his Meditations even if, in his previous works, he introduced the “Cartesian coordinates” but only as a mathematical tool).

According to Friedman, Reichenbach embraces a neo-Kantian approach making the distinction between two meanings of Kantian a priori: necessary and fixed for all time versus “constitutive of concept of object of [scientific] knowledge”.  Again, this relativization was quite wrong notion since Kant refers to “pure reason”, while (after Einstein’s relativity) the philosophers (from Wittgenstein, Carnap, Reichenbach to all the philosophers of 20th century until Friedman’s article, 2012) have believed, somehow, in the “relativization” of a priori “structure” (again, they moved from Kant’s functionalism of “pure reason” to the vocabulary of “scientific theories”). Kant did not deal with “words”, he managed his “pure intuitions” and “categories”: even if his list of “categories” is a list of “words, words, words”, his “pure intuitions” are related to the “empirical intuitions” (which involve the “perceptual images/scenes”). The Euclidean space is applied to the pure intuition of space and therefore to the empirical intuitions, i.e., to any perceptual (visual) scene inside of each human mind. Even if Kant works within a “functionalist view” (just because he did not have an alternative to the mind-brain problem), the empirical intuitions refer to something belonging to the mind of any human being (therefore, the mind should have an ontology to exist even if Kant avoided this mind-body problem). So, the “Euclidean geometry” is directly related to the perceptual images/scene of any human mind (something which really exists since Kant uses the “empirical intuitions”). Later, Wittgenstein, Carnap and the Vienna circle related geometry/mathematics to “logic” and “language”. Why was necessary for Wittgenstein and Carnap to add “language” to “logic/mathematics”? Because in the 19th century there had been elaborated different non-Euclidean geometries (as theoretical alternatives to the Euclidean geometry) and the polyadic logics (as alternative to Aristotle’s logic). In that century, these geometries were just certain theoretical constructions but later, Einstein did find an empirical application for the non-Euclidean geometry in his general theory of relativity. All the philosophers of the 20th century could not construct their philosophical approaches on “logic” and/or “mathematics” in describing the “world/universe”, anymore. Therefore, all these philosophers have appealed to “language” (Wittgenstein’s Tratactus logical-philosophic, i.e., logic-linguistic/“logic-mathematics-language” and Carnap’s Aufbau with his “linguistic framework”) since “language” had been a more general “abstract tool” than “logic/mathematics” (also, abstract tools, at least for me). In fact, everything has been reduced to “language” since the pure and the empirical intuitions were totally eliminated and the Kantian list of “twelve categories” had been completely “relativized”.

I repeat, the most important notion for the Kantian philosophical system is the “transcendental apperception” (just a functional/linguistic expression), i.e. the relation between the “pure intuitions” and the “categories”. However, the categories are “words, words, words”, so the philosophers of 20th century relativized the “linguistic frameworks”. This “relativization” does not mean a relativization of Kant’s “a priori structure”: it means the elimination of the pure intuitions and the extension of those 12 categories to the “entire language”. This process has rejected completely Kant’s “transcendental apperception” during the last two centuries. In this way, Kant’s philosophy has not been “relativized” by other philosophers or by the scientists, but it has been totally rejected! It is meaningless to talk about the “relativization” of Kantian “a priori structure” since any kind of such relativization would imply directly the rejection of Kantian main concepts (pure intuitions, categories, transcendental apperception, etc.) and the elimination of his entire “transcendental idealism”. So, such movements have represented not only the rejection of the “Euclidean space” of external world or of our visual perceptions and an extension of Kant’s categories (i.e., his “vocabulary”), but these new “sub-paradigms of thinking” would have totally rejected the Kant’s “transcendental philosophy” and not its “relativization”.

According to the special relativity, the external “spatial dimensions” are always related to “temporal dimension” and “different spatiotemporal frames” depend on the “motion of the observer”. As I emphasized in this work (and other of my previous works), even if we accept the “relativization of spacetime”, we cannot delineate one spatiotemporal framework (for instance for that person in the train in motion) from another spatiotemporal framework (for the person in rest on the pavement). Moreover, according to the general relativity, the external spacetime close to the Earth is a “non-Euclidean space”, i.e., this spatial-temporal framework really exists, it has an ontology, it is a non-Euclidean space, i.e., it is a real space (spacetime) curved by the mass of a real planet, the Earth. Again, moving from the pure and the empirical “reason” to “language” is just not “relativization”, but a total rejection of Kant’s transcendental idealism.

Let us suppose we can think that the “philosophers of mathematics” and the “philosophers of language” have relativized the Kantian “categories”. But this relativization had been created in the context of certain discoveries of the last two centuries and, therefore, there have not been some “relativizations” of the Kantian “transcendental idealism”. Such relativizations (Wittgenstein, Reichenbach, Carnap, the Vienna circle, etc., etc.) have been just “words, words, words” and nothing else. However, with my EDWs perspective (2002, 2003, 2005, 2007, etc.) I did not relativize the “world”, I did not introduce a new “linguistic framework” since the EDWs (their ED entities) really exist/are: there are the ED ontologies (not “concepts”/language), even if one EW does not exist/is for any EDW. These ED entities really exist without any language, without any living being as observer. Moreover, space (spacetime) cannot even exist (see Vacariu and Vacariu 2016) and our mental perception do not have “spacetime” (or a “geometrical spatial structure”[73]) since any mental perception (visual and auditory, for instance) are the mind and the mind is an immaterial EW, so it would be meaningless to talk about the “spacetime” or even about the “spatial cognition” or “illusory spacetime” “inside the mind”. It would be meaningless to talk about the “whole-parts” distinction referring to the mind-EW.

In this context, there is this question: “Why the mind has to be an immaterial EW?” My answer is the following: not only because the “spacetime” could not even exist, but Descartes’ “extensions” for the macro-objects and the micro-entities are real features (primary properties, not secondary properties like “colors”) and “pain” and “colors” are certain mental states which cannot be reduced to the neurons and their interactions since all the neurons do not have pain or colors (like “green color” or “red color”). So, there are certain “primary properties” for

  • the real external objects (mass and the limited extension of a “table” or a “car” or the continuity of the electromagnetic field, for instance) and
  • the internal mental states (static and discrete, as Fodor claims) which are the mind (an immaterial EW and an entity having its identity and unity.

The “secondary properties” are features which belong to certain mental states and these features are the immaterial features of the immaterial mind.

What is the reality, what do really exist? Within the EDWs perspective, I have furnished new definitions for “existences” (referring to the ED material entities) and “being” (referring to the immaterial entities) within a new vocabulary, i.e., the vocabulary for the EDWs. For the some of the EDWs, “existence” requires “interaction”. However, the notion “existence” refers only to the extended things, i.e., the material things. There is also the notion “being” which refers only to the thinking/living entities, i.e., the immaterial things: “the mind-EW is”. In order a material entity (which belongs to a particular material EW, like the field-EW, the micro-EW and the macro-EW) to exist, it needs to have an “extension”. Otherwise, we would not be able to perceive it or to deduce it has an existence/ontology. Because “1D” or “2D” are meaningless notions, then even “3D” is a meaningless notion. We can claim that any extension is “3D” but “3D” is a pseudo-notion. Following Descartes, we have to replace 1D, 2D 3D, 4D, 10D, 11D 26 D with “extension” (not “extensions”), i.e., any material thing has “extension” and, because of this property, a material thing really exists. In the old language of the unicorn world, any extension “presupposed” a “3D spatial framework”, but “space” or “spacetime” could not even exist.

On the other side, according to Descartes, there is another property for the “self to be”: “thinking” which is available only for the immaterial entities (the mind/life/self[74]). So, we can speak about two kinds of ED entities with two different ED ontologies: material (fields, micro-entities, macro-entities, mega-entities which belong to the EDWs) and the immaterial things (the minds/lives which are the minds-EW). A particular “entity” has just two possibilities: either “to exist” (a material thing) or “to be” (an immaterial entity). The third alternative is “nothing”, but nothing has no ontology, it does not exist/it is not. (Nevertheless, we can speak about the “Hypernothing”, see my work Hypermetaphysics 2023) So, in order an entity

  • to exist: it is necessary for that entity to have the property of extension like any material thing;
  • to be: it is necessary for that entity to have the property of thinking/living like any immaterial living being
  • not to exist/be: it is necessary that entity has no property and no ontology; it has neither the property of extension, nor the property of thinking/living.

So, for “existence” or “being”, it is necessary a property and therefore an ontology (there are certain ED ontologies); for the non-existing/being it is necessary “no property at all”, i.e., no ontology.

We return to Friedman (2012): contrary to Plato, Kant, the logical empiricism, etc. (from my viewpoint, we have to add any religion and the “pure mathematics”), Kuhn emphasizes the historical development of the scientific revolutions and their “incommensurability”. From my viewpoint, the scientific theories are indeed “incommensurable”, therefore, we cannot talk about the “relativization” of certain concepts/principles from these theories. Indeed, we cannot talk about the “relativization” of the a priori elements from Kant’s transcendental idealism to Einstein’s relativity. Because of Einstein’s theories of relativity, Reichenbach, the Vienna circle and many other philosophers of the 20th century (including Freidman) have tried to relativize the Kantian apriorism. From my viewpoint, there have been some “meaningless movements” created within a wrong framework of human thinking, the unicorn world. Einstein’s general relativity is not “closer to truth” than Newton’s theory. It does not mean “truth” does not exist. I prefer to replace the “eternal Truth” or “the great truth” (from religions and mathematics statements) with “different truths”. My EDWs perspective is not a scientific theory or philosophical approach; it is something beyond all these alternatives. My EDWs perspective contains certain statements which are truths and will remains truths as much as the human beings will exist on this Earth. For instance, the statement: “The mind is an immaterial EW which does not exist for the body (a material thing in the macro-EW)” is a “truth statement” and it will remain “truth” forever. It is not “relative truth” or “closer to truth” (both are meaningless notions). It is not a “small/relative truth” in opposition to the “same Truth” (religions and mathematics statements). It is just a “truth” and my EDWs perspective contain such “truth statements”. Moreover, there are statements from my EDWs which refer to some real external ED entities/processes which have existed long time before the appearance of human beings (as the “external observers” – see the “Copenhagen interpretation” as an example). The Earth, for instance, has existed long time before the human beings have appeared on this planet. Without the existence of the Earth (as a macro-entity), a macro-body (the brain included in the body) could not have appeared at all. In order a mind to be, its need the correspondence with the existence of a body/brain, even if this correspondence has no ontological status.

My approach is beyond the eternal empirism-rationalism debate, beyond any religious or mathematical “truth” (beyond Popper’s “fallibilism” or any other philosophical or scientific approach). In fact, any scientific theory or philosophical approach is not “truth” or “false” as “a whole”. In any approach, there are different statements/concepts/words, some of them referring to certain real observable and unobservable phenomena/objects/entities and representing “truth statements/concepts”, some of them being wrong statements/concepts. An example: some notions and statements explaining certain visual phenomena which refer to some real physical phenomena are quite correct, for instance, “an apple falls on the grass and soil near the tree”. This statement is truth if we refer to a real physical phenomenon which just corresponds to a perceptual image-in-motion (not words, but a visual perception-in-motion). Obviously, we express this statement using “language”. The falling of that appeal is a real process which it happens during a short period of “time” without the presence of any human observer. The Earth moves around the Sun without being necessary a human person to be the observer of this process. Without this process, the human beings would have not appeared on this planet. From my viewpoint, these statements are “truth statements” because they refer to certain real phenomena involving certain real entities.[75] Again, without the existence of the Earth and the Sun (as macro-entities, planets), the bodies (macron-entities) of living entities (life-EW) would not have appeared on Earth. A physicist could claim that the Sun is not a macro-entity, but a nuclear reactor, for instance. From my viewpoint, the Sun is a macro-planet because of its interactions with the planet Earth. Any planet just corresponds to (a) an amalgam of microparticles (b) an electromagnetic field. The Sun has to be a macro-planet since there is a kind of indirect “interactions” (i.e., correspondences) between the Sun and the Earth. The cup of coffee always interacts with the table even if the self (the I) does not perceive directly these macro-entities: all the mental perceptions are mental states which are the mind-EW and correspond to the brain/bodily processes (the macro-EW) and certain electromagnetic waves (the field-EW), for instance. In the micro-EW, there are many interactions between a huge amalgam of microparticles (photons for the Sun) with a huge amalgam of microparticles (microparticles which to the Earth); also, there are certain corresponding electromagnetic waves which interact among them (the field-EW). According to the “principle of identity of an entity”, we can explain certain real phenomena/entities (which belong to the EDWs) only through “indirect explanations”, i.e., using particular “correspondences” (no ontology) between the ED entities/processes from the EDWs. The “gravity” (no ontology) is included in such explanations only through correspondences. My EDWs approach is neither getting “closer to truth” (rationalists, empirical positivism, mathematics, religious persons, etc.), nor “expecting” someone to prove as being “false”. Certain ED phenomena described by some statements formulated within the EDWs perspective are correct (and will remain correct forever). Some will be proved, in the future, as being wrong. This is the reason, my EDWs approach is beyond “function-substance” dichotomy: some parts of my approach refer to “function” (laws, for instance, but certain physical laws not the “mathematization of nature”), other parts refer to the individual entities (“substances”) which really exist in the EDWs.

A scientific theory is, obviously, an amalgam of “statements of words” (any word is part of the mind-EW). Einstein did not accept Kant’s transcendental idealism. His theories of relativity do not refer to certain “words” in our mind; his theories of relativity refer to the external macro-entities and their motions within particular “external spacetime frameworks”. In the special relativity, these spatial frameworks are “relative” (the properties of spacetime depends on the motions of entities: for greater speed, the greater space contracts and time dilates). However, in the special relativity, “space” (spacetime) is still Euclidean but “relative” (it changes in relationship to the motion of an entity). The problem is how the special relativity relates space and time? How time is the 4th dimension of 3D spatial framework? As we saw above, even Einstein had doubts about this link. A physicist (like Lorentz) would claim that “time” is just an “additional dimension” to the other three spatial dimensions. What does it mean “addition” in this case? The physicist: “Those spatial three dimensions have a temporal dimension.” From my viewpoint, there are no 3D (neither 2D nor 1D, nor 4D or 10D); moreover, the “addition” of another dimension (temporal one) to the 3D spatial framework presupposes at least three pseudo-notions: temporal dimension, spatial dimensions, “adding”, i.e., 4D. In the general relativity, the external space near the Earth or the Sun is considered to be a non-Euclidean one. Amazing, if in the special relativity, the “spacetime” is Euclidean and relative, in the general relativity, the spacetime is non-Euclidean and relative. Amazing, but wrong…

According to Reichenbach (the Vienna circle), because of the relativity theory, the Kantian absolute apriorism becomes “relative”: the a priori constitutive principles are certain necessary presuppositions for describing certain empirical phenomena (like in the “Newtonian physics”), but the principles becomes “relative” since these principles can be changed from one theory to another theory. (Friedman 2012) For instance, the Euclidean geometry is “constitutively a priori” for the Newtonian physics only from an infinitesimal viewpoint; the general relativity relativized the “a priori constitutive principles that change and develop along with development of sciences”. (Friedman 2012) Again, following Wittgenstein, Carnap introduces “logic” and “linguistic frameworks” in order to “relativize” Kant’s Euclidean space and his categories.[76] (words, words, words…) In reality, from my EDWs perspective, there is no space (spacetime) at all: this is the reason, “Einstein also famously says, in the same work, that ‘sub specie aeterni’ Poincaré is actually correct – so that, in particular, Einstein’s reliance on a Helmholtzian conception of “practically rigid bodies” is here merely provisional”. (Friedman 2009, p. 264) Such “logico-mathematical formal structures” has been the same “umbrella”/framework of thinking for Plato, Newton, Kant, Whitehead and Russell, Carnap-the Vienna circle and all the philosophers (the theoretical philosophers) of the 20th century since everybody has been working under the “identity theory” for the mind-brain problem but also for the identity between any “macro-object” and an “amalgam of microparticles”. Based on the mathematical backgrounds/structures, these philosophers have believed that any scientific theory from physics comes “closer to truth”. Quite wrong, of course: the scientific theories are “incommensurable”, so even if the scientific theories of physics from the last two centuries are based partially (Newton and Einstein) or totally (the super-string theory) on mathematics, these theories do not come “closer to truth”. There is no “progress” from one scientific theory to another. A scientific theory is “better” than other theories not only because of explaining better certain phenomena and realizing better and more predictions (pragmatic reasons, conventions), but mainly because the last theory indicates that certain important notions from the previous theory were wrong. It does means this is a “progress” since the scientific theories are incommensurable and each theory has a “historical framework”, each scientist depends on her environment/society/culture. For Carnap, Kuhn, Friedman and many other philosophers, Kant’s transcendental apriorism has become relativized, therefore, in a sense, these notions have become just “functional words, words, words”.

Now, I can ask: “what is outside the human body”?[77] Can we talk about the “external space”? According to the empiricism, all our knowledge comes from the external environment; for the rationalism, certain elements of our knowledge are innate; for Kant, the human knowledge has certain a priori structures and a posteriori elements (i.e., some “functional” elements). However, for Kant, the empirical intuition of space is an Euclidean one, that is, our perceptual images/scenes contain the images of interactions of certain images of the macro-objects within an Euclidean space. With his conventions, Poincaré was right to claim that the external space is either Euclidean or non-Euclidean, depending on our measurement apparatus. However, did Poincaré reject the existence of space? Not at all! Even if Leibniz relativized the “space”, but he did not reject it completely. In the history of philosophy, there have been few philosophers rejecting the existence of “spacetime” just because they could not explain the “world” without “spacetime”. The arguments of those who rejected, partially, the existence of space and time were totally different than my arguments of rejecting the ontology of spacetime. Indeed, because of the non-Euclidean geometries and the polyadic logic (19th century), the language describing the external world has become relativized. According to my EDWs perspective, these different “linguistic frameworks” describe not the “thing-in-itself” as some “phenomenal entities in our minds” but the ED entities/interactions which really exist in the EDWs with the ED ontologies. Nevertheless, until 2006, everybody has been working within the unicorn world:

  • Kant: it is a thing-in-itself;
  • Berkeley: the external world does not even exist.
  • all the philosophers of 20th century (Wittgenstein, Carnap, logical empiricists, etc.): there are different “linguistic frameworks”
  • Einstein: the external world is realized by external macro-entities (planets, fro instance) and their interactions in Euclidean space (very long distance from any planet) or non-Euclidean space (near a planet);
  • quantum mechanics: the planets do not even exist, there are only microparticles and electromagnetic waves/field. The physicists from QM applied the special relativity to processes of quantum mechanics, but they did not “discover” the gravitons (necessary of explaining the gravity).

From my viewpoint, a material/physical entity exists only because of its interaction with the entities from the same EW. I repeat, a physicist could claim that the Sun is not a planet but an amalgam of radiation. However, from my viewpoint, the Sun is ED entities within the EDWs:

  • a macro-planet for the planets of the Solar system and other planets (the macro-EW)
  • an amalgam of microparticles for other microparticles (the micro-EW)
  • a huge amount of electromagnetic field/waves (within the field-EW)

The statuses of these ED entities for “the Sun” are given by their ED interactions.

According to Friedman, for Kuhn, the Kant’s a priori (the pure intuitions and the categories) becomes relative: “make the world in some sense mind-dependent, but the first disarms the apparent threat to objectivity by insisting on the absolute fixity of the categories, while the second relativizes the categories (and the experienced world with them) to time, place, and culture.” (Friedman 2012) So, there was a dispute between the logical positivists and Kuhn: some different “linguistic frameworks” versus the “historical view” related to “time, place, or culture”. From an exaggerated viewpoint, we can say that this dispute reflects the fight between religion/mathematics/logic/language/self/mind (Plato, Kant, Wittgenstein, Carnap, logical empiricists, Fodor, etc.) and reality in change/motion/dynamical system (Heraclitus, Aristotle, Descartes’ properties of extension and thinking”, Gödel (limits of arithmetic/logic regarding the proven of “truths”), Kuhn, etc. My EDWs perspective is beyond these eternal debates since both sides depend on the entity (or the EW) we investigate. A microparticle is a microparticle, the mind is the mind, a neuronal state is in continuously change, an electromagnetic wave is in a continuous motion, etc.

Kuhn rejects the “development-by-accumulation” model using the “historiographical tradition” (Koyrè on Galileo, Cassirer, Meyerson, etc.). Accordingly, Cassirer indicates that in the 17th century, there was the revolution given by the “mathematization of nature” through Galileo and later Newton. (Friedman 2012) This philosophical idealism (the “ideal formal structures paradigmatically studied in mathematics” + “systematic application of such structures to empirically given nature in modern mathematical physics—a progressive and synthetic process where in mathematical models of nature are successively refined and corrected without limit”) is related to Pythagoras, Plato and Kant’s, etc. and their “mathematical idealization”. (Friedman 2012) Very important, Friedman emphasizes the great distinction between “function” (given by the physical laws of mathematical physics) and “substance” (Aristotle). Obviously, we have the entire group of Pythagoras, Plato, Kant, the logical empiricists, etc. versus Aristotle-Meryerson-Kuhn, etc. Meyerson emphasizes the “identity” of an object given by “substance” (atoms/microparticles) versus “function” (mathematics/religion). In this context, more interestingly even, Friedman (2012) introduces the divergence between Lavoisier’s “principle of conservation of matter” and the second law of thermodynamics (i.e., the “temporally irreversible process of degradation or dissipation of energy”). Moreover, following Meyerson, Friedman writes about the “irrationality of nature”. From my viewpoint, there are no “irrationality” for any EDW since, with my EDWs perspective, I have explained ALL the mysteries of the main particular sciences (physics (cosmology, quantum mechanics, etc.), cognitive neuroscience and biology) and philosophy. Actually, after publishing my book Hypermetaphysics (2023), I have completely solved the last problem: the hyper-relationships between the Hypernothing and the first EDWs.

Cassirer indicates a “progress” of the human thinking from “naively realistic substantialistic conceptions” to more and more “abstract purely functional conceptions”. It means that the scientists and the philosophers “abandon the search for underlying ontology in favor of ever more precise mathematical representations of phenomena in terms of exactly formulated universal laws”. (Friedman 2012) On the contrary, Meyerson uses a “dialectical progression” (Hegel) for supporting the “substance” and “irrationality” of nature. So, Cassirer pleads “function”, while Meyerson “substance”. From my viewpoint, this dispute involves the “identity of an entity”, a very old topic in the history of philosophy (see Parmenides-Plato versus Heraclitus-Aristotle[78]).

Kuhn is on the side of Meyerson. (Friedman) Friedman himself accept the “historicism”. Not accidentally, working within the wrong framework of the “universe”/world, Meyerson (also Friedman) accepts Hegel (and even Plato)’s “irrationality of nature”, i.e., the limits of mathematics and the limits of human thinking in general for explaining the “reality”. In the context of Hegelian framework, the reality is “a mixture of (rational) sameness and (irrational) otherness”. (Friedman 2012) (An extreme point of this view is Heraclitus: “A river is never the same”.) The substantialists reject the “absolute” role of mathematics/logic in describing the “natural phenomena”. Nevertheless, the substantialists are constrained to accept the sameness, the identity of certain entities, so they cannot accept Heraclitus’ extreme point…

There has been a strong dispute between function and substance during the last 2,500 years. As I emphasized above, “function” has been related to mathematics, but mathematics was related, long time ago, to religion (by Pythagoras’ group and many others thinkers working on mathematics and physics). It is the dispute between “ontology” and “religion”/mathematics/logic/“words”. Again, in the 20th century, this dispute ended in “language” (Gödel indicated that mathematics always contains certain “unproved truths” or some “unproved truth premises”, the basis of any system of logic/mathematics constructed by any human mind – a real strike against the “mathematization of nature”…). Meryerson and Kuhn’s historicism is much closer to my EDWs than the “mathematization of nature” (just “words”). For Kuhn (an ontological approach), the scientific theories “converge on an independently existing truth about reality, on a theory-independent external world” (Friedman 2012).

Discovering the EDWs, I have totally rejected the “mathematization of nature” (a very old and wrong “myth” in the history of human thinking/philosophy/physics since the Ancient period until 2005) since “nature”/universe/world does not exist and all the mathematical statements are “words, words, words” since, according to Gödel, not all these statements from a mathematical system can be proven to be true. From my viewpoint, obviously, there are different “linguistic frameworks” for explaining certain EDWs, but the micro-entities and the macro-entities (the ED “substances”) really exist without any observer, without any “function”, without any “word”. (Again, see the mottos) Functions (mathematics) are just certain “linguistic frameworks” and some of them (or parts of them) refer to the ED entities and ED interactions/processes which really exist in the EDWs. Some of these ED entities (micro or macro-entities, for instance) really exist because of the interactions between the entities which belong to the same EW. However, the human mind is in itself and for itself and the electromagnetic field exists in itself and for itself. If the electromagnetic field is just a material/physical entity in the field-EW and this field does not exist for the micro- or macro-entities; the mind is an EW and an entity which really has an immaterial ontology and it is not for anything else, not even for the brain/body.

Conclusion
“I have always been interested in a person’s inner world. I am interested in man, for he contains a universe within himself; and in order to find expression for the idea, for the meaning of human life, there is no need to spread behind it, as it were, a canvas crowded with happenings.” (Andrei Tarkovsky)

The reader has to accept that the EDWs is the new framework of thinking for all the scientists and the philosophers of the next 200 years (probabilistically speaking). Why? Because discovering the EDWs, I have solved all the great problems from particular sciences and philosophy. In the future, other problems/anomalies will appear and, step by step, my EDWs approach will be replaced by another approach (probabilistic speaking, in 200 years). Will this new approach be better than my EDWs perspective? Following Kuhn, any two theories are incommensurable; a new theory indicates that certain elements (concepts, principles, statements) from the old theory are totally wrong. Does the new theory come “closer to truth” (if truth really exists)? Not really; certain statements are truths (“the mind is an immaterial EW”), a new theory/framework of thinking is not as wrong as the previous theory/framework of thinking. My EDWs perspective is a completely new framework of thinking, it is the greatest change in the history of human thinking. Some truths of my EDWs perspective will be preserved for all the human beings on this Earth in the future. Some statements will be replaced/rejected by a new approach in the future. I strongly emphasize that my EDWs perspective is not a scientific theory or a philosophical approach. My EDWs perspective is a new paradigm of thinking: it is just a classification of certain real ED entities and their ED interactions. I have discovered these ED entities/interactions. I have read about these ED entities/interactions in scientific and philosophical works (books, articles, chapters, journals, Internet, etc.). Is this “classification” a real statement? It is a new framework of thinking, I do not care about “truth”. Does a table exist? Yes, it exists for other macro-entities like a cup of coffee. Does a planet really exist? Yes, it exists for other planets/macro-entities. Does the brain/body exist? Yes, it exists in the macro-environment, the macro-EW. Does the electromagnetic field/waves exist? Yes, it exists in the field-EW. Does an electron exist? Yes, it exists for other microparticles in the micro-EW. Does any mind exist? Yes, it exists as an EW for itself and in itself. These statements are facts, not “statements”/propositions/sentences in a scientific theory or a philosophical approach. Again, I strongly emphasize that my EDWs perspective is a new framework of thinking (not a scientific theory or philosophical approach). The discovery of these EDWs will remain the greatest discovery in the history of human thinking for the next two millennium even if, probabilistically speaking, a new framework of thinking will replace my framework in 200 years.[79] Even so, certain facts will remain real facts forever (like the mind is an EW and the mind does not exist for the brain). Nothing more, nothing less, just this. I am not rationalist, empiricist, transcendentalist, idealist, materialist, eliminativist, pragmatist, conventionalist, skeptic, relativist, psychologist, cognitive scientist, mathematician, physicist, I am not mystical or religious person. I am a philosopher (a “critical realist”) furnishing a totally new framework for this “realism”, the EDWs perspective. The EDWs (their ED entities) have existed/have been independent of any human observer/observations (except the mind/life, but the mind does not “observe” itself: a self/mind does not observe/perceive one of his perceptual scene/movie or one “abstract” thought; all the mental states are the mind, an EW and a unitary entity). With my EDWs perspective, I have completely changed all essential concepts, ideas, scientific theories, philosophical approaches which had been elaborated in the last two millenniums until 2005.

In this context, are some “true statements” about “reality”? Yes, there are some true statements about the EDWs: “I think, therefore, I am” and the above statements like the Earth planet really exists, the photons really exist, the electromagnetic field really is, etc. What is, then, the reality? It is my EDWs, that is, not a “scientific theory”, not even a philosophical approach, but better, just a classification of the ED physical entities, their ED interactions and the mind-EDWs. So, my EDWs perspective is represented by certain “true statements” referring to certain particular ED phenomena/entities. Is my EDWs perspective (the new framework of thinking for all the human beings[80]) a “truth” theory/approach, is my EDWs perspective the “whole truth”[81]? My answer to this question is another question: “What is the ‘whole truth’?” My answer to this last question: “I do not care about the ‘whole/absolute’ truth”.

Bibliography

Friedman Michael (2012) “Kuhn and Philosophy”, Modern Intellectual History, Cambridge University Press
Friedman Michael (2009), “Einstein, Kant and relativized a priori”, in Michel Bitbol, Pierre Kerszberg, Jean Petitot (eds.), Constituting Objectivity. Transcendental Perspectives on Modern Physics, Springer
Markman B. Arthur and Dietrich Eric (2000), “Extending the classical view of representation”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 4, No, 12, December 2000
Peebles, P. J. E. (2022), The whole truth – a cosmologist’s reflections on the search for objective reality, Princeton University Press
Putnam Hilary (2005), “A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics (Again)*”, Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 56 (2005), 615–634
Terhesiu Dalia and Vacariu Gabriel (2002), “Brain, mind and the perspective of the observer”, Revue Roumanie de Philosophie, 46, no.1-2
Toader Iulian and Vacariu Gabriel (1999), “Inquiries on Carnap’s Aufbau (II)”, Revue Roumaine de Philosophie, no. 42-43, Romanian Academy (ISI)
Toader Iulian and Vacariu Gabriel (1997), “Inquiries on Carnap’s Aufbau (I)”, Revue Roumaine de Philosophie, no. 3-4, Romanian Academy (ISI)
Vacariu Gabriel (September 2023), Quantum mechanics versus Epistemologically Different Worlds, Editura Revista Timpul https://editurarevisteitimpul.ro/p/quantum-mechanics-versus-epistemologically-different-worlds/?fbclid=IwAR20abFcSLPstDUgeLk_Eo9kYSbcKcr6_UHQLnr3LhZM_29fdGNUQax8hUc
Vacariu Gabriel (2023), Hypermetaphysics, Amazon https://kdp.amazon.com/en_US/bookshelf?publishedId=AH8YWJEB6F0T2
Vacariu Gabriel (2022b), “Epistemologically Different Worlds (EDWs) versus “nothing”,       Big Bang, anti-matter, dark matter/energy, spacetime”, Timpul journal
Vacariu Gabriel (2016) Illusions of Human Thinking: on Concepts of Mind, Reality, and Universe in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Physics (English         and Germany), Springer Publishing Company (This book has been published in Romanian in 2014: Lumi epistemologic diferite – Noua Paradigma de Gandire (in engl.: Epistemologically Different Worlds – The New Paradigm of Thinking),       Editura Datagroup
Vacariu Gabriel (2014), More Troubles with Cognitive Neuroscience. Einstein’s Theory of Relativity and the Hyperverse, Editura Universitatii din Bucuresti
Vacariu Gabriel (2012), Cognitive neuroscience versus Epistemologically Different Worlds, Editura Universitatii din Bucuresti
Vacariu Gabriel (2011), Being and the Hyperverse, Editura Universitatii din Bucuresti
Vacariu Gabriel (2008), Epistemologically Different Worlds, (in English) Editura Universitatii din Bucuresti
Vacariu Gabriel (2007), Epistemologically Different Worlds (Ph.D. thesis) (EIPRS and UIPA scholarships). The thesis was submitted at Graduate Centre, UNSW on 06.09.2007 and posted on the internet by the staff of University of New South Wales (Sydney, Australia) on 21.09.2007 and then on 29.04.2008 at https://www.unsworks.unsw.edu.au/primo-             explore/fulldisplay?vid=UNSWORKS&docid=unsworks_5143&context=L
Vacariu Gabriel (2006), “The epistemologically different worlds perspective and some pseudo-notions from quantum mechanics”, Analele Universitatii Bucuresti
Vacariu Gabriel (2005), “Mind, brain and epistemologically different worlds”, Synthese             Review: 143/3: pp. 515-548
Vacariu Gabriel and Terhesiu Dalia (2002), “Brain, mind and the role of the observer”, in Philosophy of Consciousness and Cognitive Science, Angela Botez and Bogdan Popescu (Eds.), Bucharest, Cartea Romaneasca
Vacariu Gabriel and Toader Iulian (1998), “Color similarity in Carnap’s Aufbau”, Krisis, vol. 6
Vacariu Gabriel and Vacariu Mihai (2022), “A New Philosophical Paradigm of Thinking for Particular Sciences: Physics, Cognitive Neuroscience, and             Biology” in Thinking: Bioengineering of Science and Art (Nima Rezeai and Amene Saghazadeh, editors), Springer Nature Switzerland AG
Vacariu Gabriel and Vacariu Mihai (2020) “Rethinking ‘dark matter’ within             the epistemologically             different worlds (EDWs) perspective”, in Cosmology 2020    – The Current State, (ed.) Michael Smith (CEO, IntechOpen, United Kingdom)
https://www.intechopen.com/search?term=cosmology%202020
Vacariu Gabriel and Vacariu Mihai (2019), The Metaphysics of EDWs, Datagroup-Int
Vacariu Gabriel and Vacariu Mihai (2017), From Hypernothing to Hyperverse: EDWs, Hypernothing, Wave and Particle, Elementary Particles, Thermodynamics, and Einstein’s Relativity Without “Spacetime”, Datagroup-Int
Vacariu Gabriel and Vacariu Mihai (2016), Dark matter and Dark Energy, Space and Time, and Other pseudo-notions in Cosmology, Datagroup-Int, S.R.L.
Vacariu Gabriel and Vacariu Mihai (2015), Is cognitive neuroscience a pseudo-science?, Datagroup-Int.
Vacariu Gabriel and Vacariu Mihai (2013), “Troubles with cognitive neuroscience“, Philosophia Scientiae 17/2 (France) (ERIH)
Vacariu Gabriel and Vacariu Mihai (2010), Mind, Life and Matter in the Hyperverse, (in English) Editura Universitatii din Bucuresti
Weinert Friedel (2009), “Einstein, science and philosophy”, Philosophia Scientiæ 13-1, Varia

[1] The first motto, Einstein’s opinion about mathematics and reality is perfectly correct. From my book 2023, Hypermetaphysics: “Feynman: ‘Physics is to math what sex is to masturbation.’ ‘Philosophy of science is about as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds.’ (Feynman in Singh 2005, p. 398) Better: ‘System of philosophy’ is to ‘philosophy of language’ what sex is to masturbation; ‘system of philosophy’ is to ‘ethics’ what sex is to impotence. In front of great theoretical development in physics, philosophers started to ‘inquire language’ (at toilet) (i.e. ‘philosophy of language’). Later, because of great debates in quantum mechanics (physics, in general) and the apparition of cognitive (neuro)science, philosophers deal with total abstract notions in ‘Ethics’ since they were being unable to understand essential notions from the most important particular sciences; those from ethics have no idea about sciences, therefore, they are impotent (in thinking, of course). Instead of dealing with what it really exist, the philosophers from ethics have been able to deal only with impotent notions like ‘good’ and ‘bad’.” (p. 26) I recall, morality has always been originated in religion! The priests (“Mafia-impotent thinkers”) and the moralists (“impotent thinkers”) have always been “hands in hands” to help the politicians=anal-phabets (always, 99,99% being Mafia=bastards).

[2] As we will see in this work, “world” is related to “space”/“spacetime” (geometry/mathematics) and “motion of physical entities” (physics). The dichotomies from the title are not directly related in the sense that the terms from the left are in the same group, the terms from the right are in an opposite group. In order to communicate, we human beings, we need to use words to create statements/sentences. Some sentences refer to certain ED entities which really exist; the majority of statements/sentences are just “wordswordswords”… (This work is part of my next book 2024.)

[3] From this title, except “mind” (a notion which refers to something which really is, an EW), all other notions are just “words, words, words”. The great problem in the history of human beings on this Earth has been that the words have always been transformed in swords, swords, swords… All the great wars and some “terrorism attacks” (see “9/11” or some actual “terrorism attacks”) have been manipulations of masses under the umbrella of “God” by some “hierarchical gangbangs” (some groups of “cannibals”, similar to “Ceausescu-4-classes”, nothing else)…

[4] Many ideas from this work can be found in my previous works (2002, 2003, 2005, 2007, etc.) However, there are some new and very important ideas that appear in this works. Therefore, this work will force many “professors” to plagiarize these new ideas from this work; in few months, there will be tens of “professors” that will publish the same ideas in their journals… I do not care, anyway, the names of thieves have never remained in the history of great ideas of human thinking. In this history will remain the title “Vacariu’s Dark list”, but no name from this list (there are tens of thousands…)

[5] “God is always invented to explain those things that you do not yet understand.” (Feynman) For adopting God in their works, see Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Newton and many others… In the last century, God has been replaced with “nothing”, at least in physics (regarding the origin of “universe”, for instance) but the very contemporary slogan in physics: “Everything has appeared from nothing” is the greatest ontological contradiction with Parmenides’ slogan: “From nothing, nothing can appear.” I agree with Parmenides’ slogan and I have rejected the first slogan with my EDWs perspective. I have solved this problem in my previous works. In this work, I furnish new essential details about this and other ontological contradictions; in fact, the pseudo-dichotomies from my title have produced strong ontological contradiction during the entire history of human thinking (sciences and philosophy).

[6] “God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?” (Nietzsche) According my discovery, the EDWs, the mind is an EW which exists only in itself and for itself. What do you want something greater than this position since even “God” had existed (for all religions/churches) within our world, not outside of it. “God outside our world” would be a statement totally against any priest/governance and it would be an ontological contradiction: how God created the world if he does not exist for the world created by him?

[7] “Few classical physicists had questioned Newton’s reasoning, with the notable exception of Gottfried W. Leibniz, Ernst Mach and James Maxwell. So these notions had become part and parcel of classical physics. They had congealed to philosophical presuppositions, to thought necessities, to unquestioned assumptions. The Special theory arrived at a different result. Temporal and spatial measurements became relativized to particular reference frames. This was a necessary consequence of embracing the principle of relativity and taking the velocity of light as a fundamental postulate of the theory.” (Weinert 2009, p. 4) “The Special theory of relativity leads to a relativization of time to particular reference frames. Observers, attached to different reference frames, which are in relative uniform motion with respect to each other, will measure the flow of time differently.” (idem)

[8] A problem had been with biologists: if scientists and philosophers working within cognitive science and philosophy of mind had embraced the identity theory (the mind is the brain, i.e., only the brain/body exists a physical entity), not too many biologists had been totally reductionists in rejecting the existence of “life”… Nevertheless, nobody were able to define correctly life and its relationship to the organism. For me, life-organism is the same relationship as mind-brain, that is, mind=life and brain/body=organism.

[9] The same idea is available for the notion of “God” (see my previous works). It is not that God does not exist (or “it has been killed”); it is about the fact the conditions of the possibility for the existence of God are null.

[10] Michael Friedman (2009): “Einstein, Kant and relativized a priori” (from M. Bitbol et al. eds., Constituting Objectivity). The article written by Michael Friedman has been one of the best articles I have ever read in my career.

[11] Kant has no solution to the mind-brain problem. More exactly, he did not deal with this problem. So, his Critics of Pure Reason refers to the abilities of “human reasoning”, a kind of “functionalism” (like Fodor who accepts, at least, token identity – any mental state is a neuronal state – not type identity; type-token distinction a “linguistic” one). Kant did not even try to answer the mind-body problem; his approach had nothing to do with ontology.

[12] When I uses the notion, the “illusory spacetime”, it means I refer to a correspondence (no ontology) between ED entities which belong to the EDWs. For instance, the car moves on the street not through space (spacetime) (since it cannot even exist) but through “nothing” (no ontology) which corresponds to something material. In our case, the car is moving in nothing (we exclude the air from equation) which corresponds to the electromagnetic field (present everywhere in this “universe”). I recall, according to the special relativity, because the electromagnetic field is in motion with speed c, even the “illusory time” does not exist for that field (we uses the “illusory space” (no ontology) only in our explanation).

[13] “The visible spectrum is the band of the electromagnetic spectrum that is visible to the human eyeElectromagnetic radiation in this range of wavelengths is called visible light (or simply light). The optical spectrum is sometimes considered to be the same as the visible spectrum, but some authors define the term more broadly, to include the ultraviolet and infrared parts of the electromagnetic spectrum as well. A typical human eye will respond to wavelengths from about 380 to about 750 nanometers.[2] In terms of frequency, this corresponds to a band in the vicinity of 400–790 terahertz. These boundaries are not sharply defined and may vary per individual.[3] Under optimal conditions these limits of human perception can extend to 310 nm (ultraviolet) and 1100 nm (near infrared).” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visible_spectrum) This is a mistake: we do not see the light of a bulb, we perceive the bulb having the red color, but we do not perceive the light (waves or photons) “emitted” by that bulb. We see only the bulb and the Sun as macro-entities but not as electromagnetic fields (radiation) or photons. Why? Because the eyes, brain, body (macro-entities) can interact only with the macro-objects. This is the reason we perceive the bulb (a macro-entity) but not the light “emitted” by that macro-object, the bulb. (In fact, it is not the bulb which emits light: is a concentration of the electromagnetic field which emits electromagnetic waves and it is a huge amalgam of photons which emit photons. The “visible spectrum” corresponds to the wavelengths of light which interact with the concentration of electromagnetic field which correspond to the macro-objects. This is the reason, we perceive the green car: only certain electromagnetic waves (with certain wavelengths and frequencies) interact with that “car” (i.e., interact with the concentration of the electromagnetic field which corresponds to that car, a macro-object which does not exist for any electromagnetic wave).

[14] The problem with this concentration of the electromagnetic field would be that this field has no boundaries; it is spreads (having less and less concentration) to the entire “universe”, but there is no identity of this concentration (which would correspond to my brain/body) in comparison with the concentration of the same electromagnetic field which correspond to another person, for instance, to one “professor” who have plagiarized my ideas. Since all the human persons are the same electromagnetic field spreads in the entire “universe”, one human person cannot plagiarize the idea of another human person, since there are no distinction between any two human persons at all. The THIEVES are save by the radical reductionists; the problem would be, these radical reductionists would not exist, according to their radical reductionist approach… so, their radical reductionist approach (involving certain strong ontological contradictions) is a pseudo-approach.

[15] The “visual depth” of visual perception does not even exist, it is just an “illusion” exactly as “space” has been an illusion for the human thinking in general so many millenniums… There is no 1D or 2D visual perception, there are no images reverse on retina (a very wrong idea, anyway…). Retina has only three kinds of cells for reactions to different wavelengths of light but those cells do not have different colors than the cells of the human body. Moreover, those cells do not even exist for light (electromagnetic waves/field or photons).

[16] Against such stupid idea (supported by people who realized real crimes on animals a few decades ago for manipulating academic mass-media!), the mental images in the brain, see our previous works… (A strong manipulation was the experiment with a monkey who was seeing a white circle on a black table. The scientist who realized the crime argued that inside the monkey’s brain (occipital lobe) was a circle. Some people from academic environment really believed this manipulation; other professors asked that person if the monkey see an intersection (full of running cars having very different colors) in New York, we would see a picture/movie of that intersection inside the monkey’s brain? Everybody agreed (including the person who realized the crime), we would not see such movies inside the monkeys brain. Therefore, the experiment with that monkey was, indeed, just a crime. “(or maybe, for the salvation of a monkey, it was not any experiment with a monkey… Did any other person repeat a similar experiment?).

[17] We cannot claim that the mind is somewhere within the field-EW where light is. With this supposition, we can apparently solved the problem of colors, but the electromagnetic field is something continuously in the entire “cosmos”, so, my mind would be spread in the entire “universe”. Very stupid idea… We can only claim that any mind (an EW) corresponds to the electromagnetic field and maybe because of this correspondence, there are colors in my mind. But how then we solve the people of not seeing colors but only “white and black” or “gray”? But white, black and gray are also colors! Is missing for them something which would interact with light? But light does not exist for the brain/mind…

[18] In reality, all the sensorial-perceptual mechanics are strongly related to the brain, these mechanics are less active when a human body sleep, but we cannot say these mechanics are not active… These parts of the body exist as entities which are in continuously interactions from their viewpoint. If my body interacts with a chair, the parts of the body does not exist for the chair. Moreover, the parts of the body does not exist for the mind. A finger is not something different than my body, the finger is “part” of my body; more precisely, any finger and all the other “parts” of my body are the body (an entity which has a unity for the corresponding mind-EW). From my viewpoint, the online-offline cognition is a pseudo-notion: the “online cognition” (wrong expression) would be the interactions between the brain, body and external environment; the “off-line cognition” (wrong expression) would be the mind-EW.

[19] Contrary to the computationalism, according to the dynamical system approach, there is no distinction between the brain, the body and the external environment. (see my previous works)

[20] The eliminative materialists do not investigate the relationship between electromagnetic waves and microparticles.

[21] A real, particular truth: tens of thousands of people have plagiarized my ideas because my discovery of the EDWs has been the greatest discovery until now in the history of human thinking. With my EDWs, I have solved all the GREATEST problems of particular sciences (physics, cognitive neuroscience and biology) and philosophy.

[22] “The Watt’s governor” (see below) does not exist as an entity (having its identity) for those two metallic balls (for instance, which are parts of the “mechanism”). It would be an ontological contradiction to accept this idea. However, the Watt’s governor exists as an entity in its interaction with that gas. If we stop the emission of the gas, the Watt’s governor still exists as an entity (from its interaction with external environment).

[23] About these two thresholds, see my work 2007 or 2008 and later.

[24] This functional identity is related to functionalism but also to the above “function”.

[25] For a planet in a galaxy, the galaxy does not exist; the galaxy is an amalgam of planets for another planet which interacts with that “galaxy”. However, for the second galaxy (the closest to the first galaxy, for instance), the first galaxy is an entity because both galaxies interact as two different individual entities (each having its identity in relationship to the other galaxy). This is the dark matter. (about this topic, see my previous works)

[26] “All observed elementary particles are either bosons (with integer spin) or fermions (with odd half-integer spin).[8] Whereas the elementary particles that make up ordinary matter (leptons and quarks) are fermions, elementary bosons occupy a special role in particle physics. They act either as force carriers which give rise to forces between other particles, or in one case give rise to the phenomenon of mass.” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boson)

[27] Again, because of the “incommensurability” (not only of the scientific theories, much more) of the philosophical approaches, it is much difficult to insert a philosopher in one “catalog” or another…

[28] “The usefulness of the cup is its emptiness.” (Bruce Lee) https://www.reddit.com/r/selfimprovement/comments/65vlvh/the_usefulness_of_the_cup_is_its_emptiness_bruce/?rdt=40012

[29] Obviously, we need to change our language/words (it does not mean what language is, English or Romanian); more exactly, we need to re-write our language. The beginning has been already done by me in writing so many books/articles until now. Nevertheless, other philosophers, scientists and linguistics have to work to improve our new vocabulary given by the EDWs perspective.

[30] Exactly as the microparticles of light (photons) were necessary to exist for the photoelectric effect (Einstein 1905) (a physical phenomenon which could not be explained through considering the light just being only an electromagnetic wave), we need to accept the existence of the stone and the Earth as macro-entities having their masses for explaining their interactions. However, this acceptance is not just a pragmatic or linguistic “convention” since the stone would fall on the Earth without any human observer and the Earth has been rotating around the Sun for the last four billions years. Only the “impotent” philosophers (“impotent” in understanding the scientific theories from physics (for instance) and in passing beyond these theories) have thought the “only game in town being language”…

[31] I published my idea about the correspondence between the energy and the mass long time ago… https://www.discovermagazine.com/the-sciences/e-mc2-what-does-einsteins-most-famous-equation-mean?utm_campaign=organicsocial&utm_content=%F0%9F%97%84%EF%B8%8Ffrom_the_archive%3A_%F0%9F%8C%9F_unl&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook&fbclid=IwAR1bbaDMhE8NBZyA9kqlBEF8c69q65ZG1R_ItkZk_T-FNCD2SEWdFSTGIm8

[32] The same is available for the Sun as an electromagnetic field and the Earth as an electromagnetic field, even if here the individuals are much more complicated since the electromagnetic field is the same in the entire “Cosmos”, so the Sun and the Earth are just concentrations of this continuous electromagnetic field. So, it would be quite difficult to talk about the identities of the Sun and the Earth as different concentrations of the electromagnetic field since it is the same electromagnetic field in the entire Cosmos…

[33] The first principle for the identity of an entity is given by its interactions with the entities from the same EW.

[34] An apple is more than 50% water. Then does the apple exist as an entity? Yes, it exists in relationship to the Earth. The water of that apple exists for other elements which form the apple. Moreover, let us think at the day/period when a very little apple has started to appear in a tree: it is quite difficult to identify the apple in that tree; the apple is part of the tree. Later, after two months, the apple has become a “mature” apple, but it has been part of the tree. We cannot claim that the apple is an entity separated by the tree. Later, the apple falls on the soil. In that moment, the apple is a separate entity than the tree.

[35] I would like to thanks to Prof. Ilie Parvu for drawing my attention for this aspect.

[36] Recall the connectionism’s strike (“rethinking innateness”) against Fodor’s (computationalism) “innate” knowledge. (see my works). Anyway, the distinction “innate-acquired knowledge” is one of the most important pseudo-distinction in the history of human thinking. (I have a twin-brother and I tell you, there are no innate concepts or ideas…)

[37] It is know that, in general, women can perceive more “nuances of colors” than men. This difference is between any two persons, anyway. However, a cat has been grown in a particular environment (only with horizontal lines) for the first period of its life; later the cat was not able to see the vertical lines… Probably the same result would be for perceiving colors or nuances of colors (recall that “Mary thought-experiment” who have been living her first years in a room only with white and black colors). Therefore, I consider the innate-acquired distinction a pseudo-distinction. I have a twin brother and there is a great difference between his knowledge and my knowledge (ideas, concepts, etc.). However, in general, my brother and I perceive the “same colors”.

[38] The a priori-a posteriori distinction is not a very useful one for scientists since the physicists, for instance, do not really care about this distinction in elaborating their applied, empirical theories. (The super-string theory is an invented theory with impossible applications; against this theory see my previous works)

[39] This is the reason, Kant refers to pure elements of reason and not mind… In reality, Kant has nothing to do with the mind-brain problem. His approach is a kind of functionalism one, it has nothing to do with ontology.

[40] We recall Descartes did not write about “space”, but only about “extension”: the human brain/body has extension, the human mind, since it is immaterial, could not have any “extension”.

[41] About previous Friedman’s works, see Vacariu 2008 (6.8) or Vacariu 2016.

[42] “In classical physics and special relativity, an inertial frame of reference (also called inertial space, or Galilean reference frame) is a frame of reference not undergoing any acceleration. It is a frame in which an isolated physical object—an object with zero net force acting on it—is perceived to move with a constant velocity or, equivalently, it is a frame of reference in which Newton’s first law of motion holds. All inertial frames are in a state of constant, rectilinear motion with respect to one another; in other words, an accelerometer moving with any of them would detect zero acceleration.” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inertial_frame_of_reference)  We have to understand that the inertial frames of reference involves constant velocity and rectilinear motion (the special relativity).

[43] We recall, for Kant, space (geometry) and motion (physics) are strong related through the relationship between the sensibility (pure intuition of space/geometry) and the understanding (categories/physics); together these elements represent the transcendental apperception (an abstract, “functional” notion within Kant’s transcendental idealism).

[44] “As Einstein realized, when the foundations of science become problematic, the man of science becomes a philosopher. [Einstein 1936, § 1]… As Einstein realized himself, science makes philosophical presuppositions. The scientist needs philosophical ideas, simply because amongst the experimental and mathematical tools in the toolbox of the scientist there are conceptual tools, like the fundamental notions.” (Weinert 2009, p. 17)

[45] About Einstein as “physicist-philosopher”, Reichenbach believes that “evolution of philosophical ideas is guided by the evolution of physical theories”. (Reichenbach 1949, 301” in Weinert, p. 18)

[46] “Rather than speaking of space-time, as Minkowski did, Einstein often prefers the expression, ‘time-space’. [Einstein & Infeld 1938, 199–208] [Einstein 1922a, 29] And he points out that time and space do not have the same status in Minkowski’s four-dimensional world.” (Weinert, p. 4) Weinert mentions that Einstein adopts a “relational view” for spacetime. (idem) For instance, in the general relativity, the spatial-temporal frames depend on the gravitational field. (idem, p. 5) However, this relational view is against the irreversible entropic physical processes (thermodynamics). (idem) Weinert emphasizes that the “entropy” is a “statistical principle” (therefore, not an ontological one). “Although Einstein endorsed, from time to time, the unreality of time, his whole theory of time-space is relational. It points towards a philosophy of becoming since physical time is constituted by the asymmetric, invariant order of physical events in space-time.” (idem, p. 7)

[47] “‘A priori’ and ‘a posteriori’ refer primarily to how, or on what basis, a proposition might be known. In general terms, a proposition is knowable a priori if it is knowable independently of experience, while a proposition knowable a posteriori is knowable on the basis of experience.” https://iep.utm.edu/apriori/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CA%20priori%E2%80%9D%20and%20%E2%80%9Ca%20posteriori%E2%80%9D%20refer%20primarily%20to,on%20the%20basis%20of%20experience.

[48] “The main difference between rationalism and empiricism is that rationalism is the knowledge that is derived from reason and logic while on the other hand empiricism is the knowledge that is derived from experience and experimentation.” (https://byjus.com/free-ias-prep/rationalism-vs-empiricism/#:~:text=Definition-,Rationalism%20is%20the%20term%20used%20in%20philosophy%20to%20refer%20to,derived%20from%20reason%20and%20logic.&text=Rationalists%20believe%20that%20reason%20can,through%20experimentation%20can%20explain%20reality.

[49] “Einstein generalizes the Galilean relativity principle to include electro-magnetic phenomena; he postulates the velocity of light in vacuum as an upper speed limit on all phenomena. He uses the Lorentz transformations for the calculation of spatial and temporal measurements in the transition from one reference frame to another.” (Weinert, p. 1) Einstein needs to take into account Lorentz transformations because of, among other phenomena, the constancy of the speed of light (an empirical fact rises to a postulate by him). “The problem situation is the kinematics of reference

frames, given the results of classical mechanics and electromagnetism. Historically, his first concern was the notion of time. When the Special theory of relativity was generalized to the General theory, his second philosophical worry became the notion of space—or more precisely space-time, for Einstein had accepted Minkowski’s four-dimensional representation of the relativity theory.” (idem, p. 2) Nevertheless, both space and time (or spacetime) are human mind creations since the ontology of spacetime would create strong ontological contradictions with the existence of the electromagnetic field in the same place at the same time. (see above)

[50] I recall, when Einstein became older, he rejected the “existence of time”, but not the “existence of space”…

[51] Newton did not have a definition for the “gravitational force” (even if he introduced a mathematical formula for “gravitation”). Moreover, the transmission of “gravitational force” was an instant fact (action-at-distance). Contrary to this idea it was Maxwell’s principle regarding the limited speed of light, c, being the greatest speed which can be reached by any physical entity/process. Therefore, Einstein needs to replace Newton’s “gravitational force” with “curved spacetime” (transmission of curvature in spacetime having the speed of light, no more). In my previous works, I indicated that “spacetime” could not have any ontological status and I replaced curved spacetime with “nothing” among macro-objects (the macro-EW) which corresponded to “curved electromagnetic field” (the field-EW). So, the gravitational force for the macro-objects (for instance) from the macro-EW is given by the curvature of the corresponding electromagnetic field from the field-EW.

[52] I am not the first thinker who deny the existence of spacetime (see, for instance, Leibniz). However, my argument in rejecting the ontology of any “spacetime” is totally new constructed within my EDWs perspective. I furnished arguments which indicated that “spacetime” could not have any ontology.

[53] I have to recall that certain strong debates among the interpretations of Quantum Mechanics have been during the last century until I discovered the EDWs; there were strong debated about the ontological or epistemological status of microparticles and electromagnetic waves and their relationships. As I indicated in my early works (2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, etc.), all the great problems of QM have been solved by introducing the EDWs: the waves and the particles belong to the EDWs, no more. (I recall, many “physicists”, “cognitive scientists” and “philosophers” have plagiarized my ideas since I have solved all the great problems of physics, cognitive neuroscience and philosophy.)

[54] I have always considered “mathematics” just a “tool” in helping the scientists to construct predictions with their theories, no more. The nature (i.e., my EDWs) “does not know any mathematics”.

[55] As I emphasized in the past, the micro-EW and the macro-EW do not have any ontological status; there are just labels/concepts. However, the micro-entities and the macro-entities really exist but in these “EDWs”.

[56] I repeat: as I indicated in my previous works (2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, etc.), all the interpretations of quantum mechanics have been totally wrong since all have been constructed within the wrong framework, the unicorn world. (see my book 2023, Quantum mechanics versus Epistemologically Different Worlds, and many other previous works on this topic)

[57] I consider the difference between “development-by-accumulation” and “discontinuity/ incommensurability” as being an “artificial distinction”. Any “incommensurability change” presupposes “accumulation” and/or “rejection” of certain previous knowledge. I have realized a “revolutionary change” by discovering the EDWs and rejecting the identity theory (which had produced many “anomalies” in the past). I reject the idea of a “continuity” in my discovery of the EDWs with other theories/approaches. Almost paradoxically, without knowing and rejecting the “identity theory” and the “Cartesian dualism” regarding the mind-body problem, obviously, it would have been difficult for me to discover the EDWs.

[58] My opinion is that the “universal grammar” is not innate; there are neither “innate ideas”, nor “innate concepts”. However, the body (brain) is innate and parts of the brain are necessary for acquiring any language. The distinction between innate-acquired is a pseudo-distinction which has dominated philosophy and cognitive science in the last 2,500 years.

[59] Weinert mentions that Schrödinger’s equation even if it is a differential equation for an electromagnetic wave, it involves an abstract Hilbert space.  (Weinert, p. 8) As I emphasized in my previous works, this “abstract Hilbert space” was necessary for Schrödinger to grasp both state of “dead cat” and “living cat”. In reality, the physicists working on quantum mechanics have been obliged to explain the relationship between an electromagnetic wave and a microparticle. From my viewpoint, there are at least three EDWs in Schrödinger’s thought experiment: macro-EW, micro-EW and field-EW and Schrödinger’s cat is either live or dead, but not both.

[60] “Quantum mechanics was Einstein’s bête noire. His opposition never faltered. Today it is generally regarded as untenable. Quantum systems manifest degrees of entanglement over large distances. Einstein’s ‘spooky action-at-a distance’ is a laboratory reality.” (Weinert, p. 9) With my EDWs perspective, Einstein was “closer to truth” then all the physicists working on quantum mechanics from his time until 2005.

[61] “Einstein holds that the interplay of specific constraints —like covariance, invariance, relativity—creates a fit of the theory or model with the evidence extracted from the external world. Any modification, he holds, would destroy the coherence of the theory of relativity. [Einstein 1918b; 1919; 1933] This provides a clue to a solution of the puzzle of how theories manage to represent the world. A theory ‘represents’ a section of the empirical world, if it satisfies a certain number of constraints.” (Weinert, p. 10) “The empirical facts comprise Einstein famous predictions: the red shift of light as a function of gravitational field strengths and the bending of light rays in the vicinity of strong gravitational fields. He also explains the perihelion advance of Mercury and other planets.” (Weinert, p. 11)

[62] “Einstein, in fact, rejected naïve realism. [Einstein 1944, 280–1] Due to the need for approximations and idealizations there will always be theoretical structure, for which there is no direct empirical evidence. For instance, the evidence does not tell us whether space-time exists, devoid of all matter. But Einstein holds that one theory always satisfies the constraints better than its rivals.” (Weinert, p. 13) “From the point of view of Einstein’s problem situation, his philosophical attitude was characterized during his lifetime as a form of critical realism.” (p. 14) I consider my position as being also a kind of “critical realism”.

[63] “The laws of physics must retain their form (remain covariant) under the substitution of coordinate systems through all transformations. [Norton 1989; 1993] What remains invariant is to be regarded as the physically real. 44 More specifically Einstein advanced his ‘point-coincidence argument’. Einstein explicitly claims that the laws of physics are statements about space-time coincidences.” (Weinert, p. 16) Working on structural realism, Weinert emphasizes the “forms” of the physical laws. The problem is any “form” is an empty word. Weinert is aware that nobody has observed any space or time (or spacetime), but he talks about the “structure of spacetime” (another empty word). Related to this idea, see Putnam’s idea from last paragraph of his article 2005 suggesting an “absolute time”: “So, what relieves my initial distress at the idea of an absolute time coming back into the picture is the following thought: it might not be quite as bad a contradiction of Einstein’s vision as it first seems. It might be that, before we ‘superimpose’, each space-time is perfectly Einsteinian—each space-time is a Minkowski space-time which knows nothing about any ‘simultaneity’. And it may be that the time parameter that both GRW and Bohm need is just the absolute time parameter that quantum cosmology seems to need. Of course, this is just a speculation. But it would mean that, although Einstein would have to admit that there is such a thing as simultaneity, it comes from ‘outside’ any one well-defined space-time, it comes from the quantum mechanical ‘interference’ between whole space-times. And with this speculative suggestion, I will close.” (Putnam 2005, p. 632)

[64] “Einstein’s work has shown that there is a genuine interaction between science and philosophy. Every true theorist is a ‘tamed metaphysicist’. [Einstein 1936 17; 1950b, 342] We have seen how Einstein’s physical problem situation lead to philosophical consequences. A consideration of Einstein’s career as a physicist-philosopher illustrates Reichenbach’s observation that the ‘evolution of philosophical ideas is guided by the evolution of physical theories’. [Reichenbach 1949, 301]” (Weinert, p. 18) Indeed, a great scientific theory is always a philosophical perspective; also, a great philosophical approach has to be constructed based on the scientific theories and scientific data from that period.

[65] See also Fodor’s article “Special science” in 1974 promoting exactly the same idea.

[66] It is known that the elliptical trajectory of the Earth around the Sun has been in a continuous change, but these changes are in very small quantities, therefore, the “gravity” would be “the same” during millions/billions of years. The scientific laws are the same even if some of their parameters have been changed in an “interval of similarity”. (About the interval of similarity, see my previous works)

[67] Recall Einstein’s reply to Bohr (and the physicists from Copenhagen school): “I don’t believe that bed is spread in the entire the room as billions of particles and when I open the door, the microparticles run into the corner and I see the bed”.

[68] “Words, words, words” are also “swords, swords, swords”: if a philosopher like Wittgenstein or Carnap believes everything is “words”, then he does not believe swords really exist (swords are just words, nothing else). Then, an enemy can send an atomic bomb near the house of Wittgenstein or Carnap. Probably, these philosophers (all the philosophers al the last century) would not be very worry about that bomb coming toward their house (even if the secret services would inform them about this “fact”) since everything (including the bomb) is either “words, words, words” or “good or bad”. Everybody agrees that “words” are just words (mental states or neuronal activations) in our mind. Do “good” and “bad” have any ontology? No: a crime is not always something bad: killing a dictator is always “good”, since the lives of hundreds of thousands of people are saved. In fact, ethics and philosophy of language always deal only with concepts, “words, words, words”. A “philosopher” dealing with “words” is not a real philosopher since words (which refer to something having no ontology) are only masturbation or impotence. (I notice here the very important difference between “words” (no ontology) and “mathematical concepts” (having an ontology for Pythagoras, Plato and Gödel, etc., for instance)…)

[69] Against this “truth”, recall Gödel’s incompleteness theory…

[70] “If God made the world, I would not be that God, for the misery of the world would break my heart.” (Schopenhauer)

[71] See the title of Wittgenstein’s main work…

[72] Recall’s Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen’s attack on quantum mechanics: all the interpretations were “incomplete”…

[73] With my EDWs approach, in one of my previous works, I have completely rejected an important notion in cognitive (neuro)science: “spatial cognition”.

[74] Descartes did not make a clear distinction between the mind and the self, even if he believed these are two different notions: the self/the I has been composed from the mind (immaterial) and the brain/body (material). For him, the “self” refers to the mixture/interaction between the mind and the body. The problem was that he could not explain the “interactions” between these two ontological different substances, therefore, he could not explain the ontological status of self/the I. This was the main reason, he needed to introduce “God” in his equation.

[75] I avoid talking about the “meaning” of each word/statement since I have never worked under the umbrella of “philosophy of language”…

[76] Inspired from Cassirer’s logic-mathematical structures, in his Aufbau, Carnap considers that the “empirical science proceeds by progressively embedding natural phenomena in an ordered sequence of abstract relational structures as we successively articulate and refine mathematical representations of these phenomena in actual historical development of our theories.” (Friedman 2012) Obviously, “words, words, words”… no more.

[77] It would be meaningless to ask “What is it outside the human mind?” since any mind is an EW and any EW is in itself and for itself, nothing else is/exists for an EW.

[78] I mention here that any philosopher cannot be completely inserted in one group or the other. For instance, even if Aristotle rejects Plato’s ideas, he introduces his Aristotelian logic. Even if Kant supports Euclidean geometry, it is not about the external space (not about the thing-in-itself) but about the pure and empirical intuitions of space, nothing more.

[79]  “If I could be something elseI’d like to be a painter.” (Hemingway) “If I could be something else, I’d like to be a composer of classical music.” (Gabriel Vacariu) Nobody could not have stolen my music. I am the greatest thinker until now, this is the main reason so many people have PLAGIARIZED my ideas. My message for those who have plagiarized my ideas: “When you find yourself in a room surrounded by your enemies you should tell yourself ‘I am not locked in here with you, you are locked in here with me.’ This is the kind of mindset you should have if you want to succeed in life. Get rid of that victim mentality.” (Bruce Lee) I have been in the same boxing ring with thousands of “professors” (USA, Germany, Canada, Netherlands, etc.) who have plagiarized my ideas. I have won all these battles, they (thieves) have already become “losers” for their colleagues since every specialist (physics, cognitive neuroscience, philosophy) knows they (those from my Dark list and other tens of thousands of people) have just plagiarized my ideas from my EDWs perspective.

[80] Many people are organized in gangbangs groups of thieves and bastards; the great majority of people (the masses) are just “empty peoples”. Nevertheless, because of my EDWs perspective, all the living actual people (dominated by envy, a feature imposed by the evolution of species) have been “living in vain” because all of them have been working within the unicorn world until 2006. After 2006, they do not even exist.

[81] About the “whole truth”, see the title of Peebles’s book 2022: he adopts a pragmatic view about “truth” and considers that any theory from physics is a social construct. Pragmatism means “words, words, words”, nothing else. So, we can consider, the person who wrote that book (about “the truth, ‘the whole truth’ and nothing but the truth”, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2004/04/how-the-courtroom-got-its-oath.html) as being just a social construct, can’t we, Mr. Peebles? But in your book, you claim you accept the fact that your body is placed on a chair. Words or a contradiction with your pragmatism? (More details about Peebles’ book in my book 2024)

[82] “Do not correct a fool or he will hate you; correct a wise man, and he will appreciate you.” (Bruce Lee) The imperialists are fool and bastards (this is the reason they are “imperialists”. I have made a huge scandal with my dark list (those who have plagiarized my ideas, many of them being “imperialists”) at the entire international level. Almost everybody in this world knows about my EDWs, but nobody quote my name. Why? Because the “imperialists” have interdicted my name. Why? Because many of them are in my dark list! I do not care about their authorities; I do not care about their artificial “celebrity”. They do not even exist. I have already lived the eternity here on Earth during the last 20 years. Anyway, the imperialists have lost the battle with me: they do not even exist, while I am the eternity. This is the difference between them (imperialists) and me (eternity). Just this. If Heraclitus invited some people to come in his frozen house telling them “Enter, enter, there are also gods here”, I tell to the “imperialists”: “It is forbidden for all of you to enter here since I am Deus. Here, in Paradise, I am together with da Vinci, Brancusi, Dostoevsky, Beethoven and a few others, no more. The Paradise does not even exist for you, the imperialists, only the Inferno exist for all of you, plagiarists and ignorant people.” The imperialists (international level) have closed my email addresses, my Facebook page, they totally control my new Facebook (INCREDIBLE: on some Facebook pages, I can post some messages, but I cannot post my “standard message”!) and new email address, my Internet (!!), they have created me so many problems… I have had the worst promotion at my department, other little, non-existent devils (national level) cut some of my lectures and my course on Tarkovsky (for actual “boss” of our department, too many students participated to my course last year)… All these devils/thieves have lost the battle with me! In reality, they do not even exist, they have lived in vain. Tens of millions of people know about my discovery the EDWs… the imperialists, you can kill a person, you can kill me; however, you cannot kill an idea, i.e., you cannot steal MY IDEA, the EDWs. “Let the future tell the truth, and evaluate each one according to his work and accomplishments. The present is theirs; the future, for which I have really worked, is mine.” (Tesla) When you are the greatest, every human being (on this Earth) hates you (more or less) because “envy” is the most important feature of any human mind (a feature imposed by the species evolution). “I don’t want to go outside. There are people there.”

https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=769160921921977&set=a.484395370398535

“Difficulty is what wakes up the genius.” (Nassim Nicholas Taleb) See my DARK list on Internet…. “Gabriel Vacariu with your groundbreaking work you’ve completely changed science and philosophy, and yet somehow you are cruelly overlooked when great scientists and philosophers are discussed. I’m sure it’s just a matter of time, Gabriel. Those thousands of plagiarists will be brought to justice, and you’ll be recognized as the Titan of the modern age that you are.” (Damian Keen 2023)

Publicat în Filosofie, IdeiRecomandat0 recomandări

Răspunsuri

Adresa ta de email nu va fi publicată. Câmpurile obligatorii sunt marcate cu *